scholarly journals CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AND ITS EFFECT ON CORPORATE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: A PRAGMATIC EVIDENCE FROM MALAYSIA

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (01) ◽  
pp. 177-194
Author(s):  
Muhammad Tahir Khan ◽  
Haseeb Ur Rehman ◽  
Arsalan Arsalan Hashmi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Scandals ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
Financial Scandals ◽  
External Governance

Current corporate governance failure and financial scandals are the reason for the governance mechanism due to ignoring the adoption of governance mechanisms in corporate practices. The main objective of the paper is to investigate the association between governance mechanism corporate performances based on extant literature and to put a light on the current governance mechanism in the Malaysian firms. This paper emphasizes the compliance of governance mechanism and the role of MCCG in improving the performance of corporate firms. This paper highlights the issues, current corporate scandals, and failure of corporate governance mechanisms in the first and second decades of the 21st century. Various scandals and misconduct are discussed to report the problems allied to corporate governance. This paper addresses the various corporate governance theories, models, and good governance structure. The internal and external governance mechanisms have been discussed in detail to put a light on its influence on corporate performance

Governance of Financial Institutions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guler Aras
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Capital Markets ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
The 2008 Financial Crisis ◽  
Sustainable Economic Growth

Corporate governance is a central issue in business and economics. However, governance in financial institutions is more complicated than in other fields because of the nature of financial services and instruments. Financial organizations are similar to other businesses in terms of their purposes of establishment, but confidence in management and complex risk structures are more important in financial organizations than in other businesses. In financial institutions, there are various areas in which problems arise that are related to corporate governance, including the agency problem and stakeholder protection. The importance of good governance for sound performance of financial institutions was reconfirmed during the 2008 financial crisis, raising the need to understand the agency problems and the efficiency of various corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating them. International organizations, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Basel Committee, the International Finance Corporation, and the International Organization of Securities Commissions, have been working with regulators and policy makers to improve corporate governance practices both in nonfinancial and financial institutions. Corporate governance, especially in financial institutions, is essential in guaranteeing a sound financial system, capital markets, and sustainable economic growth. Governance weaknesses at financial institutions can result in the transmission of problems across the finance sector and the economy. Consequently, the effectiveness of governance mechanisms of financial institutions and capital markets after financial crises had significant importance in a period that witnessed an intensive discussion of corporate governance issues with new regulations and the related academic works.

scholarly journals Does Corporate Governance Have a Say on Dividends in Australian Listed Companies?

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 47-75
Author(s):  
Omar Al Farooque ◽  
Ali Hamid ◽  
Lan Sun
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Monitoring And Control ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance Practices

This paper investigates whether corporate governance has an impact on dividend policy in Australian listed firms. The empirical studies of corporate governance and dividend policy in the Australian context tend to have a limited scope and the findings are mixed. Unlike the existing literature, this paper provides a more comprehensive examination of the relationship between dividend policy and corporate governance mechanisms. Using a sample of 1,438 firm-year observations for the period of 2005 to 2011 and the panel data approach, this study finds that dividend payout is significantly positively (negatively) correlated with board size, board independence, institutional ownership and use of a Big-4 audit firm (CEO duality and managerial ownership). Moreover, dividend yield is significantly positively (negatively) correlated with managerial ownership (foreign ownership). These findings suggest that dividend policy and corporate governance mechanisms are complementary i.e. firms paying higher dividends are more likely to engage in good governance practices as well as having strong monitoring and control systems in place and therefore both dividend policy and corporate governance are considered as effective tools in reducing agency costs.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: An Analysis of Family and Non-family Controlled Firms

2011 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qaiser Rafique Yasser
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
The Impact

The aim of this study is to scrutinise the impact of corporate governance mechanism on on the performance of family and non-family controlled firms in Pakistan. It has been found that a corporate governance structure influences the performance of both family and non-family controlled companies significantly. However all corporate governance mechanisms are not significant as the significant variables differ between family and non-family controlled companies. Thus, regulators need to be cautious in setting codes for different companies. JEL classification: G34, L21, L25 Keywords: Corporate Governance, Firm Performance

scholarly journals Do Multinational Companies Practice Good Corporate Governance? Empirical Evidence from Bangladesh

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 96
Author(s):  
G. M. Wali Ullah ◽  
Sarwar Uddin Ahmed ◽  
Samiul Parvez Ahmed ◽  
Kazi Md. Jamshed
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Multinational Companies ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Way

Corporate Governance refers to the way an organization is directed, administrated or controlled. It includes the set of rules and regulations that affect the manager's decision and contribute to the way company is perceived by the current and potential stakeholders. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation such as; boards, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders and spells out the rules and procedures and also decision-making assistance on corporate affairs. Corporate governance practices in Bangladesh are gradually being introduced in most companies and organizations (Du, 2006). However, Bangladesh has fallen behind its neighboring countries and global economy in corporate governance (Gillibrand, 2004). Corporate governance structure is mainly considered ambiguous. Specific governance structures or practices will not necessarily fit all companies at all times. Firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms are generally associated with better financial performance, higher firm valuation and higher stock returns. Unfortunately, investors in Bangladesh have a little information about how these corporate values affect the performance of the Multinational Companies (MNCs). This study aims to provide a quantitative contribution to the literature by examining the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on financial performance from the perspective of MNCs. A panel data based Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) regression model was used to measure the quantitative significance of various corporate governance related variables on MNC performance, as identified through a detailed literature review.

scholarly journals PENGARUH MEKANISME CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DAN UKURAN PERUSAHAAN TERHADAP KINERJA KEUANGAN (Survei Pada Perusahaan Manufaktur yang terdaftar di BEI )

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 010-031
Author(s):  
Animah Animah ◽  
Lukman Effendy ◽  
Alamsyah M. Thahir ◽  
Erna Widiastuty
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Firm Size ◽  
Sampling Technique ◽  
Partial Least Square ◽  
Least Square ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism

The purpose of this research is to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms,  firm size of financial performance. The Population of this research is the company manufacturing  in BEI. The sampling technique used is purposive sampling. The analytical tool used is using partial least  square program. The independent variables in this research are corporate governance mechanism,  firm size  while the dependent variable is the performance of the financial. The result of the research shows that firm size  influence to financial performance, while other variables such as corporate governance mechanisms have no effect negative  to financial performance.

scholarly journals Family companies and the costs of governance mechanisms: A discriminant analysis for a sample of Algerian companies

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-71
Author(s):  
Mohamed Cherif BENZOUAI
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Discriminant Analysis ◽  
Discriminant Function ◽  
Lower Cost ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Family

This paper aims at shedding light on the importance of corporate governance mechanisms costs when considering the decision of adoption of those mechanisms by companies, by relying on the discriminant analysis of a sample of 112 Algerian unlisted companies. The special nature of the agency problem in family companies allows it to adopt a different and lower cost governance structure than other companies. The study found that the variables that reflect corporate governance mechanisms have a significant effect in the discriminant function between the family companies and the rest of the companies.

Corporate governance and risk in cross-listed and Canadian only companies

2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (10) ◽  
pp. 2740-2757 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atreya Chakraborty ◽  
Lucia Gao ◽  
Shahbaz Sheikh
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Differential Effect ◽  
Composite Index ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate if there is a differential effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm risk in Canadian companies cross-listed on US markets and Canadian companies not cross-listed (Canadian only companies). Design/methodology/approach Using a sample comprised of all Canadian companies included in the S&P/TSX Composite Index for the period 2009–2014, this study applies OLS and fixed effect regressions to investigate the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm risk. Interaction variables between governance mechanisms and the cross-listing status are used to examine if this effect is different for cross-listed firms. Findings Results indicate that the effect of board characteristics such as size, independence and proportion of female directors remains the same in both cross-listed and not cross-listed firms. CEO duality and insider equity ownership impact firm risk only in cross-listed companies, while institutional shareholdings, environmental, social and governance disclosure and family control affect firm risk in Canadian only firms. Overall, the empirical results indicate that some governance mechanisms impact firm risk only in firms that cross-list, while others are well-suited for Canadian only firms. Practical implications This study suggests that some of the differences between Canadian companies that cross-list and the Canadian companies that do not cross-list in US stock markets may change the impact of governance mechanisms on firm risk. Therefore, these findings have important implications for the design of governance mechanisms in Canadian firms. Since some of these differences are common to other economies, the conclusions can be extended to companies in other countries with similar governance structures. Originality/value Although previous studies have investigated the effect of governance mechanism on firm risk, this is the first paper that studies the differential effect for companies that cross-list in US markets. Specifically, differences in the ownership structure, firm control and in the regulatory and institutional environment, may explain this differential effect. Unlike most of the previous studies that focus on the effect of individual governance mechanisms, this study uses several mechanisms and their interactions at the same time.

Corporate Governance in Islamic Banks

2021 ◽  
pp. 322-337
Author(s):  
Sami Ben Mim ◽  
Yosra Mbarki
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Transmission Channels ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism

This study investigates the efficiency of the Shariah supervisory board as a corporate governance mechanism in Islamic banks. The authors mainly seek to examine the effect of the Shariah board's composition (size and academic background of its members) on the performance of Islamic banks. They also try to highlight the transmission channels explaining this effect, and compare the efficiency of the Shariah board with that of traditional corporate governance mechanisms, namely the board of directors. The empirical investigation is based on a sample of 72 Islamic banks from 19 countries. Estimation results suggest that the Shariah board positively affects the Islamic banks performance through the number of Islamic Shariah scholars. This effect is mainly due to the size and cost transmission channels. These results are robust to different performance measures. On the other hand, results show that the board of directors' size produces a positive effect on a bank's performance, offering evidence for complementarity between traditional and Islamic governance mechanisms.

scholarly journals Dividend policy and corporate governance in Saudi stock market: Outcome model or substitute model?

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amina Hamdouni
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Debt Policy

Theories suggest that corporate governance mechanisms affect corporate dividend policies. This study extends and tests the implications of two extant static agency models making opposite predictions. The outcome model predicts an increase in dividends when the corporate governance mechanisms improve, because shareholders are better able to force managers to disgorge cash. In contrast, the substitute model suggests that an improvement in the corporate governance mechanisms reduces the role of dividends in controlling agency costs, leading to a decrease in dividends. This paper investigates the dividend policy for firms listed on Saudi Arabia Stock Exchange. This is a case study of Saudi Stock Market, where the determinants of dividend policy have received little attention. This study use a panel dataset of non-financial firms listed on Saudi Arabia Stock Exchange between the years of 2007 and 2010. Based on a panel of 366 firm year observations of 99 Saudi firms, we provide evidence in outcome model or substitute model with ownership structure, board structure and debt policy. Three Tobit models are specified: In the first, we construct a governance index based on eight criteria: seven criteria which capture various aspects of a firm’s structure, policies and practices that constitute good governance and a criterion that examines the company’s compliance with Shariah law in all its activities. Therefore, we estimate the effect of corporate governance on dividend policy in the first model. In the second, we investigate how dividends interact with corporate governance mechanisms in a panel of data. We explore the relation between dividends and ownership structure (ownership concentration and managerial ownership), board structure (board size, Board independence and Chairman-CEO duality) and debt policy. In the final, another test of the substitute and the outcome models is built on the Jensen (1986) free cash flow theory, which states that dividend policy can extract surplus cash from management control by reducing free cash flow. In this third model, we examine how corporate governance improvements affect the dividends’ sensitivity to free cash flows by focusing on the coefficients on the interactive variables of the ownership structure, board structure, debt policy and the free cash flow. For the three models, we divide sample in two subsamples and we compare the results obtained by using criteria of company’s compliance with Shariah law. For the effects of corporate governance (measured by corporate governance score) on dividend levels, we find that dividend policy is a substitute model for good governance for all Saudi Arabia firms. When we select only Shariah compliant firms, results indicate also that dividend policy is a substitute model for good governance but results are insignificant. When we select only Non-Shariah compliant firms, results indicate the same conclusion. We find that governance is associated with fewer dividends, supporting the substitute model and indicating the influence of good governance by forcing less cash to be returned to investors. For the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on dividend levels, we find that the only variable affect the dividend levels for Non-Shariah compliant firms is the separation in the functions of chairman and of CEO supporting the substitute model. For Shariah compliant firms, dividend policy is an outcome for the separation in the functions of chairman and of CEO, and ownership concentration. Governance through the separation in the functions of chairman and of CEO and ownership concentration influences firms by forcing more cash to be returned to investors. For the effects of the corporate governance improvements on dividends’ sensitivity to free cash flow, our results support the substitute hypothesis for Shariah compliant firms regardless the board independence, board meeting, managerial ownership and debt. Improvements in these corporate governance mechanisms reduce firms’ need to force out the free cash flow through dividends. For Non-Shariah compliant firms, our results support the outcome model for managerial ownership and ownership concentration

scholarly journals The financial impacts of board mechanisms on performance: The case of listed Moroccan banks

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-113
Author(s):  
Issam El Idrissi ◽  
◽  
Youssef Alami ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Return On Equity ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Purpose: The present study examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on listed Moroccan banks' financial performance. Research methodology: This study investigates the relationship between listed banks' governance mechanisms and financial performance in the CSE for six years between 2014-2019. This study employs three performance measures, return on assets, return on equity, and Tobin's Q, to determine bank performance. This research uses the GMM EGLS approach to analyze data. In the first phase of this empirical research, we did use OLS, Fixed Effects, and Radom Effects regressions to show their inefficiency. Results: Our results portray that most board mechanisms have a negative impact on financial performance. In comparison, the audit committee and nomination & remuneration committee have a positive effect on financial performance. Limitations: Many qualitative and quantitative factors could influence financial performance and not only the used variables in this paper. Contribution: This research shows that the dynamic connection between corporate governance and financial performance is robust in the Moroccan banking context. Also, our study has important implications for establishing good corporate governance practices in emerging economies.

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