scholarly journals Hypersonic Weapon as a New Challenge for the Anti-aircraft Defense Command and Control System

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 89-99
Author(s):  
Piotr Malinowski
Keyword(s):  
Command And Control ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Missile Defense ◽  
Air Defense ◽  
Level Of Automation ◽  
New Type ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Military ◽  
Command And Control System ◽  
Limited Scope

The intensification of the air threat resulting from the emergence of hypersonic weapons in the immediate vicinity of Poland has become a significant challenge for the Polish armed forces, including anti-aircraft defense. The capabilities of the new type of weapon determine not only the need to modernize and acquire systems designed to engage aerial targets, but also the command and control systems that control them. Due to the nature and the limited scope of the article, the deliberations presented in it are generalized results of a research on the scale of the threat posed by hypersonic weapons in the airspace and the need to modernize anti-aircraft defense command and control subsystems, which may be involved in combating them as part of the national air defense system. The presented conclusions also concern the problems of multiplying the current level of automation of the command and control  subsystem. This is related to the need for the effectiveness of the military decision-making process as well as uninterrupted and efficient cooperation with the national and allied elements of the air reconnaissance and air defense assets subsystems, including the components of missile defense, which is predestined to engage hypersonic weapons.   

The ROK-U.S. Combined Command and Control System and Crisis Management Procedures

2005 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-172
Author(s):  
Taeyoung Yoon
Keyword(s):  
Control System ◽  
Crisis Management ◽  
Management System ◽  
Command And Control ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Military Force ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Management Procedures ◽  
And Control ◽  
Command And Control System

This article seeks to examine the development of the ROK-U.S. combined command and control system and crisis management procedures in South Korea. In particular, it explores the four crises which occurred between 1968 and 1999 in order to identify its implications for the ROK-U.S. combined crisis management. During a crisis, command and control over the armed forces are critical issues, in order to co-ordinate military movements and alert operations in the context of overall crisis objectives. Within the ROK-U.S. alliance, the ROK command and control chain of armed forces was highly integrated with the command and control chains of the UNC until 1978 and with the CFC from 1978. This CFC combined command structure has enabled the ROK to participate in the chain of operational control of its own forces and to strengthen its position in the ROK-U.S. combined crisis management procedures. Although both co-operated closely to cope with Korean crises in the past, there were some tensions in the use of military force and in the co-ordination of the detailed operational dimension of military operations. However, it can be argued that as long as the ROK crisis objectives and strategy were achieved through a consensus of alliance crisis options, these arrangements provided an effective crisis management system for ROK to resolve Korean crises. To some extent, the combined crisis management system enabled ROK to use America's massive military and intelligence capabilities to deter North Korea and to manage crises effectively. In the face of an era of transition and transformation in the ROK-U.S. alliance relationships following the September 11 2001, the ROK and U.S. need to minimise potential negative effects on combined crisis management system and maintain coherent deterrence capability and alliance stability on the Korean peninsula.

scholarly journals Contemporary conditions of organization and functioning of the Command and Control System of the Polish Armed Forces

2019 ◽  
Vol 194 (4) ◽  
pp. 791-809
Author(s):  
Marek Strzoda ◽  
Dariusz Szkoluda
Keyword(s):  
Control System ◽  
Command And Control ◽  
Essential Element ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Strategic Defense ◽  
The Republic ◽  
State Defense ◽  
And Control ◽  
Command And Control System

The Command and Control System of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland constitutes an essential element of the State Defense System. Its primary function is to enable decision-makers and commanders at all levels to make decisions and to create systems of actions that, in the course of the operation, achieve strategic, operational and tactical goals. Various external factors and internal conditions influence the structure and then the functioning of this system. This system is subject to continuous evaluation and, consequently, changes that are to lead to its improvement, so that the assumed goals are achieved efficiently and effectively. The article discusses three groups of conditions directly, and with certain factors indirectly, affecting the organization of the command and control system as well as its functioning. The first one concerns the change in the nature of modern security threats. With regard to the short characterization of hybrid activities, subliminal actions, and asymmetric threats, it was indicated how they determine the requirements regarding the organization and functioning of the Armed Forces Command and Command System adequate to such situations. The findings of the 2016 Strategic Defense Review and its result document – the Defense Concept of the Republic of Poland constitute the second group of factors. In the consequence of strategic analysis, the conclusions and recommendations included in the Concept should be taken into account when introducing changes to the command and control system. In the last part, it was pointed out how the decision to establish the Territorial Defense Forces (WOT) and the organizational assumptions resulting from it concerning their structure, tasks, and rules of operation influenced the changes in the Command and control System of the Polish Armed Forces. The conditions presented in particular parts of the study should be considered during the forecasted and partially implemented organizational and functional improvements to the Polish Armed Forces Command and control System.

THE GENDER ASPECT OF ASSURANCE OF DEMOCRATIC CIVIL CONTROL IN THE SECTOR OF SECURITY AND DEFENSE OF THE STATE

2020 ◽  
pp. 32-35
Author(s):  
J. Bobrova ◽  
J. Bobrov
Keyword(s):  
Command And Control ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The State ◽  
The Body ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
Equal Rights ◽  
Military Organization ◽  
High Level ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Military

The effective command and control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other elements of the defense forces with the aim toachieve the high-level of defense capability of the state which are inextricably related with the appropriate normalization andexercising the practical events of democratic civil control of the military organization of the state.The process of reforming the defense sector is aimed at transforming the system of unified command and control andmilitary command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The establishment of a new system of command and control provides for aclear delimitation of authority between the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the functioning of new typesand branches of troops (forces). Additionally, it is provided for the separation of the functions of planning, generation andimplementation of means and forces within the Armed Forces, and the Ministry of defense has transformed from the body ofmilitary command to the central body of executive authority, responsible for the reform and implementation of the state policy inthe military sphere and the sphere of defense, the military policy in terms of staff, the technical policy and the policy in terms ofdefense purchases etc. One of the major tasks of the Ministry of Defense is the exercise within the framework of authority ofdemocratic civil control of the activity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the military-political and administrative command andcontrol of the military organization.The gender equality requires the establishment of equal rights and opportunities for men and women in the matters ofmilitary service, participation in the protection of the state – not only on a legislative but also on a practical level. For a longperiod of time the military profession was solely masculine. It has been related with the significant physical, moral-psychologicalpressure on a human being, the necessity to be firm in overcoming the hard and difficult daily military routine. Currently, the roleof the woman in a society has undergone significant changes. The latter have also touched the military sphere. It is therefore theissue of democratic civil control of the military organization of the state is to be considered through the prism of its genderaspect. For the sole, gender element of this control is the finest measure of its effectiveness, the indicator of absolute control ofcivic society in the military sphere, which assures the accountability of military to civil personnel and totally includes thepossibility of a military coup d’état in a state.

WHETHER THE CHANGE IN COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND, INTRODUCED ON JANUARY 1ST 2014 ABOLISHED THE PRINCIPLE OF ONE-MAN COMMAND IN PEACETIME?

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-54
Author(s):  
Hanna RUTKIEWICZ
Keyword(s):  
Control System ◽  
Command And Control ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The Republic ◽  
And Control ◽  
Command And Control System

Z dniem 1 stycznia 2014 r. weszła w życie ustawa z dnia 21 czerwca 2013 r. o zmianie ustawy o urzędzie Ministra Obrony Narodowej oraz niektórych innych ustaw, która wprowadziła dość radykalne zmiany w „pokojowym” (obowiązującym poza czasem wojny) systemie kierowania, a w szczególności dowodzenia Siłami Zbrojnymi Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Od tej daty w Siłach Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na najwyższym szczeblu dowodzenia nie obowiązuje, przynajmniej w czasie pokoju, zasada jednoosobowego dowodzenia, czego nie wyartykułowano w uzasadnieniu projektu wspomnianej ustawy. Wyklucza ją ustawowe usytuowanie na tym szczeblu hierarchii organizacyjnej trzech najwyższych dowódców, właściwych rzeczowo w określonych sferach, niepozostających wobec siebie w hierarchicznej podległości służbowej. Nie pozwala na zmianę tego stanu przyznanie Szefowi Sztabu Generalnego Wojska Polskiego określonych bardzo ogólnikowo i wywiedzionych dopiero w drodze interpretacji zapisu ustawowego kompetencji nadzorczych względem Dowódcy Generalnego Rodzajów Sił Zbrojnych i Dowódcy Operacyjnego Rodzajów Sił Zbrojnych. Żadnego z tych dowódców regulacje ustawowe nie uprawniają do dowodzenia pozostałymi. Nie można przyjąć, by powszechnie artykułowana i aprobowana zasada cywilnej kontroli nad armią oznaczała przypisanie cywilnemu ministrowi kompetencji dowodzenia, a nie kierowania, armią. Można natomiast stwierdzić, że zasada jednoosobowego dowodzenia została zachowana w obszarach przyporządkowanych odpowiednio: Szefowi Sztabu Generalnego Wojska Polskiego, Dowódcy Generalnemu Rodzajów Sił Zbrojnych, Dowódcy Operacyjnemu Rodzajów Sił Zbrojnych, gdy chodzi o dowodzenie każdego z nich w swoim obszarze.

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