Behavior Analysis of Together-Conspired Bidding Based on the Evolutionary Game

2012 ◽  
Vol 209-211 ◽  
pp. 1513-1516
Author(s):  
Qian Li
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Behavior Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Theoretical Basis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Research Work ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Periodic Fluctuation ◽  
Construction Market

Based on the “replication dynamics” ideas, the paper establishes asymmetric evolutionary game model of together-conspired bidding using evolutionary game theory, and obtains its evolutionary stable strategy under the present governmental supervision that surround-bidder and accompanying-bidder’s proportion is periodic fluctuation of the center stability, explains the reason why together-conspired bidding is difficult to be prevented effectively. In order to find the decisive factor of the evolutionary drift, further investigation shows that the evolutionary drift is converged to the different evolutionary stable properties when evolution conditions change, such as the supervision target, supervision strength. Through the analysis to the punishment extent on surround-bidder and accompanying-bidder, the conclusion is arrived that the strength of punishment and execution on the surround-bidder can effectively control together-conspired bidding, which provides the theoretical basis to governmental supervision department for the management and research work on together-conspired bidding in the construction market.

scholarly journals A Study of Taxi Service Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhu Bai ◽  
Mingxia Huang ◽  
Shuai Bian ◽  
Huandong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Mode Choice ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Taxi Service ◽  
Service Mode ◽  
The Impact

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.

Research on Opportunistic Behavior in Energy Security Cooperation of China and Japan

2011 ◽  
Vol 71-78 ◽  
pp. 2085-2088
Author(s):  
Chun Chu ◽  
De Shan Tang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Behavior Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Energy Security ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Opportunistic Behavior ◽  
Security Cooperation ◽  
Energy Cooperation ◽  
China And Japan

Analyze the opportunistic behavior between China and Japan in energy security cooperation with game theory. There are two types countries in the process of the cooperation, they are opportunistic and cooperating countries. To use of evolutionary game theory model of cooperation and energy cooperation between China and Japan in the opportunistic behavior analysis, the results show that under certain conditions, cooperation can be avoided the incidence of opportunistic behavior, if not satisfy the relevant constraints, the co-operation will inevitably.

Evolutionary Game Theory-Based Modeling and Stability Analysis of Subsidy Policy on Safety Investment in SMEs

2010 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
pp. 575-579
Author(s):  
Yu Mei Lu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Stability Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Theoretical Basis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Group Behavior ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Safety Investment

Evolutionary game theory originated as an application of the mathematical theory of games to biological contexts, having the advantages of truly reflecting the diversity and complexity to provide theoretical basis to study macro-control group behavior. The evolutionary game theory-based modeling and stability analysis of subsidy policy on safety investment in SMEs is studied, and the simulation about the effect of the alteration of the ratio on the evolvement results is executed. The results indicate that the safety subsidy of local governments can enhance SMEs’ enthusiasm to invest. It has excellent significance to study further how to achieve equilibrium between SMEs and local governments using evolutionary game theory, and to provide theoretical basis to study operation mode of subsidy policy on safety investment in SMEs.

scholarly journals Research on Promotion of Consumers’ Application of After Service in Online Shopping Based on Evolutionary Game Theory-- Introduction of Smart Contract

2021 ◽  
Vol 233 ◽  
pp. 01074
Author(s):  
Hongzhen Lei ◽  
Di Lu ◽  
HongHong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Online Shopping ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Smart Contract ◽  
Service Guarantee ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

In order to research how to promote online shopping consumers’ application of after service, build an evolutionary game model of both consumers and e-stores. This paper introduces the variables of supervision and punishment, tries to introduce the smart contract as a powerful service guarantee, and analyzes the influence relationship of variables between the two players and their strategic choices. This paper analyzes the ESS of the system when the relationship among smart contract, revenue, supervision and punishment meets 8 different conditions. Finally, giving suggestions to optimize the after service in online shopping according to the results.

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Theory Study for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Considering Green Development Performance under the Chinese Government’s Reward–Penalty Mechanism

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (17) ◽  
pp. 6303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongyu Long ◽  
Hongyong Liu ◽  
Xingwei Li ◽  
Longjun Chen
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Construction And Demolition Waste ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Demolition Waste ◽  
Green Development ◽  
Evolutionary Paths

The low efficiency of the closed-loop supply chain in construction and demolition waste (CDW) recycling has restricted the green development of China’s construction industry. Additionally, the government’s reward–penalty mechanism has a huge influence on green development. This study aimed to investigate the effect of green development performance (GDP) and the government’s reward–penalty mechanism on the decision-making process of production and recycling units, as well as to reveal the optimal strategies under different conditions. Therefore, the strategies’ evolutionary paths of production and recycling units were investigated by using evolutionary game theory. Firstly, an evolutionary game model between production units and recycling units was proposed under the government’s reward–penalty mechanism. Then, the evolutionary stability strategies in different scenarios were discussed. Finally, the effects of the relevant parameters on the evolutionary paths of the game model were analyzed using numerical simulations. The main conclusions are as follows. (1) When the range of GDP changes, the evolutionary stable strategy changes accordingly. GDP plays a positive role in promoting the high-quality development of the CDW recycling supply chain, but an increase in GDP can easily lead to the simultaneous motivation of free-riding. (2) The government’s reward–penalty mechanism effectively regulates the decision-making process of production and recycling units. An increase in the subsidy rate and supervision probability helps to reduce free-riding behavior. Moreover, the incentive effect of the subsidy probability on recycling units is more obvious, while the effect of the supervision probability on improving the motivation of active participation for production units is more remarkable. This paper not only provides a decision-making basis to ensure production and recycling units to make optimal strategy choices under different conditions but also provides a reference for the government to formulate a reasonable reward–penalty mechanism that is conducive to a macro-control market.

scholarly journals Research on franchised store chain operation based on evolutionary game theory

2021 ◽  
Vol 275 ◽  
pp. 03022
Author(s):  
Siyuan Deng
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Business Model ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Brand Management ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Case Analysis ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Policy Recommendations ◽  
Chain Operation ◽  
Selection Of

Franchised store chain is the most popular business model today. The franchisor and the franchisees share the same brand, but the value of the entire brand will be degraded once one side pursues self-interests in brand management. From the perspective of franchised store chain, this paper develops an evolutionary game model between franchisor and franchisees under the assumption of bounded rationality. The strategic selection of franchisor and franchisees includes cooperation and no-cooperation. In the end, the corresponding policy recommendations are proposed in the foundation of case analysis.

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