Price and Carbon Emissions Level Decisions in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain: Insights from Carbon Labelling

2013 ◽  
Vol 572 ◽  
pp. 668-671
Author(s):  
Yong Hong Cheng ◽  
Zhong Kai Xiong ◽  
Yu Xiong
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Environmental Awareness ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Purchasing Behavior ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Initial Carbon

To analyze the effects of carbon labelling on firms production and marketing decisions, as well as consumers purchasing behavior, we consider a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer and assume the market demand is both price-and carbon emissions level-sensitive, then the optimal decisions policies for pricing and carbon emissions level are discussed under decentralized and centralized decision-making. Interestingly, our results show that only when the initial carbon emissions level of the product is less than a certain threshold, as consumers environmental awareness increasing, the amount of carbon emissions per unit of output produced will decrease. On the contrary, the carbon emissions level will increase. Moreover, we found that when consumers environmental awareness maintains the same level, the centralized decision-making is more conducive to reduce carbon emissions and improve whole supply chain performance. Finally, some numerical examples are given to verify the research results.

scholarly journals The Green Product’s Pricing Strategy in a Dual Channel considering Manufacturer’s Risk Attitude

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Junjie Ma ◽  
Wenchao Yu ◽  
Shuxia Li ◽  
Linghong Zhang ◽  
Shaobin Zang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Environmental Awareness ◽  
Risk Attitude ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Demand Forecast ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Dual Channel

This paper develops a two-echelon green supply chain that consists of one green manufacturer and one retailer. The green manufacturer has both online direct and offline retail channels. Considering manufacturer’s risk attitude and product’s green level, the paper constructs centralized and decentralized game models when the online channel’s demand is uncertain. Furthermore, this paper analyzes the impacts of a set of factors, including consumer environmental awareness (CEA), product green level, and risk attitude on decision-making in the supply chain. Finally, we present numerical examples. The main findings are as follows: the manufacturer and the retailer will benefit from the improvement of CEA; hence, they could invest more to obtain more profits by improving CEA; manufacturer’s risk attitude has a negative impact on the pricing and profits of the supply chain; as such, the members of the supply chain should improve the accuracy of their demand forecast, so as to minimize risks and losses resulting from uncertainty in demand.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Coordination with Carbon Trading Price and Consumers’ Environmental Awareness Dependent Demand

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qinghua Pang ◽  
Mingzhen Li ◽  
Tiantian Yang ◽  
Yi Shen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Environmental Awareness ◽  
Emissions Reduction ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Price Increases ◽  
Carbon Emissions Reduction

Carbon emissions reduction in supply chain is an effective method to reduce the greenhouse effect. The paper investigates the impacts of carbon trading price and consumers’ environmental awareness on carbon emissions in supply chain under the cap-and-trade system. Firstly, it analyzes the centralized decision structure and obtains the requirements to coordinate carbon emissions reduction and order quantity in supply chain. Secondly, it proposes the supply chain coordination mechanism with revenue-sharing contract based on quantity discount policy, and the requirements that the contract parameters need to satisfy are also given. Thirdly, assuming the market demand is affected by consumer’s environmental awareness in addition form, the paper proposes the methods to determine the optimal order quantity and the optimal level of carbon emissions through model optimization. Finally, it investigates the impacts of carbon trading price on carbon emissions in supply chain. The results show that clean manufacturer’s optimal per-unit carbon emissions increase as the carbon trading price increases, while nongreen manufacturer’s optimal per-unit carbon emissions decrease as the carbon trading price increases. For the middle emissions manufacturer, the optimal per-unit carbon emissions depend on the relationship between the carbon trading price and the carbon reduction coefficient.

scholarly journals Coordinating a Supply Chain with a Loss-Averse Retailer and Effort Dependent Demand

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liying Li ◽  
Yong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Special Class ◽  
Numerical Study ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Channel Coordination ◽  
Gain Loss ◽  
Decision Making Behavior ◽  
Dependent Demand

This study investigates the channel coordination issue of a supply chain with a risk-neutral manufacturer and a loss-averse retailer facing stochastic demand that is sensitive to sales effort. Under the loss-averse newsvendor setting, a distribution-free gain/loss-sharing-and-buyback (GLB) contract has been shown to be able to coordinate the supply chain. However, we find that a GLB contract remains ineffective in managing the supply chain when retailer sales efforts influence the demand. To effectively coordinate the channel, we propose to combine a GLB contract with sales rebate and penalty (SRP) contract. In addition, we discover a special class of gain/loss contracts that can coordinate the supply chain and arbitrarily allocate the expected supply chain profit between the manufacturer and the retailer. We then analyze the effect of loss aversion on the retailer’s decision-making behavior and supply chain performance. Finally, we perform a numerical study to illustrate the findings and gain additional insights.

scholarly journals Optimal Decisions for Two Risk-Averse Competitive Manufacturers under the Cap-and-Trade Policy and Uncertain Demand

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 1010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongxia Sun ◽  
Jie Yang ◽  
Yang Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Reduction Rate ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government

With the increasingly serious problem of environmental pollution, reducing carbon emissions has become an urgent task for all countries. The cap-and-trade (C&T) policy has gained international recognition and has been adopted by several countries. In this paper, considering the uncertainty of market demand, we discuss the carbon emission reduction and price policies of two risk-averse competitive manufacturers under the C&T policy. The two manufacturers have two competitive behaviors: simultaneous decision making and sequential decision making. Two models were constructed for these behaviors. The optimal decisions, carbon emission reduction rate, and price were obtained from these two models. Furthermore, in this paper the effects of some key parameters on the optimal decision are discussed, and some managerial insights are obtained. The results show that the lower the manufacturers’ risk aversion level is, the higher their carbon emission reduction rate and utilities. As the carbon quota increases, the manufacturers’ optimal carbon reduction rate and utilities increase. Considering consumers’ environmental awareness, it is more beneficial for the government to reduce the carbon quota and motivate manufacturers’ internal enthusiasm for emission reduction. The government can, through macro control of the market, make carbon trading prices increase appropriately and encourage manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions.

scholarly journals Research on Quality Decisions and Coordination with Reference Effect in Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhou Xideng ◽  
Xu Bing ◽  
Xie Fei ◽  
Li Yu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Service Quality ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Reference Quality ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Although supply quality management has been studied extensively, one important marketing phenomenon, that is, reference effect has been rarely considered in dual-channel supply chain quality management literatures. In fact, the quality reference effect is also an important factor which influences consumer purchasing behavior. We aim to explore the influence of the reference effect on the optimal decisions and performance of a dual-channel supply. Thus, we formulate dynamic models that include the product quality reference effect and the service quality reference effect in a dual-channel supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer under the different decision-making scenarios. Utilizing differential game theory, optimal decisions are obtained for the product quality and service quality decision under the different decision-making scenarios. In addition, the optimal decisions and profits are compared, then a service cost-sharing coordinating mechanism is proposed and proven to be effective in the supply chain system. The main results show when the initial reference service quality is low, the consumer service quality reference effect is beneficial to the manufacturer. The spillover effect of service quality is not conducive to the retailer and the manufacturer. When the initial reference product quality is low, both online and offline product quality reference effects are beneficial to the retailer and the manufacturer. The stable (or final) reference quality will not be affected by the initial reference quality. The sum of the two members’ profits under decentralized decision making is less than the total profit of the supply chain under centralized decision making. We design a cost-sharing coordinating mechanism to eliminate the double marginal effect.

scholarly journals A Green Supply-Chain Decision Model for Energy-Saving Products That Accounts for Government Subsidies

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (8) ◽  
pp. 2209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jian Xue ◽  
Ruifeng Gong ◽  
Laijun Zhao ◽  
Xiaoqing Ji ◽  
Yan Xu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Energy Conservation ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Energy Saving ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Government Subsidies

Government subsidies are a common policy adopted to promote energy conservation and emission reduction. The decision-making that occurs within the green supply chain for energy-saving products under government subsidies is an area of great academic interest and game theory is becoming a popular tool in such research. In this paper, we examined centralized and decentralized decision-making models for the green supply chain and a coordinated decision-making model for revenue-sharing contracts based on game theory. We studied the effects of government subsidies on retail prices, energy conservation levels, market demand, supply chain profits, and social welfare for energy-saving products. We then compared the effectiveness of the three models using a numerical example. Our results revealed the range of contract parameters for which manufacturer and retailer profits increase. Our results show that government subsidies can significantly improve social welfare and promote the improvement of energy-saving products. Centralized decision-making generates higher profits than decentralized decisions and government subsidies were positively correlated with the level of energy conservation, product prices, and market demand. Revenue sharing contract coordination decisions can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the same effect as centralized decisions.

scholarly journals Analysis of the Value of Information and Coordination in a Dyadic Closed Loop Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (20) ◽  
pp. 8398
Author(s):  
Juan Pedro Sepúlveda-Rojas ◽  
Rodrigo Ternero
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Value Of Information ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Local Optimization ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Optimization Approach ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Impact

Purpose: This article analyzes the value of information and coordination in a closed loop supply chain (CLSC) and discusses the benefits of a global or local optimization approach and the impact of uncertainty. Methodology: A theoretical dyadic closed loop supply chain is analyzed where the manufacturer re-manufactures products returned by customers, producing “as good as new products” for the retailer. Twelve coordination scenarios were analyzed. For the definition of these scenarios, a framework based on two criteria was proposed: value of information and perimeter of decision making. Findings: Information on returns leads to lower costs than information on demand. In the presence of complete or partial coordination between the actors in the supply chain, it is preferable to have low product return rates. However, if we are in the complete absence of coordination, high rates of return are more convenient as they function as a buffer against uncertainties. The perimeter of decision making (global or local optimization) does not significantly improve the supply chain performance in relation to its costs. Only the exchange of information improves its performance. Therefore, companies should make efforts to exchange information, first, on their lot sizes, then on their returns and finally, on the customer demand. Originality: The novelty of our work relies on an analysis of the closed loop supply chain performance with the simultaneous presence of information, coordination, and uncertainty.

scholarly journals Coordinating Three-Level Supply Chain under Disruptions Using Revenue-Sharing Contract with Effort Dependent Demand

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qinghua Pang ◽  
Yanli Hou ◽  
Yifei Lv
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Optimal Contract ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Special Case ◽  
Additive Form ◽  
Dependent Demand

Considering that the market demand is stochastic and dependent on effort, this essay shows that the benchmark revenue-sharing contract could not coordinate a three-level supply chain consisting of one manufacturer, one distributor, and one retailer. By assuming that the retailer himself bears the effort cost, coordination is achieved by implementing revenue-sharing contract based on rebate and penalty policy in one transaction or two transactions of three-level supply chain, and the former is a special case of the latter. When the disruptions induce the changes of the market demand, the revenue-sharing contract could not coordinate the supply chain. To deal with the problem, this essay introduces two forms of improved revenue-sharing contracts which have antidisruption ability. The model of improved revenue-sharing contract is optimized when the market demand is in the additive form with effort dependent demand. Formulas are given to calculate the optimal contract parameters. Finally, this essay demonstrates the accuracy of the model of improved revenue-sharing contract with the help of numerical examples.

scholarly journals Pricing and Coordination Strategy in a Green Supply Chain with a Risk-Averse Retailer

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Liyan Wang ◽  
Minghai Ye ◽  
Shanshan Ma ◽  
Yipeng Sha
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Random Variable ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Coordination Strategy ◽  
Optimal Decisions

This paper addresses the pricing and coordination strategy in a green supply chain in which a manufacturer produces a green product and sells it to a risk-averse retailer. The product’s demand is a random variable influenced by the green level and the retail price. The problem is modeled in three different structures, a centralized and two decentralized models, in which the upstream manufacturer and the downstream retailer act as the channel leader, respectively. This paper presents the optimal decisions for all supply chain members, analyzes the effects of green degree and risk-averse coefficient on the supply chain members’ decision-making and their profits, and performs the numerical analysis. The results show that the green degree and the whole supply chain’s expected profits are highest in the centralized scenario, followed by the retailer-led scenario, and lowest under the manufacturer-led scenario; the green degree and the manufacturer’s expected profit increase with the risk-averse coefficient, no matter who dominates the channel; however, the risk-averse coefficient’s effects on the retailer’s expected utility and the retail price depends on who dominates the channel and on the greening investment parameter.

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