scholarly journals On Being Human and Divine: The Coherence of the Incarnation

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-31
Author(s):  
Christopher Hauser

According to the doctrine of the Incarnation, one person, Christ, has both the attributes proper to a human being and the attributes proper to God. This claim has given rise to the coherence objection, i.e., the objection that it is impossible for one individual to have both sets of attributes. Several authors have offered responses which rely on the idea that Christ has the relevant human properties in virtue of having a concrete human nature which has those properties. I show why such responses should be rejected and, in light of that, propose an alternative response to the coherence objection.

Author(s):  
John Tasioulas

This chapter investigates whether or not human rights are grounded in human dignity. Starting from an interest-based account of human rights, it rejects two objections to that account that have been pressed in the name of human dignity: the deontological and the personhood objections. More positively, it contends that human dignity is the equal moral status possessed by all human beings simply in virtue of their possession of a human nature, and that so understood, it has an essential role to play in grounding human rights, but that it can only play this role in tandem with universal human interests. In particular, human dignity is central to explaining both why humans can possess rights and why these rights are resistant to trade-offs. The chapter concludes with some reflections on the implications of this view for whether each and every human being possesses all of the standard human rights.


Human Affairs ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-223
Author(s):  
Sunday Adeniyi Fasoro

Abstract In the Groundwork, Kant seems to make two paradoxical claims about the source of human dignity. First, he claims that if “rational nature exists as an end in itself” (Kant, 1998, p. 36), it is because “humanity is… dignity, insofar it is capable of morality” (Kant, 1998, p. 42). Second, he claims that although “autonomy is the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature” (Kant, 1998, p. 43), the human being can only have “dignity… insofar he fulfils all his duties” (Kant, 1998, p. 46). This paper argues that neither claim is repugnant because Kant seeks to advance two kinds of dignity. Kant intends to elucidate that the human being possesses a basic ‘entitled dignity’ in virtue of his capacity for morality, but that he needs to become a moral being in order for him to realise his ‘true dignity’. This paper claims that the formal condition under which a person can be worthy of respect is identical with the condition of realising his ‘true dignity’.


2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 523-534
Author(s):  
Jean Rhéaume

At least two important consequences follow from the fact that human rights are based on human nature. First, they exist according to natural law even in cases where positive law does not recognize them. Secondly, they cannot evolve because the nature and purpose of the human being does not change: only their formulation and level of protection in positive law can vary according to the socio-historical context.


Author(s):  
Douglas J. Den Uyl ◽  
Douglas B. Rasmussen

This chapter argues against the claim advanced by Daniel Haybron, Daniel C. Russell, and Mark LeBar that human self-perfection is ultimately based on notions of well-being and human flourishing that we bring to our understanding of human nature and in favor of the idea that it is human nature itself that ultimately grounds our understanding of human well-being or human flourishing. In doing so, the question of whether there is some gap between (a) what it is to be a good human being and (b) what is good for a human being is addressed. It is shown that the arguments on behalf of a such a gap fail and that the version of perfectionism that is advanced—that is, individualistic perfectionism—is ideally suited to not only avoid such a gap but also to display their unity, especially when perfection is understood as a process of living things and not as some cosmic or metaphysical process.


Author(s):  
Sara Brill

This chapter offers an account of the bios of the human animal in light of Aristotle’s treatment of the lives of non-human animal collectives. This discussion is anchored in Aristotle’s claim that the regime (the politeia) is the way of life of the city, and it is argued that proper attention to the zoological lens informing Aristotle’s Politics requires us to view the relation between human being and polis as an intensified form of the relation between any animal and its proper habitat. Its intensity is due precisely to the forms of intimacy and estrangement made possible by the possession of language. The Politics’s sustained meditation on how to ensure the longevity of a city’s bios—its political ecology—must, then, be read as a necessary complement to its account of human nature, its anthropology.


Author(s):  
Brad Inwood

Ethics is the part of the Stoics’ legacy that is most prominent and influential today. Their theory of the good life for human beings falls into the family of theories associated with Socrates and his followers. This tradition includes Plato and most Platonists, Xenophon, the Cynics, Aristotle, and later Aristotelians, all of whom share the view that virtue, the excellence of a human being, is the highest value and is its own reward. ‘Ethics’ discusses the Stoics’ views on human nature and rationality; the four basic virtues: justice, courage, wisdom, and moderation or self-control; and the doctrine that the fully rational and wise person will be free of passions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-62
Author(s):  
Joshua R. Farris

When we wait for a significant other, it is not as if we are waiting for someone who looks like her, talks like her, or even walks like her. Instead, what we want is her. And, the same goes for the afterlife: if there is an afterlife, we long to see our loved ones. Not those who look like our loved ones, who sound like them, or even smell like them, but we actually want them. In the study of human nature, this is, arguably, one of the modern insights on humanity. The question of the “particularity” of human beings matters. In technical philosophical studies, the question of “particularity” is a question of thisness (i.e., the fact that objects are countable as discrete in virtue of some property or feature that makes an object what it is). What makes one person this person rather than that person? By showing how the concept of thisness is important in modern and contemporary theology, I will argue for a specific view as that which accurately captures both the historical consensus and the modern emphasis of personhood.


This volume makes a contribution to the field of neurolaw by investigating issues raised by the development, use, and regulation of neurointerventions. The broad range of topics covered in these chapters reflects neurolaw’s growing social import, and its rapid expansion as an academic field of inquiry. Some authors investigate the criminal justice system’s use of neurointerventions to make accused defendants fit for trial, to help reform convicted offenders, or to make condemned inmates sane enough for execution, while others interrogate the use, regulation, and social impact of cognitive enhancement medications and devices. Issues raised by neurointervention-based gay conversion “therapy”, the efficacy and safety of specific neurointervention methods, the legitimacy of their use and regulation, and their implications for authenticity, identity, and responsibility are among the other topics investigated. The focus on neurointerventions also highlights tacit assumptions about human nature that have important implications for jurisprudence. For all we know, at present such things as people’s capacity to feel pain, their sexuality, and the dictates of their conscience, are unalterable. But neurointerventions could hypothetically turn such constants into variables. The increasing malleability of human nature means that analytic jurisprudential claims (true in virtue of meanings of jurisprudential concepts) must be distinguished from synthetic jurisprudential claims (contingent on what humans are actually like). Looking at the law through the lens of neurointerventions thus also highlights the growing need for a new distinction—between analytic jurisprudence and synthetic jurisprudence—to tackle issues that increasingly malleable humans will face when they encounter novel opportunities and challenges.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-84
Author(s):  
Ana Honnacker

Humanism is charged with fostering a harmful anthropocentrism that has led to the exploitation of non-human beings and the environment. Posthumanist and transhumanist ideas prominently aim at rethinking our self-understanding and human-nature relations. Yet these approaches turn out to be flawed when it comes to addressing the challenges of the “age of the humanity”, the Anthropocene. Whereas posthumanism fails in acknowledging the exceptional role of human beings with regard to political agency and responsibility, transhumanism overemphasizes human capabilities of controlling nature and only deepens the human-nature dualism. Therefore, a critical and humble version of humanism is suggested as a viable alternative. Drawing on pragmatist thinkers William James and F.C.S. Schiller, a resource for de-centering the human being is provided that critically reflects our role in the larger ecosystem and underlines human potentials as well as human responsibilities.


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