scholarly journals A Pilot Study: Metal-Induced Immunotoxicity and Deaths of the 100 Vaccinees in the Republic of Korea for 2 Months of 2020 Flu Vaccination

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 014-021
Author(s):  
Munhee Jeon ◽  
Jongsung Oh ◽  
Kyu Yun Jang ◽  
Ki-Yeob Jeon

Summary: More than 100 persons died within 7 days of infl uenza vaccination by November 2020 (for two months of 2020 fl u vaccination) in the Republic of Korea (South Korea). The current study was conducted to allocate properly any possible causality by examining the presence of heavy metals in a vaccine and metal-induced immunotoxic lesions after fl u vaccinations in the experimental mice. It detected cadmium 0.12 ppb (parts per billion = μg/L) and mercury 1.77 ppb in one of the cost-free infl uenza vaccinees (Lot Number: A14720017) distributed by the Korean government. Lungs of the undiluted-vaccine-injected mice showed signifi cantly more diff use infl ammatory damages than lungs of the 1:4 dilutedvaccine-injected mice which showed no to mild infl ammatory changes (p < 0.027 by the method 1, and p < 0.001 by the method 2). Based on this study, it can be presumed that the metals-induced immunotoxicity of type IV hypersensitivity or of psuedoallergy would have caused death in some of persons who coincidentally died within 7 days of vaccinations. Background : A 17-year-old man died within three days of infl uenza vaccination (Lot Number: A14720007), a 77-year-old woman died within a day (Lot Number: A14720016), and more than 100 persons died within 7 days of infl uenza vaccination by November 2020 (for two months of 2020 fl u vaccination) in the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Singapore authorities halted two of the seven brands of fl u vaccinees even though there was no report of death after fl u vaccinations in Singapore. This raises a possibility that there can be a diff erence between the excipients of the fl u vaccinees used in Singapore and in Korea. Our assumptions were that there would have been immunotoxic metals in the fl u vaccinees, the metals would have induced type IV hypersensitivity or Complement Activation-Related Psuedoallergy (CARPA), and would have caused some deaths of 100 persons who incidentally died within 7 days after fl u vaccinations. Methods: In this study, we analyzed twice for the presence of any metal components of aluminum, indium, cadmium, gallium, and mercury in the infl uenza vaccine. Analysis of the metal contents of the 1:29 diluted fl u vaccine was assessed by the Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry (ICP-MS) method. Simultaneously, total 10 BALB/c mice were used to analyze any pathological changes after 7 days of fl u vaccination. Animals were divided into two groups: one group of 5 mice were injected intraperitoneally with 0.1 ml of 1:4 diluted fl u vaccine with injectable distilled water; and the other group of 5 mice were injected intraperitoneally with 0.1 ml of undiluted fl u vaccine. They were freely reared for 7 days in a Polycarbonate cage (400 x 255 x 180 mm). The mice were sacrifi ced after CO2 short-acting gas anesthesia. Brains, hearts, lungs, livers, and kidneys were harvested, prepared with H & E stain, and observed for any histopathological changes. Findings : In one of the cost-free infl uenza vaccinees (Lot Number: A14720017), which were distributed by the Korean Government, the current study detected cadmium 0.12 ppb (parts per billion = μg/L), and mercury 1.77 ppb. But neither aluminum, gallium, nor indium was detected. Both experimental groups showed no demonstrable infl ammatory changes in the specimens of brains, hearts, livers, and kidneys. However, lungs of the undiluted-vaccine-injected group showed signifi cantly more diff use damages than lungs of the 1:4 diluted-vaccine-injected group which showed no to mild infl ammatory changes. The semiquantitative scores of the diluted-vaccine-injected group and the undiluted-vaccine-injected group were 0.7 ± 0.3 and 1.9 ± 0.3, respectively by method one ([a street-view], mean ± SE, p = 0.027 <0.05); and 9.0 ± 1.1 and 18.6 ± 1.6, respectively by method two ([a sky-view], mean ± SE, p < 0.001). Interpretation: Mercury (1.77 ppb) and cadmium (0.12 ppb) were found in the freely distributed infl uenza vaccine by the Korean Government for the season of 2020-2021. Infl ammatory damages in the lungs of experimental mice, which occurred within 7 days after infl uenza vaccination, could be caused by metal-induced type IV hypersensitivity ( delayed-type, T-cell-mediated hypersensitivity) or metal nanoparticle-induced CARPA. In application, metal-induced delayed-type hypersensitivity or metal nanoparticle-induced CARPA could explain some deaths of the 100 persons who unintentionally died within 7 days of infl uenza vaccination by the November 2020 and of the 1,531 persons who coincidentally died within 7 days after Infl uenza vaccination from the fall of 2019 to the spring of 2020 in South Korea, and of the persons who fortuitously died within one week after infl uenza vaccinations in the United States-23.2persons/100,000 vaccinees of an age of over 75 and 11.3 persons/100,000 vaccinees of an age between 65 and 75. The results may be helpful for the causal identifi cation of some deaths of COVID-19 vaccinees.

2019 ◽  
Vol 78 (03) ◽  
pp. 621-644 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Phuong Le

This article examines why the “history issue” continues to hinder Japanese-Korean relations after nominally successful negotiations such as the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea and the 2015 comfort women agreement. It contends that leaders put off and quite possibly sacrificed reconciliation in order to achieve treaties and agreements that addressed more immediate security, economic, and political needs. However, because agreements were not transparently negotiated, partly due to the lack of a neutral third-party mediator, Koreans believe the treaties were not fair nor final settlements. Additionally, the reconciliation process has been flawed because it haphazardly tackles disagreements and does not consider time. A third-party such as the United States should mediate a settlement between Japan and South Korea to ensure adequate confidence building measures. Such measures will lower the costs of giving and accepting an apology, increasing the chances of an enduring and legitimate treaty.


2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (8) ◽  
pp. 31-40
Author(s):  
O. Davydov

The advancement and promoting by the United States of its concept of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) has shaped many of political discussions in Asian countries in recent years. The Republic of Korea is no exception. From this perspective, the article reviews the basic aspects of the evolution of South Korea’s foreign policy course as well as new priorities in that area which have been forged with the advent of President Moon Jae-in administration. The paper shows that the complex fluctuations of the South Korea’s external policy have been defined by the need to maintain the focus on the United States, on one side, and desire to nurture strategic partnership with China, on the other side. However, finding the right balance in that political equation has been significantly complicated due to the growing confrontation between the two global powers. Special attention is given to the role and place of South Korea in the U. S. Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. The article examines the main directions, some of the outcomes and the prospects of cooperation between Washington and Seoul aimed at harmonizing their regional strategies in view of the factors facilitating those interactions as well as those hampering them. President Trump highlighted that the United States – the Republic of Korea alliance remains a linchpin for security, stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. However, the dialogue between the two partners has not revealed the willingness of South Korea to collaborate with the United States on that theme beyond a narrow framework of purely economic coordination. Particularly, South Korea has consistently rejected the attempts of its ally to involve the country into the activities of Quad for fear of a possible adverse effect for the Korea–China relationships. All of those questions are examined in the article in linkage with a number of bilateral problems prevailing in the ROK–USA alliance which have complicated the collaboration between the two countries on regional issues in recent times.


2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 226-244
Author(s):  
Valerii T. Yungblud ◽  
◽  
Denis A. Sadakov ◽  

The article describes the formation of a military and political alliance of the United States and the Republic of Korea in 1954. The article aims at defining the motives and priorities of the parties in the American-Korean negotiations held from June to November 1954 and at determining which factors influenced the negotiation outcome. On the whole, the significance of conflict elements in the US-South Korea relations increased in 1953–1954. While the Americans’ goal was to stabilize the situation on the peninsula and create a strong security system in northeast Asia, the priority of the Koreans and their leader Syngman Rhee, the President of the South Korea, was to restore the country’s unity. These priorities were not in line after the failure of the Korean talks at the 1954 Geneva Conference. Being totally dependent on the Americans in the military and economic spheres, Rhee was forced to comply with the armistice and cooperate in the implementation of the US initiatives regarding reunification of the country, which had very little chance of success. In exchange, he expected the US-Korea Mutual Defense Treaty to come into force and demanded the implementation of economic and military aid programs. Although the USA made concessions regarding all the points, they managed to create sufficient counterbalance to restrain Syngman Rhee: they established control over the South Korean military forces; assigned broad authority to the Coordinator of aid programs; had considerable armed forces on the territory of Korea. The Republic of Korea was included in the US regional security system on the terms of the Americans.


Worldview ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 23 (8) ◽  
pp. 13-15
Author(s):  
Edward A. Olsen

Observers of Korea have recently received a surfeit of facts about the military takeover, riots, civil insurgency in Cholla province, widespread arrests, and abuse of prisoners. What we lack is a firm sense of what all these events mean for South Korea and the United States. Though it is still early, sufficient evidence exists to warrant a preliminary judgment about the new leadership of post-Park Korea and what may be ahead for the Republic of Korea.


2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 85-105
Author(s):  
Steven Hugh Lee

AbstractSince December 1997, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States have met in a series of talks aimed at promoting peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the region. According to a November 1998 U.S. Department of Defense report, the discussions have created a “diplomatic venue for reducing tensions and ultimately replacing the Armistice Agreement with a permanent peace settlement.”1 Amidst the tragic human suffering which has occurred in North Korea, there have been some encouraging developments on the peninsula. The 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea placed international controls on North Korea’s atomic energy program and cautiously anticipated the normalization of U.S.-DPRK relations. Since assuming power in early 1998, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung has vigorously pursued a policy of engagement with P’yo¨ngyang, known as the “sunshine policy.” Over the past decade, North Korea has also reoriented its foreign policy. In the early 1990s, the regime’s social and economic crisis led to a rethinking of its autarkic economic system. By early 1994, the state had created new free trade zones and relatively open foreign investment laws.2 By complying with the Agreed Framework, the DPRK has also shown a willingness to work with the international community on sensitive issues affecting its internal sovereignty and ability to project power beyond its borders.


Author(s):  
Alexander Zhebin

The article analyzes the prospects for US-North Korean and inter-Korean relations, taking into account the completed policy review of the new US administration towards the Democratic People&apos;s Republic of Korea (DPRK), as well as the results of the President of the Republic of Korea Moon Jae-in’s trip to Washington in May 2021 and his talks with US President Joe Biden. It is concluded that the “new&quot; course proposed by the United States in relation to the DPRK will not lead to a solution to the nuclear problem of the Korean Peninsula and will interfere with the normalization of inter-Korean relations. During his visit to the US President Moon failed to obtain the US consent on ROK more “independent policy” toward North Korea. In spite of lavish investments into US economy and other concessions, Seoul was forced to promise to coordinate his approaches to the DPRK with US and Japan and support US position on Taiwan straits and South China Sea. The author argues that in the current conditions, the introduction of a regime of arms limitation and arms control in Korea should be a necessary stage on the way to complete denuclearization of the peninsula. The transition to a such method of the settlement of the nuclear problem could lead to the resumption of the negotiation process, mutual concessions, including reductions in the level of military-political confrontation, partial or large-scale lifting of economic sanctions in exchange for North Korea&apos;s restrictions of its nuclear weapon and missile systems.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 104-114
Author(s):  
Chaerin Kang

The purpose of this research paper is to underline a few of the problematic articles of the Criminal Act in Korea and suggest possible solutions. In the Republic of Korea, three criminal elements—Applicability of Constituent Requirements, Criminal Defences, and the Principle of Responsibility—must be proven to convict a defendant. When a perpetrator does not meet all three criminal elements, they are protected by particular articles of the Criminal Act such as Articles 9, 10, and 26. These articles guarantee citizens' right to decide their own actions accordingly and provide an opportunity for improvement by reducing the punishment. All three articles of the Criminal Act reflect positive intentions embedded in the law. However, the articles' flaws have begun to cause the perpetrators to exploit the law and disdain Korea's Criminal Act. Thus, this paper aims to consider the Criminal Act's malfunctions, especially within Article 9, 10, and 26, and suggest possible solutions to improve its shortages.    


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document