Aging Management of Nuclear Power Plants in Korea

2007 ◽  
Vol 120 ◽  
pp. 193-198
Author(s):  
Tae Eun Jin ◽  
Heung Bae Park ◽  
Hho Jung Kim
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Science And Technology ◽  
Operating Experience ◽  
System Structure ◽  
Regulatory Body ◽  
Aging Effects ◽  
Safety Standards ◽  
Periodic Safety ◽  
High Level

Kori Unit 1, which is the oldest nuclear power plant (NPP) in Korea has been operated since 1978. In addition, 10 other NPPs have been operating more than 10 years. As the number of aging plants rise, public concern over the safety of operating NPPs has increased. Periodic safety review (PSR) in addition to the existing safety assessments are proposed by IAEA as an effective way to verify that operating NPPs maintain the high level of safety. In this regard, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), Korea’s nuclear regulatory body, recently established an institutional process through revision to the atomic energy act to introduce PSR. This PSR considers, among other factors, improvements in safety standards and practices, the cumulative effects of plant aging, operating experience, and the evolution of science and technology. In particular, the assessment and management of plant aging is one of the major areas. It includes identification of the system, structure and components (SSCs) for aging management, assessment of aging effects and planning of aging management implementation program. PSR results could be one of the procedural requirements that are utilized to renew an operating license of a NPP. This paper describes safety assessment requirements including PSR and aging management activities in Korea. This paper also includes the strategy and method for the application of PSR results to the aging management and continued operation of NPPs.

The Integrated Aging Management System Applied to Nuclear Power Plants in Korea

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Se-Youl Won ◽  
Kyeong-Soo Lee ◽  
Jae-Gon Lee
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Operating Experience ◽  
Evaluation Report ◽  
Time Operation ◽  
Standard Guideline ◽  
Periodic Safety ◽  
Long Time

According to Post Fukushima action items in Korea, KHNP has established the integrated aging management system to reinforce aging management of system, structures, and components (SSCs) effectively for seven operating units, which are in service for more than twenty years, and for Kori Unit 1 and Wolsung Unit 1, which are subject to continued operation (CO) based on NUREG-1801 GALL report. KHNP’s integrated aging management programs (AMPs) focus on the establishment of aging management system for long-lived operation of nuclear power plants in Korea. The integrated aging management system consists of the integrated AMP standard guideline, operating guideline for each plant, individual AMPs of each plant, and AMP Data Base (DB) system including implementation results, basic DB information related to facilities operating in NPPs, and operating information such as operating experience and evaluation report. The integrated aging management system is importantly utilized for Periodic Safety Review (PSR) and the renewal of CO. Therefore, it will be largely contributed to keep NPPs the level of safety for long time operation through the effective aging management.

Development Trends in Nuclear Technology and Related Safety Aspects

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Kuczera ◽  
P. E. Juhn ◽  
K. Fukuda
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Fuel Cycle ◽  
Nuclear Reactors ◽  
Nuclear Technology ◽  
User Requirements ◽  
Safety Standards ◽  
Safety Requirements ◽  
Fuel Cycles ◽  
High Level

The IAEA Safety Standards Series include, in a hierarchical manner, the categories of Safety Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides, which define the elements necessary to ensure the safety of nuclear installations. In the same way as nuclear technology and scientific knowledge advance continuously, also safety requirements may change with these advances. Therefore, in the framework of the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) one important aspect among others refers to user requirements on the safety of innovative nuclear installations, which may come into operation within the next fifty years. In this respect, the major objectives of the INPRO subtask “User Requirements and Nuclear Energy Development Criteria in the Area of Safety” have been: a. to overview existing national and international requirements in the safety area, b. to define high level user requirements in the area of safety of innovative nuclear technologies, c. to compile and to analyze existing innovative reactor and fuel cycle technology enhancement concepts and approaches intended to achieve a high degree of safety, and d. to identify the general areas of safety R&D needs for the establishment of these technologies. During the discussions it became evident that the application of the defence in depth strategy will continue to be the overriding approach for achieving the general safety objective in nuclear power plants and fuel cycle facilities, where the emphasis will be shifted from mitigation of accident consequences more towards prevention of accidents. In this context, four high level user requirements have been formulated for the safety of innovative nuclear reactors and fuel cycles. On this basis safety strategies for innovative reactor designs are highlighted in each of the five levels of defence in depth and specific requirements are discussed for the individual components of the fuel cycle.

NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT IN SPAIN: ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION AND ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES

10.6036/10156 ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 355-358
Author(s):  
Pablo Fernández Arias ◽  
DIEGO VERGARA RODRIGUEZ
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Waste ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Nuclear Waste Storage ◽  
Alternative Strategies ◽  
Temporary Storage ◽  
Long Term Storage ◽  
High Level

Centralized Temporary Storage Facility (CTS) is an industrial facility designed to store spent fuel (SF) and high level radioactive waste (HLW) generated at Spanish nuclear power plants (NPP) in a single location. At the end of 2011, the Spanish Government approved the installation of the CTS in the municipality of Villar de Cañas in Cuenca. This approval was the outcome of a long process of technical studies and political decisions that were always surrounded by great social rejection. After years of confrontations between the different political levels, with hardly any progress in its construction, this infrastructure of national importance seems to have been definitively postponed. The present research analyzes the management strategy of SF and HLW in Spain, as well as the alternative strategies proposed, taking into account the current schedule foreseen for the closure of the Spanish NPPs. In view of the results obtained, it is difficult to affirm that the CTS will be available in 2028, with the possibility that its implementation may be delayed to 2032, or even that it may never happen, making it necessary to adopt an alternative strategy for the management of GC and ARAR in Spain. Among the different alternatives, the permanence of the current Individualized Temporary Stores (ITS) as a long-term storage strategy stands out, and even the possibility of building several distributed temporary storage facilities (DTS) in which to store the SF and HLW from several Spanish NPP. Keywords: nuclear waste, storage, nuclear power plants.

Digital I&C Operating Experience in the US

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Geddes ◽  
Ray Torok
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Failure Modes ◽  
Operating Experience ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Common Cause ◽  
Hardware Failure ◽  
Common Cause Failure ◽  
Defensive Measures

The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) is conducting research in cooperation with the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) regarding Operating Experience of digital Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems in US nuclear power plants. The primary objective of this work is to extract insights from US nuclear power plant Operating Experience (OE) reports that can be applied to improve Diversity and Defense in Depth (D3) evaluations and methods for protecting nuclear plants against I&C related Common Cause Failures (CCF) that could disable safety functions and thereby degrade plant safety. Between 1987 and 2007, over 500 OE events involving digital equipment in US nuclear power plants were reported through various channels. OE reports for 324 of these events were found in databases maintained by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). A database was prepared for capturing the characteristics of each of the 324 events in terms of when, where, how, and why the event occurred, what steps were taken to correct the deficiency that caused the event, and what defensive measures could have been employed to prevent recurrence of these events. The database also captures the plant system type, its safety classification, and whether or not the event involved a common cause failure. This work has revealed the following results and insights: - 82 of the 324 “digital” events did not actually involve a digital failure. Of these 82 non-digital events, 34 might have been prevented by making full use of digital system fault tolerance features. - 242 of the 324 events did involve failures in digital systems. The leading contributors to the 242 digital failures were hardware failure modes. Software change appears as a corrective action twice as often as it appears as an event root cause. This suggests that software features are being added to avoid recurrence of hardware failures, and that adequately designed software is a strong defensive measure against hardware failure modes, preventing them from propagating into system failures and ultimately plant events. 54 of the 242 digital failures involved a Common Cause Failure (CCF). - 13 of the 54 CCF events affected safety (1E) systems, and only 2 of those were due to Inadequate Software Design. This finding suggests that software related CCFs on 1E systems are no more prevalent than other CCF mechanisms for which adherence to various regulations and standards is considered to provide adequate protection against CCF. This research provides an extensive data set that is being used to investigate many different questions related to failure modes, causes, corrective actions, and other event attributes that can be compared and contrasted to reveal useful insights. Specific considerations in this study included comparison of 1E vs. non-1E systems, active vs. potential CCFs, and possible defensive measures to prevent these events. This paper documents the dominant attributes of the evaluated events and the associated insights that can be used to improve methods for protecting against digital I&C related CCFs, applying a test of reasonable assurance.

The Regulatory Framework for Safe Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants in Korea

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sangmyeon Ahn ◽  
Jungjoon Lee ◽  
Chanwoo Jeong ◽  
Kyungwoo Choi
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Regulatory Framework ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Current Status ◽  
Nuclear Facilities ◽  
Safety Requirement ◽  
Regulatory Review ◽  
Safety Standards

We are having 23 units of nuclear power plants in operation and 5 units of nuclear power plants under construction in Korea as of September 2012. However, we don’t have any experience on shutdown permanently and decommissioning of nuclear power plants. There are only two research reactors being decommissioned since 1997. It is realized that improvement of the regulatory framework for decommissioning of nuclear facilities has been emphasized constantly from the point of view of IAEA’s safety standards. It is also known that IAEA will prepare the safety requirement on decommissioning of facilities; its title is the Safe Decommissioning of Facilities, General Safety Requirement Part 6. According to the result of IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission to Korea in 2011, it was recommended that the regulatory framework should require decommissioning plans for nuclear installations to be constructed and operated and these plans should be updated periodically. In addition, after the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan in March of 2011, preparedness for early decommissioning caused by an unexpected severe accident became important issues and concerns. In this respect, it is acknowledged that the regulatory framework for decommissioning of nuclear facilities in Korea need to be improved. First of all, we focus on identifying the current status and relevant issues of regulatory framework for decommissioning of nuclear power plants compared to the IAEA’s safety standards in order to achieve our goal. And then the plan is established for improvement of regulatory framework for decommissioning of nuclear power plants in Korea. It is expected that if the things will go forward as planned, the revised regulatory framework for decommissioning could enhance the safety regime on the decommissioning of nuclear power plants in Korea in light of international standards.

Study on a Methodology of Human Factor Engineering Operating Experience Review for Nuclear Power Plant

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danying Gu ◽  
Shuhui Zhang ◽  
Zhonghe Ning
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Human Factor ◽  
Operating Experience ◽  
Sources Of Information ◽  
Nuclear Facilities ◽  
Human Factor Engineering ◽  
Design Procedures ◽  
Function Allocation ◽  
Review Criterion

The reviewing of operating experience at nuclear power plants (NPP) is not only critically important to safe and reliable operations, but also useful to guide the design of new plants which are similar to the current one under review. How to identify and analyze the safety-related operating experience and then implement a more extensive review is a vital and challengeable issue. In this paper, a methodology of human factor engineering (HFE) operating experience review (OER) is proposed for NPP. The need for the application of HFE in the life cycle activities of NPP and other nuclear facilities has been demonstrated by plant operating histories and regulatory and industry reviews. As a very important element of HFE, the OER is performed from the beginning of the design process. The main purpose of performing an OER is to verify that the applicant has identified and analyzed HFE-related safety problems and issues in previous designs that are similar to the current one. In this way, negative features associated with predecessor designs may be avoided in the current NPP design while retaining positive features. The research of OER concentrates on the aspect of review criterion, scope and implementation procedure of the HFE-related operating experience. As the NRC requirement, the scope of operating experience can be divided into six types in accordance with sources of information. The implementation procedures of USA and China are introduced, respectively. The resolution of HFE OER issues involve function allocation, changes in automation, HSI equipment design, procedures, training, and so forth. The OER conclusions can contribute to other HFE activities and improve the safety, reliability and usability of the HSI design in NPP.

Underground Siting of Nuclear Power Plants: Insights From Fukushima

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jay F. Kunze ◽  
James M. Mahar ◽  
Kellen M. Giraud ◽  
C. W. Myers
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Light Water Reactors ◽  
Light Water ◽  
Waste Storage ◽  
Small Modular Reactor ◽  
Fukushima Daiichi ◽  
Water Reactors ◽  
High Level

Siting of nuclear power plants in an underground nuclear park has been proposed by the authors in many previous publications, first focusing on how the present 1200 to 1600 MW-electric light water reactors could be sited underground, then including reprocessing and fuel manufacturing facilities, as well as high level permanent waste storage. Recently the focus has been on siting multiple small modular reactor systems. The recent incident at the Fukushima Daiichi site has prompted the authors to consider what the effects of a natural disaster such as the Japan earthquake and subsequent tsunami would have had if these reactors had been located underground. This paper addresses how the reactors might have remained operable — assuming the designs we previously proposed — and what lessons from the Fukushima incident can be learned for underground nuclear power plant designs.

Centralization of Canada’s Spent Nuclear Fuel

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krista Nicholson ◽  
John McDonald ◽  
Shona Draper ◽  
Brian M. Ikeda ◽  
Igor Pioro
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Site Selection ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Selection Process ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Geologic Repository ◽  
Candu Reactors ◽  
High Level

Currently in Canada, spent fuel produced from Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) is in the interim storage all across the country. It is Canada’s long-term strategy to have a national geologic repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel for CANada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors. The initial problem is to identify a means to centralize Canada’s spent nuclear fuel. The objective of this paper is to present a solution for the transportation issues that surround centralizing the waste. This paper reviews three major components of managing and the transporting of high-level nuclear waste: 1) site selection, 2) containment and 3) the proposed transportation method. The site has been selected based upon several factors including proximity to railways and highways. These factors play an important role in the site-selection process since the location must be accessible and ideally to be far from communities. For the containment of the spent fuel during transportation, a copper-shell container with a steel structural infrastructure was selected based on good thermal, structural, and corrosion resistance properties has been designed. Rail has been selected as the method of transporting the container due to both the potential to accommodate several containers at once and the extensive railway system in Canada.

Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning in Germany: Projects, Regulation and Experience

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leopold Weil ◽  
Bernd Rehs
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Energy ◽  
Radioactive Decay ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Regulatory Body ◽  
Nuclear Facilities ◽  
Interim Storage ◽  
Near Future ◽  
Selection Of

In Germany, altogether 19 nuclear power plants (NPPs) and prototype reactors have been permanently shut down. For 15 NPPs the dismantling is in progress with “green-field conditions” as planning target. Two units were completely dismantled and two are in safe enclosure. The main legal provision for all aspects of the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Germany is the Atomic Energy Act (AtG), which also contains the basic legal conditions for the decommissioning of nuclear facilities. It stipulates that decommissioning is subject to a licence by the regulatory body of the respective Federal State (Land). An emerging decommissioning practice in Germany is the removal of complete undismantled large components and their transport to interim storage facilities. During the period of storage, the radionuclide inventory of the components will decrease due to radioactive decay and the subsequent segmentation of the components can be done with less radiation protection effort. The commissioning of the Konrad repository in the near future might have consequences on planning of decommissioning, regarding the selection of a decommissioning strategy and the waste management.

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