The Development of the Legal Principles on Assignor Estoppel Doctrine in the U.S. Patent Law - Focused on the Supreme Court’s Minerva Decision -

2021 ◽  
Vol 69 ◽  
pp. 149-219
Author(s):  
Joo-Hwan Lee ◽  
Keyword(s):  
2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 675-694
Author(s):  
David E. Graham

Much has been written over the past several years regarding the increased U.S. employment of UAVs as a weapon system against both combatants on a battlefield and terrorists far removed from an active zone of military operations. As an element of this dialogue, there has occurred a growing discussion as to whether, given what some view as the appearance of new threats to national security—existing in the form of al-Qaeda and similar terrorist organizations—there is now a need for enhanced clarity and transparency concerning the legal principles applicable to when, where, and how such systems might be used. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that, if, in fact, uncertainty exists as to the legal norms to be applied in the employment of UAVs against those who threaten U.S. security interests—it is an uncertainty of a U.S. self-inflicted nature. In truth, the old law, i.e., currently existing codified and customary international legal principles, can quite sufficiently regulate the lawful use of these systems. Any confusion surrounding this subject is, in reality, due to the consistently self-serving and highly questionable manner in which the U.S. government has both interpreted and applied these norms. Before turning to a discussion of the relevant legal issues, however, it would be helpful to briefly examine the basic nomenclature of commonly U.S.-deployed UAVs.


Author(s):  
Justine Pila ◽  
Paul L.C. Torremans

This chapter considers the subject matter for which European patents may validly be granted under the European Patent Convention (EPC), and the substantive European (EPC and EU) legal principles governing their identification and conception. To this end it discusses the two-fold role of the requirement for an invention in European patent law: first, as a means of filtering protectable from non-protectable subject matter; and second, as a means of denoting the object of patent protection, i.e. that which must be new, inventive, susceptible of industrial application, and clearly and sufficiently defined and described in the patent specification, and that with reference to which the scope of the patent monopoly is defined under Article 69 EPC. It also discusses the range of public policy-based exclusions from European patentability, and their relation to the requirement for an invention itself.


2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Carrier

One of the most pressing issues in antitrust law involves “product hopping.” A brand-name pharmaceutical company switches from one version of a drug (say, capsule) to another (say, tablet). The concern with this conduct is that some of these switches offer only a trivial medical benefit but significantly impair generic competition.The antitrust analysis of product hopping is nuanced. In the U.S., it implicates the intersection of antitrust law, patent law, the Hatch-Waxman Act, and state drug product selection laws. In fact, the behavior is even more complex because it involves uniquely complicated markets characterized by buyers (insurance companies, patients) who are different from the decision-makers (physicians).This article introduces the relevant U.S. laws and regulatory frameworks before exploring the five litigated cases.


2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 269-278
Author(s):  
David A. Hurst

The U.S. & German Bench and Bar Gathering, “A New Bridge Across the Atlantic,” held in Washington, DC, in May 2012, was aptly timed to discuss the developments in German and American patent law. The Federal Circuit Bar Association and the Patentanwaltskammer (German Patent Lawyers Association) brought distinguished judges and attorneys from their respective countries to discuss the current state of the two patent systems. This involved consideration of where the two systems might be converging and why the two countries have had dissimilar litigation patterns. Particularly with respect to the latter of these inquiries, much of the debate throughout the conference focused on the differences in litigation discovery and procedural rules. The conference highlighted the fact that, at the most fundamental level, these differences are a product of differing perceptions of how justice should be administered. A brief overview comparing patent litigation in Germany and the United States will help frame this report.


2009 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 379-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee Ann Bambach

The figures of both Moses and Muhammad stand in the United States Supreme Court, included among the great lawgivers of history depicted in two friezes along the North and South walls of the Courtroom. Moses, who is seen carrying the Ten Commandments, is honored as the “prophet, lawgiver, and judge of the Israelites,” with the Supreme Court's tourist information sheet explaining that “Mosaic Law” is “based on the Torah, the first five books of the Old Testament.” Muhammad is described as the “Prophet of Islam” and carries both a sword and the Qur'an, the “primary source of Islamic law.”Yet the parallel depictions of these two prophets in the U.S. Supreme Court belie the very different respect that the laws they are associated with have received in the U.S. judicial system. Jewish law or legal principles are generally cited by courts with approval, often to add perceived moral and ethical authority to a court's decision. For example, in the U.S. Supreme Court's well-known Miranda v. Arizona decision, the Court declared that the privilege against self-incrimination was an ancient right, with analogues that could be found in the Bible, quoting the great medieval Jewish scholar Maimonides for support: “To sum up the matter, the principle that no man is to be declared guilty on his own admission is a divine decree.”


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