Communication and cooperation in repeated games

We study the role of communication in repeated games with private monitoring. We first show that without communication, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in such games is a subset of the set ofε‐coarse correlated equilibrium payoffs (ε‐CCE) of the underlying one‐shot game. The value ofεdepends on the discount factor and the quality of monitoring. We then identify conditions under which there are equilibria with “cheap talk” that result in nearly efficient payoffs outside the setε‐CCE. Thus, in our model, communication is necessary for cooperation.

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On Communication and Collusion

The American Economic Review ◽

10.1257/aer.20141469 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 106 (2) ◽

pp. 285-315 ◽

Cited By ~ 36

Author(s):

Yu Awaya ◽

Vijay Krishna

Keyword(s):

Cheap Talk ◽

Discount Factor

We study the role of communication within a cartel. Our analysis is carried out in Stigler’s (1964) model of repeated oligopoly with secret price cuts. Firms observe neither the prices nor the sales of their rivals. For a fixed discount factor, we identify conditions under which there are equilibria with “cheap talk” that result in near-perfect collusion, whereas all equilibria without such communication are bounded away from this outcome. In our model, communication improves monitoring and leads to higher prices and profits. (JEL C73, D43, D83, L12, L13, L25)

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RESOLVING RECURRENT IMPERFECTIONS IN THE DAIRY PRODUCTION USING GAMING SIMULATION

New Medit ◽

10.30682/nm1904c ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 18 (4) ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Meriem Msaddak ◽

Jamel Ben-Nasr ◽

Lokman Zaibet

Keyword(s):

Value Chain ◽

Repeated Games ◽

Dairy Production ◽

Simulation Approach ◽

Cooperative Action ◽

Technology Generation ◽

Gaming Simulation ◽

Quality Of Milk

The dairy value chain in Tunisia has been facing recurrent problems mostly related to coordination, contracting, pricing and quality imperfections. The policy focus on technology generation and dissemination, without considering the underlying problems related to market imperfections and institutional and socio-economic processes, has contributed to low technology adoption and limited development in the dairy value chain. This paper uses a gaming simulation approach to allow breeders to experiment and consider strategies of cooperation which lead to increased returns and improved quality of milk. The game allows understanding the role of trust and cooperation in improving the performance of the dairy value chain. The experiment was done in two regions and in four sessions each. Results show that benefits to breeders are derived from the price of milk which is determined by the number of cooperation in the repeated games strategies. The resulting Nash equilibrium is one where farmers cooperate without cheating. This solution avoids farmers the risk of rejection of milk and results in price increase as a result of the collective cooperative action.

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Game Theory

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199368815.013.18 ◽

2016 ◽

Author(s):

Cristina Bicchieri ◽

Giacomo Sillari

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Nash Equilibrium ◽

Evolutionary Game Theory ◽

Repeated Games ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Complete Information ◽

Decision Makers ◽

Correlated Equilibrium ◽

Extensive Form

Game theory aims to understand situations in which decision-makers interact strategically. Chess is an example, as are firms competing for business, politicians competing for votes, animals fighting over prey, bidders competing in auctions, threats and punishments in long-term relationships, and so on. In such situations, the outcome depends on what the parties do jointly. Decision-makers may be people, organizations, animals, or even genes. In this chapter, the authors review fundamental notions of game theory and their application to philosophy of science. In particular, Section 1 looks at games of complete information through normal and extensive form representations, introduce the notion of Nash equilibrium and its refinements. Section 2 touches on epistemic foundations and correlated equilibrium, and Section 3 examines repeated games and their importance for the analysis of altruism and cooperation. Section 4 deals with evolutionary game theory.

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Cognitive Health Counseling 40+

Zeitschrift für Gesundheitspsychologie ◽

10.1026/0943-8149/a000085 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 21 (1) ◽

pp. 24-33 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Anne Eschen ◽

Franzisca Zehnder ◽

Mike Martin

Keyword(s):

Outcome Variable ◽

Pilot Phase ◽

Subjective Memory ◽

Cognitive Health ◽

Health Counseling ◽

Agents Of Change ◽

Main Outcome Variable ◽

Further Development

This article introduces Cognitive Health Counseling 40+ (CH.CO40+), an individualized intervention that is conceptually based on the orchestration model of quality-of-life management ( Martin & Kliegel, 2010 ) and aims at improving satisfaction with cognitive health in adults aged 40 years and older. We describe the theoretically deduced characteristics of CH.CO40+, its target group, its multifactorial nature, its individualization, the application of subjective and objective measures, the role of participants as agents of change, and the rationale for choosing participants’ satisfaction with their cognitive health as main outcome variable. A pilot phase with 15 middle-aged and six older adults suggests that CH.CO40+ attracts, and may be particularly suitable for, subjective memory complainers. Implications of the pilot data for the further development of the intervention are discussed.

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