A Study on the Intelligenti Zed Marine Oil-Spill Rapid-Clearing System

2012 ◽  
Vol 256-259 ◽  
pp. 1969-1974
Author(s):  
Xiao Jun Zhang ◽  
Shang Ping Li ◽  
Yuan Fei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Storage Tanks ◽  
Single Chip ◽  
Large Area ◽  
Marine Oil ◽  
Oil Storage ◽  
Clearing System ◽  
Water Separator ◽  
Oily Water

At present it is difficult to thoroughly clear away the marine oil-spill when collision takes place. As we know the traditional oil-spill-treatment is slow and the oil pollution can not be handled timely. In order to clear the surface oil and protect marine environment, a study on rapid- clearing of marine oil pollution system is presented in this paper, which is equipped with a high-resolution camera on the top of the oil pollution lifter to identify the oil pollution and get data by image processing, then the oil pollution recovering which is set in the front of the oil storage tanks collecting oil spill by the single-chip machine while moving. Thus the oil spill can be separated into clean oil and water by the oily-water separator through the flexible tube. This system is more efficient, cleaner and less-polluted than the traditional one, which is worthy of large area surface oil-spill clearing.

UNDERGROUND OIL SPILL INVESTIGATION AND CLEANUP1

1983 ◽  
Vol 1983 (1) ◽  
pp. 393-396 ◽  
Author(s):  
David McIntyre
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Federally Funded ◽  
Storage Tanks ◽  
Federal Funds ◽  
Property Owner ◽  
Oil Storage ◽  
Region I

ABSTRACT In April 1978, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region I office received an oil spill report which involved a sheen leaching from an industrial park into a river in Connecticut. Initial investigation revealed only two 10,000-gallon and one 11,000-gallon buried storage tanks as possible sources. All were located relatively close together about 200 feet from the river. The maintenance man reported that one of the 10,000-gallon tanks had spilled an estimated 500 gallons into the ground the previous year. EPA responded and initially worked with the property owner and the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection in addressing the problem. Although the leaching seemed to be relatively minor at first, it gradually increased after July 1978. The property owner was unable to finance cleanup actions after the first few months. EPA assumed cleanup responsibility, using federal funds, and eventually took over all investigation and recovery efforts in 1980. The incident has involved many phases, including locating and estimating the volume of the underground contamination, attempted source identification through sample analysis, installing recovery systems, excavating the oil storage tanks, winter operations of the recovery systems, disposal of product, and river cleanup. Analyses of test boring data in 1979 indicated the maximum volume of spilled product on the groundwater to be between 50,000 and 150,000 gallons. Since 1980, the recovery systems alone have yielded more than 90,000 gallons of oil, making this innocuous incident one of the largest inland oil spills ever in Region I. It also has been the most expensive federally-funded inland spill in the region. Recovery from the groundwater is expected to continue through 1982, albeit at a decreasing rate. The total observed volume of oil involved in the spill will probably exceed 110,000 gallons.

How About Farms and Ranches?

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 819-820 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martha A. Wolf
Keyword(s):  
Water Level ◽  
Human Health ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Pollution Prevention ◽  
The State ◽  
Storage Tanks ◽  
The Past ◽  
Oil Storage ◽  
Farm Equipment ◽  
Initial Results

ABSTRACT During the past several years it has become apparent that farms and ranches have been delinquent in compliance regarding oil pollution prevention planning and practices. Some deaths have been caused by practices used at these aboveground oil storage tanks. These facilities store smaller quantities of oil, but they can be a great concern for human health and the environment. Some farmers and ranchers store large quantities of oil for the fueling of farm equipment. Yet others have tanks located directly on the shores of lakes and rivers in order to run the pumps needed to irrigate of crops. These tanks are often moved to adjust for rising and lowering of the water level. Region VIII has worked with the state of Montana and several tribes to increase awareness of the need for following spill prevention practices. The initial results have been mixed. There are many farmers and ranchers who work with the state or tribe and come into compliance, while others prefer to take their chances on being selected for a random inspection.

DEVELOPMENT OF HARBOR OIL SPILL REMOVAL-RECOVERY SYSTEMS: PHASE I

1975 ◽  
Vol 1975 (1) ◽  
pp. 379-386
Author(s):  
Arthur Widawsky
Keyword(s):  
Phase I ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Storage Tanks ◽  
Open Area ◽  
Recovery System ◽  
Water Separator ◽  
In Series ◽  
Oil Water

ABSTRACT A harbor oil spill removal-recovery system comprises four subsystems: containment, recovery, storage and transfer, and separation. Commercially available subsystems were analytically evaluated Based on the evaluation, six containment booms, ten skimmers, three pumps, two towable storage tanks, and three oil-water separators were tested in rivers, wave tanks, and on land. The highest test-rated subsystems were then assembled into two harbor oil spill removal-recovery systems: a confined-area system, and an open-area system. Both systems were then tested in a Naval harbor. The tests showed that essentially all the oil intentionally spilled in the harbor, with EPA approval, was recovered. Major findings were (1) none of the booms tested could contain oil when towed at 2 knots, (2) for 1-mm thick oil slicks, the maximum oil pickup rate was 55 gpm, obtained with a large advancing weir skimmer, (3) the towable tank concept was effective, and (4) neither a gravity nor coalescer oil-water separator operating alone could produce a water effluent with less than 10 ppm of oil; however, a gravity and a coalescer separator operating in series produced a water effluent of less than 10 ppm of oil

FLEXIBILITY ON U.S. EPA OIL SPILL PREVENTION MEASURES TO ACCOMMODATE SMALL CAPACITY MULTI-SECTOR STAKEHOLDERS

2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 353-356
Author(s):  
Patricia Fleming
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Pollution Prevention ◽  
Gas Production ◽  
Prevention Measures ◽  
Oil And Gas Production ◽  
Oil Storage ◽  
Production Facilities

ABSTRACT In December 2006 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published revisions to the Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure (SPCC) regulation (40 CFR part 112) to streamline regulatory requirements pertaining to the prevention of oil discharges to navigable waters and adjoining shorelines. The purpose of these revisions was to allow flexibility for the regulated community in designing an oil spill prevention program that is appropriate for each individual facility. The range of regulated facilities for the SPCC universe includes everything from oil exploration and production facilities to end users of oil. The equipment and oil-handling activities vary as a result of the individual business operations of the facility. EPA has moved away from a prescriptive approach for requirements pertaining to the oil pollution prevention regulation in 40 CFR 112 and has incorporated performance based elements into the regulation to accommodate the wide universe of regulated stakeholders while maintaining protection of human health and the environment. Since promulgation of the regulation, the rule has incorporated alternative measures for when secondary containment is determined to be impracticable. In 2002, a provision was added to the rule to allow for deviations from rule requirements when an alternative environmentally equivalent measure is employed. The most recent revisions to the SPCC rule in 2006 include alternatives for facilities with small oil storage capacities to self-certify their SPCC Plans in lieu of a Professional Engineer certification. Additionally, the Agency is developing an additional proposal to streamline and simplify the SPCC rule for oil and gas production facilities, farms, and a subset of qualified facilities. This paper will highlight the SPCC rule provisions that provide flexibility in order to facilitate compliance and achieve the goal of preventing discharges of oil to navigable waters and adjoining shorelines. It will discuss the background of the SPCC rule; the key revisions that specifically offer alternative compliance options, with a focus on small oil storage capacity facilities; and provide an overview of the 2007 proposed revisions to the SPCC rule.

scholarly journals OFFSHORE OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: IN PURSUIT OF A UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LIABILITY REGIME

2016 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 66-108
Author(s):  
Jae Sundaram
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Civil Liability ◽  
The United States ◽  
Offshore Platforms ◽  
International Convention ◽  
Marine Oil ◽  
Pollution Damage ◽  
Offshore Oil ◽  
Offshore Operations

A significant amount of marine oil pollution is vessel-source with another being non-vessel-source originating from offshore oil platform operations. The world has witnessed a number of oil spill disasters since the 1950s including the Deepwater Horizon incident in the United States, the Montara Wellhead Platform in Australia and the continuing oil spill incidents in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. Technological advances mean that offshore operators now venture further out from coastlines to explore for, and exploit hydrocarbon reserves, thus increasing the crude oil output, and also the possibility of oil pollution incidents from offshore platforms. The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 1969 and the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Oil Pollution Damage 1971 were developed under the leadership of the International Maritime Organization in response to the increasing incidents of vessel-source oil pollution of the marine environment. Since the entry into force of these Conventions the membership has increased and the incidents of vessel-source oil pollution reduced. Efforts made by the Comité Maritime International (CMI), as early as in 1977, to develop a uniform civil liability convention for claims arising from offshore operations did not come to fruition, and very little progress has been made in finding a solution. Currently, there is no uniform international civil liability regime in place for oil pollution compensation claims arising for damages caused by offshore operations. This article explores the reasons behind the lack of a coherent legal framework to process civil liability claims arising from offshore oil spill incidents, especially when a comprehensive international regulation exists to govern vessel-source and other related forms of marine oil pollution. It argues that the lack of leadership to find a solution is proving to be highly damaging and that there is a strong case and an urgent need to establish a uniform international offshore oil spill liability regime. The article looks at existing regimes, both regional and national, as a way forward to develop an international regime for oil pollution compensation for damages arising from offshore activities.

Damage Assessment and Restoration Following the JULIE N Oil Spill: A Case Study

2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 409-412
Author(s):  
Gary S. Mauseth ◽  
Frank G. Csulak
Keyword(s):  
Natural Resources ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Natural Resource ◽  
Damage Assessment ◽  
Habitat Restoration ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Fuel Oil ◽  
Large Area ◽  
Verbal Agreement

ABSTRACT On September 27, 1996, the T/V JULIE N inbound with a cargo of 8.8 million gallons of #2 fuel oil struck the Million Dollar Bridge, spanning Portland Harbor between Portland and South Portland, Maine. The incident resulted in a spill of approximately 180,000 gallons of oil, which spread throughout a large area of Portland Harbor. The marine and coastal resources of Portland Harbor and the Fore River, including water resources, shellfish, wetlands, sediments, and birds were exposed and/or injured by the oil. The spill also had an adverse impact on several different public use services. The natural resource trustee agencies (including the State of Maine, NOAA, and the Department of the Interior) and Amity Products Carriers, Inc. (Responsible Party, RP) conducted a cooperative natural resource damage assessment to assess and restore natural resources exposed and/or injured by the spill. The trustees and RP operated under an initial verbal agreement to cooperate until a written agreement was executed over a year after the incident. The cooperative process and lessons learned are described in the paper. Particularly positive components included cooperative data collection and active collaboration on study design and endpoints. The trustees expended $782,860 in assessment costs. The RP expended an additional $169,101 in cooperative laboratory and field investigations, as well as $364,720 in consultant costs. The total assessment costs were $1,316,681. The trustees and the RP were then able to successfully negotiate a $1 million dollar settlement for the purpose of planning, implementing, and overseeing selected restoration projects. These projects included reducing the discharge of PAH's into the Fore River, wetland and bird habitat restoration, and construction of a recreational trail along the Fore River. The RP sought compensation from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund under the limitation of liability provisions of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Compensation included expenses beyond statutory liability for response, NRDA assessment, and damages to natural resources among others.

NEW ZEALAND: “DOWN UNDER” OIL SPILL CONTINGENCY PLANNING1

1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 241-245
Author(s):  
John T. Roosen
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Marine Pollution ◽  
Regional Government ◽  
Marine Oil ◽  
Industry Practice ◽  
Main Engine ◽  
Broad Policy

ABSTRACT New Zealand has embarked upon a new direction in marine oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response. The new direction was driven by a parliamentary review of the Marine Pollution Act that found New Zealand ill prepared to respond to a marine oil spill. The new program put together four key components that depended on government and industry cooperation in a user-pays environment. First, the Marine Pollution Act of 1974 was reformatted into a new Maritime Transport Act (MTA), which brought into focus broad policy guidelines. Second, Marine Protection Rules now provide detailed ongoing program information that changes with updates to industry practice and technology. Third, a Crown entity, the Maritime Safety Authority, was established as the main engine of change. Lastly, oil pollution response was redistributed from the central government into a four-tiered response mechanism. The tiers start with commercial facilities and ships, progress to regional government and then to the national government, and ultimately provide an avenue for international assistance.

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