A Proposed Architecture for Key Management Schema in Centralized Quantum Network

Author(s):  
Ahmed Farouk ◽  
Mohamed Elhoseny ◽  
Josep Batle ◽  
Mosayeb Naseri ◽  
Aboul Ella Hassanien

Most existing realizations of quantum key distribution (QKD) are point-to-point systems with one source transferring to only one destination. Growth of these single-receiver systems has now achieved a reasonably sophisticated point. However, many communication systems operate in a point-to-multi-point (Multicast) configuration rather than in point-to-point mode, so it is crucial to demonstrate compatibility with this type of network in order to maximize the application range for QKD. Therefore, this chapter proposed architecture for implementing a multicast quantum key distribution Schema. The proposed architecture is designed as a Multicast Centralized Key Management Scheme Using Quantum Key Distribution and Classical Symmetric Encryption. In this architecture, a secured key generation and distribution solution has been proposed for a single host sending to two or more (N) receivers using centralized Quantum Multicast Key Distribution Centre and classical symmetric encryption.

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (11) ◽  
pp. 3734
Author(s):  
Xinying Li ◽  
Yongli Zhao ◽  
Avishek Nag ◽  
Xiaosong Yu ◽  
Jie Zhang

Quantum-key-distribution (QKD) networks can provide absolutely secure keys for the entire communication system in theory. At present, the key-distribution rate is relatively low, and the key-distribution rate decreases exponentially as the distribution distance increases. The trusted-relay scheme commonly used in existing QKD networks achieves the purpose of extending the security distance by consuming additional keys. Since the channel is unreliable, the key-relay process will accumulate system errors to a certain extent, increasing the probability of key-relay failure. In some high-bit-error-rate network scenarios such as wireless networks and disaster environments, the channel-error rate is as high as 30–50%. And in these scenarios, there are usually a large number of confidential messages that need to be delivered. However, the key-management mechanism of the current QKD system does not consider the scenario of key-relay failure. If the key is not successfully relayed, all the keys participating in the relay process will be destroyed, including the key that has been successfully relayed before. This situation causes the key to be wasted and reduces the encryption capability of the system. In this paper, we proposed the quantum-key-recycling (QKR) mechanism to increase the number of keys available in the network and introduced a secure service grading mechanism to properly reuse the recycled keys. The QKR mechanism can be regarded as a key-management mechanism acting on the point-to-point QKD system, and the mechanism is designed for a classical channel to reuse the key resources. A post-processing method for recycled keys is proposed to improve the security of the keys. Simulation results show that the QKD network using the key-recycling strategy is about 20% higher in key-utilization rate than the traditional QKD network without the QKR mechanism, and about 10% higher in-service security coverage.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Weilong Wang ◽  
Kiyoshi Tamaki ◽  
Marcos Curty

AbstractMeasurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) can remove all detection side-channels from quantum communication systems. The security proofs require, however, that certain assumptions on the sources are satisfied. This includes, for instance, the requirement that there is no information leakage from the transmitters of the senders, which unfortunately is very difficult to guarantee in practice. In this paper we relax this unrealistic assumption by presenting a general formalism to prove the security of MDI-QKD with leaky sources. With this formalism, we analyze the finite-key security of two prominent MDI-QKD schemes—a symmetric three-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol and a four-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol—and determine their robustness against information leakage from both the intensity modulator and the phase modulator of the transmitters. Our work shows that MDI-QKD is feasible within a reasonable time frame of signal transmission given that the sources are sufficiently isolated. Thus, it provides an essential reference for experimentalists to ensure the security of implementations of MDI-QKD in the presence of information leakage.


Author(s):  
Stephen Barnett

The practical implementation of quantum information technologies requires, for the most part, highly advanced and currently experimental procedures. One exception is quantum cryptography, or quantum key distribution, which has been successfully demonstrated in many laboratories and has reached an advanced level of development. It will probably become the first commercial application of quantum information. In quantum key distribution, Alice and Bob exploit a quantum channel to create a secret shared key comprising a random string of binary digits. This key can then be used to protect a subsequent communication between them. The principal idea is that the secrecy of the key distribution is ensured by the laws of quantum physics. Proving security for practical communication systems is a challenging problem and requires techniques that are beyond the scope of this book. At a fundamental level, however, the ideas are simple and may readily be understood with the knowledge we have already acquired. Quantum cryptography is the latest idea in the long history of secure (and not so secure) communications and, if it is to develop, it will have to compete with existing technologies. For this reason we begin with a brief survey of the history and current state of the art in secure communications before turning to the possibilities offered by quantum communications. The history of cryptography is a long and fascinating one. As a consequence of the success or, more spectacularly, the failure of ciphers, wars have been fought, battles decided, kingdoms won, and heads lost. In the information age, ciphers and cryptosystems have become part of everyday life; we use them to protect our computers, to shop over the Internet, and to access our money via an ATM (automated teller machine). One of the oldest and simplest of all ciphers is the transposition or Caesarean cipher (attributed to Julius Caesar), in which the letters are shifted by a known (and secret) number of places in the alphabet. If the shift is 1, for example, then A is enciphered as B, B→C, · · ·, Y→Z, Z→A. A shift of five places leads us to make the replacements A→F, B→G, · · ·, Y→D, Z→E.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 111-116
Author(s):  
Porkodi Chinniah ◽  
Sangavai Krishnamoorthi

Distributed Sensor Networks are broadly used in many applications and key distribution is a challenging task. In this work, a key management scheme is developed for distributed sensor networks based on elliptic curve cryptography over prime field. Key distribution among the nodes and interactive as well as non interactive protocols for agreement of common secret key for message transmission between two nodes are discussed. The probability for connectivity of the network generated according to the proposed key distribution scheme is discussed in detail. The implementation of the proposed scheme is done using NetSim interfaced with MATLAB. Connectivity of the network is also checked through eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix of the network.   


2012 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 130-141
Author(s):  
N. Sugandhi ◽  
S. Mirdula ◽  
D. Manivannan ◽  
R. Ranjini ◽  
D.H. Sharmili Minu

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joo Yeon Cho ◽  
Jose-Juan Pedreno-Manresa ◽  
Sai Patri ◽  
Andrew Sergeev ◽  
Jörg-Peter Elbers ◽  
...  

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