Product Hopping

2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Carrier

One of the most pressing issues in antitrust law involves “product hopping.” A brand-name pharmaceutical company switches from one version of a drug (say, capsule) to another (say, tablet). The concern with this conduct is that some of these switches offer only a trivial medical benefit but significantly impair generic competition.The antitrust analysis of product hopping is nuanced. In the U.S., it implicates the intersection of antitrust law, patent law, the Hatch-Waxman Act, and state drug product selection laws. In fact, the behavior is even more complex because it involves uniquely complicated markets characterized by buyers (insurance companies, patients) who are different from the decision-makers (physicians).This article introduces the relevant U.S. laws and regulatory frameworks before exploring the five litigated cases.

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 460-486
Author(s):  
Andre Fiebig ◽  
David Gerber

Abstract The recent appointments of Timothy Wu as Special Assistant to the U.S. President for Technology and Competition Policy and Lina Khan, a member of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, two prominent advocates for a fundamental shift in U.S. antitrust policy, and the introduction of federal and state legislation to change how antitrust is applied signal a realistic possibility of a fundamental change of direction in the course of U.S. antitrust. The shift advocated by these self-described “Brandeisians” goes beyond the reform proposals advocated by the Post-Chicago School movement. Whereas the Post-Chicago School movement, which was based primarily on industrial organization theory, advocated for change while recognizing the primacy of economic theory in the application of antitrust law, the Neo-Brandeisians argue that economic considerations should only be part of the substantive antitrust analysis and not necessarily the determinative factor. For many Europeans, and in particular Germans familiar with legal history, the ideas advanced by the Neo-Brandeisians will be familiar. Louis Brandeis, whose writings and opinions serve as the intellectual compass of the Neo-Brandeisians, was himself influenced by the Freirechtsbewegung and their skepticism of a wertfreie jurisprudence. Borrowing from post-modernist philosophy, the Neo-Brandeisians recognize that the dominant legal doctrines reflect the prevailing power structures in society. In their view, the fact that U.S. antitrust law relies heavily on economic theory does not allow it to claim value neutrality. The more radical members of this movement consequently argue that other values beyond economics should be considered in the application of U.S. antitrust law by the courts and antitrust agencies. In this article we attempt to introduce this movement to a European audience and assess its possible impact on the direction of U.S. antitrust.


Author(s):  
Jonathan M. Barnett

This chapter presents a history of the U.S. patent system based on quantitative and qualitative evidence relating to patentees’ expectations that courts will uphold the validity of contested patents, find infringement, and award injunctive relief against infringing parties. Additionally, this chapter describes historical changes in antitrust law that have impacted patentees’ ability to enter into licensing and other patent-dependent transactions. Based on these features of patent law and antitrust-related patent law, supplemented by background institutional developments, the history of the U.S. patent system during 1890–2006 consists of three periods: (i) a strong-patent, weak-antitrust period from 1890 through the mid-1930s; (ii) a weak-patent, strong-antitrust period from the late 1930s through the 1970s; and (iii) a strong-patent, weak-antitrust period from the early 1980s through 2006. Historical trends in the volume of patent applications by U.S. inventors are consistent with this division of U.S. patent history.


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-198
Author(s):  
Joseph R. Zakhary

In California Dental Association v. FTC, 119 S. Ct. 1604 (1999), the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that a nonprofit affiliation of dentists violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (1998), which prohibits unfair competition. The Court examined two issues: (1) the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) jurisdiction over the California Dental Association (CDA); and (2) the proper scope of antitrust analysis. The Court unanimously held that CDA was subject to FTC's jurisdiction, but split 5-4 in its finding that the district court's use of abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis was inappropriate.CDA is a voluntary, nonprofit association of local dental societies. It boasts approximately 19,000 members, who constitute roughly threequarters of the dentists practicing in California. Although a nonprofit, CDA includes for-profit subsidiaries that financially benefit CDA members. CDA gives its members access to insurance and business financing, and lobbies and litigates on their behalf. Members also benefit from CDA marketing and public relations campaigns.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (18) ◽  
pp. 153-180
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Jurczyk

The paper aims at showing the influence and the views espoused by economic theories and schools of economics on competition policy embedded in antitrust law and conducted by competition authorities in the field of vertical agreements. The scope of the paper demonstrates how substantially the economization of antitrust law has changed the assessment as to the harmfulness of vertical agreements. The analysis of economic aspects of vertical agreements in antitrust analysis allows one to reveal their pro-competitive effects and benefits, with the consumer being their beneficiary. The basic instrument of the said economization is that antitrust bodies draw on specific economic models and theories that can be employed in their practice. Within the scope of the paper, the author synthesizes the role and influence of those models and schools of economics on the application of competition law in the context of vertical agreements. In presenting, one after another, the theories and schools of economics which used to, or are still dealing with competition policy the author emphasises that in its nature this impact was more or less direct. Some of them remain at the level of general principals and axiology of competition policy, while others, in contrast, delineate concrete evaluation criteria and show how the application of those criteria changes the picture of anti-competitive practices; in other words, why vertical agreements, which in the past used to be considered to restrain competition, are no longer perceived as such. The paper presents the models and recommendations of neoclassical economics, the Harvard School, the Chicago and Post-Chicago School, the ordoliberal school, the Austrian and neoAustrian school as well as the transaction cost theory.


Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo

This chapter examines the indicators used by U.S. President Jimmy Carter and two key decision makers in his administration, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, to assess the intentions of the Soviet Union during the period 1977–1980. Using evidence from U.S. archives and interviews with former U.S. decision makers, it compares the predictions of the selective attention thesis, capabilities thesis, strategic military doctrine thesis, and behavior thesis. After discussing the U.S. decision makers’ stated beliefs about Soviet intentions, the chapter considers the reasoning they employed to justify their intentions assessments. It then describes the policies that individual decision makers advocated and those that the administration collectively adopted. It also explores whether decision makers advocated policies that were congruent with their stated beliefs about intentions and evaluate sthe impact of beliefs about intentions on U.S. foreign policy at the time.


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