scholarly journals ‘The exception to the rule’: exploring the exception and the exceptional in planning policy

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (0) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Neil Harris

This article explores exceptions to planning ‘rules’ as a specific form of discretion exercised by planners and decision makers. Theoretical and conceptual ideas on rules and exceptions to rules, drawing principally on administrative and political decision making, are used to examine the role of exceptions and exceptional circumstances in planning. This analysis addresses the interdependency between exceptions and ‘rules’, the circumstances in which planning decision makers are invited to consider exceptions to rules or exceptional circumstances, and the distinct forms of planning regulation created using exceptions. The conclusions call for systematic analysis of the role that exceptions play in different contexts and planning systems.

Author(s):  
Wissam Saleh Abdul-Hussein Jassim Al-Rub

The Iranian Constitution of 1979 and the amendment of 1989 considered the Supreme Leader of the Iranian Islamic Revolution the most powerful institution in influence and presence in the political system. The guide, directly or indirectly, through the agencies operating under his administration, and here we say that the political vision of the wali al-Faqih governs its authority over all the perceptions of decision-makers in their formulation and implementation of strategic decisions that achieve the goals of the Iranian regime at home and abroad.


2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 124-148
Author(s):  
Eryan Ramadhani

Abstract The study of political decision-making cannot exclude the actors involved in the process. Neither can it disregard the interplay between decision-makers and political institution where they operate. This article aims to explain how perception of survival affects decision-making by focusing on leaders, specifically by analysing Benigno S. Aquino III’s leadership (2010–2016). Built on political psychology, I will show that motivation to maintain power may bias leaders’ reasoning leading to suboptimal decision. Accountability can help leaders mitigate bias, or de-bias, by stimulating their use of cognitive complexity. But the same effort may backfire and make leaders resort to heuristics instead. Where leaders end up in the cognitive spectrum depends on the types of audiences to whom they feel accountable: core (the ruling elites and loyal voters) and external (the opposition and its supporters) audiences. Preoccupation with core audiences can make leaders downplay the opposition challenge. Furthermore, leaders’ perceived understanding of their support base may be erroneous. The result is overconfidence in their perception of survival. I argue that President Aquino’s misperception of survival was rooted in his belief that (1) Filipinos would like to have his legacy continued and that (2) his popularity would help his successor Manuel Araneta Roxas II win the 2016 presidential race. This overconfidence turned out to be detrimental. Roxas’s electoral loss to Rodrigo Duterte put an end to the Daang Matuwid, President Aquino’s good governance platform.


Author(s):  
Marisa Linton

In a move away from overarching explanations of the Terror based on ideology, class or a ‘system of Terror’, historians have been investigating the web of connections between politics, ideology, tactics, emotions and the role of individuals. Consequently, a more complex picture of revolutionary politics has begun to emerge. This chapter uses these new approaches to examine the individual experiences of Jacobin leaders. It asks how far we can reconstruct the motives that led individual Jacobin leaders to choose terror. Personal factors, including friendships, influenced political decision-making to a far greater extent than previously acknowledged. Emotions, above all fear, played an integral role in the Terror. The Jacobin leaders needed to maintain their public identity as ‘men of virtue’ or risk being destroyed in the politicians’ terror. The chapter examines the genesis of the politicians’ terror that culminated in the mutual destruction of political factions during the Year II.


Author(s):  
Charles A. Miller

The “sunk costs fallacy” is a popular import into political science from organizational psychology and behavioral economics. The fallacy is classically defined as a situation in which decision-makers escalate commitment to an apparently failing project in order to “recoup” the costs they have already sunk into it. The phenomenon is often framed as a good example of how real decision-making departs from the assumption of forward-looking rationality which underpins traditional approaches to understanding politics. Researchers have proposed a number of different psychological drivers for the fallacy, such as cognitive dissonance reduction, and there is experimental and observational evidence that it accurately characterizes decision-making in certain contexts. However, there is significant skepticism about the fallacy in many social sciences, with critics arguing that there are better forward-looking rational explanations for decisions apparently driven by a desire to recoup sunk costs – among them reputational concerns, option values and agency problems. Critics have also noted that in practical situations sunk costs are informative both about decision makers’ intrinsic valuation for the issue and the prospects for success, making it hard to discern a separate role for sunk costs empirically. To address these concerns, empirical researchers have employed a number of strategies, especially leveraging natural experiments in certain non-political decision making contexts such as sports or business, in order to isolate the effects of sunk costs per se from other considerations. In doing so, they have found mixed support for the fallacy. Research has also shown that the prevalence of the sunk costs fallacy may be moderated by a number of factors, including the locus of decision-making, framing, and national context. These provide the basis for suggestions for future research.


Derrida Today ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin McQuillan

How might we begin to think about deconstruction in relation to the formulation of political policy? Once we begin to ask this question the whole idea of policy as such is put in question and conversely the limitations of philosophy as the basis for political decision making quickly become apparent. Through a consideration of this problem and by reference to a number of key tropes in Derrida's later writings, this essay begins the task of thinking about the deconstruction of policy and of asking what the future role of deconstructive thought might be.


Author(s):  
Katalin Feher

The goal of the paper is to investigate the expected participation and mentality of smart citizens in smart cities. The key question is the role of the human factor in smart environments globally studied through a research corpus of the mainstream summaries, trend reports, white papers and visions of business – governmental – university research co- operations. Foremost, a short review of the changing scholarly trends is presented as a theoretical framework. Concerning its key ideas, the corpus based findings are recapped and analysed by content networks and the most referred city strategies. Besides, a critical approach reveal further required factors and risks to investigate. The ultimate goal is to understand how the smart city landscape is shaped by citizen-based strategies, open data, empowerment and responsibility. Accordingly, the paper closes with theoretical, practical and metaphor-based recommendations to support the business and political decision making, and also, the emerging scholarly trends in the context of upcoming technological-structural changes.


Author(s):  
Pascal D. König ◽  
Georg Wenzelburger

AbstractThe promise of algorithmic decision-making (ADM) lies in its capacity to support or replace human decision-making based on a superior ability to solve specific cognitive tasks. Applications have found their way into various domains of decision-making—and even find appeal in the realm of politics. Against the backdrop of widespread dissatisfaction with politicians in established democracies, there are even calls for replacing politicians with machines. Our discipline has hitherto remained surprisingly silent on these issues. The present article argues that it is important to have a clear grasp of when and how ADM is compatible with political decision-making. While algorithms may help decision-makers in the evidence-based selection of policy instruments to achieve pre-defined goals, bringing ADM to the heart of politics, where the guiding goals are set, is dangerous. Democratic politics, we argue, involves a kind of learning that is incompatible with the learning and optimization performed by algorithmic systems.


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