scholarly journals Emotional preparation for the unification of Korea: Through the embracement, forgiveness and love shown in the Gospel of Matthew

2020 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
In-Cheol Shin

The greatest wish of the Baeda l people, or South Koreans, living in the Korean Peninsula is the unification of Korea. However, even when it has been 70 years since the outbreak of the Korean War, the two Koreas that used to be one nation are still in conflict. There have been many discourses on unification over the past 70 years, but these discourses still fail to create clear rules and a framework for unification. Discourses from the perspective of biblical theology offer insight regarding the problems at stake as well as alternatives, but they do not offer perspectives on a definite solution. This article, in line with its statement on biblical theology, does not pretend to contribute to a clear-cut solution to meet the challenge of Korea’s unification. Rather, this article intends to contribute to the formation of an emotional consensus that can contribute to the unification of Korea by looking at the teachings about peace in the Gospel of Matthew. The article explores whether the notion of embracement, forgiveness and love written during the conflict between the Matthean community and Formative Judaism can be applied to help create an emotional bond between the two Koreas. The terms embracement, forgiveness and love found in the Gospel of Matthew are upheld as symbolising peace derived from opposition and conflict. Jesus taught us to overcome situations of opposition and conflict through embracement, forgiveness and love.Contribution: The purpose and contribution of this article was to discuss if the notions of embracement, forgiveness and love found in the Gospel of Matthew can be helpful for the emotional preparation of the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula by comparing the situations reflected in the Gospel of Matthew and that of the Korean Peninsula.

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 206-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angela Semee KIM

AbstractGlobal attention to events on the Korean Peninsula has been striking in the past year. With an inter-Korean summit and an unprecedented US-DPRK summit, hopes of a final end to the Korean War have been renewed. Although these summits resulted in declarations which pronounced an end to the Korean War and an establishment of a peace regime, the declarations must not be mistaken as official peace treaties. Unlike a peace treaty, which is governed by international law, the two summit declarations are not governed by international law due to their lack of legality. Therefore, a clear distinction must be drawn between the declarations and a peace treaty. This paper aims to determine the legal status of the declarations and explain how they are merely non-binding political declarations. The paper then identifies and explores some of the legal implications of a Korean peace treaty.


1955 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander L. George

The Korean War represented the first American experience with the problem of meeting local Communist aggression by means of limited, if costly, warfare. But despite the revulsion with that experience, and the “new look” at military strategy and foreign policy, it may not be the last. The character of recent weapons developments and the passing of our thermonuclear monopoly make it probable that in the future, as in the past, American policy-makers will be forced to consider the alternative of local conflict, with all its problems and risks, in determining how to respond to the threat or actuality of Communist moves in the peripheral areas.In these circumstances, analyses of American policy-making immediately before and during the Korean War may well illuminate the perspectives and considerations relevant to this difficult and dangerous type of operation. Here, no more can be done than toexamine the effect of strategic planning and estimates of Communist intentions and behavior on the decision to commit American forces to the defense of South Korea. This decision, and even the crucial decision to commit ground forces to eventual offensive operations against the aggressor, was made within afew days of the North Korean attack. Attention, accordingly, is focused on American policy reactions to the war in the first week or ten days following June 25, 1950.


2006 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 15-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael M. Sheng

In October 1950 the Chinese leader Mao Zedong embarked on a two-front war. He sent troops to Korea and invaded Tibet at a time when the People's Republic of China was burdened with many domestic problems. The logic behind Mao's risky policy has baffled historians ever since. By drawing on newly available Chinese and Western documents and memoirs, this article explains what happened in October 1950 and why Mao acted as he did. The release of key documents such as telegrams between Mao and his subordinates enables scholars to understand Chinese policymaking vis-à-vis Tibet much more fully than in the past. The article shows that Mao skillfully used the conflicts for his own purposes and consolidated his hold over the Chinese Communist Party.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 43-66
Author(s):  
Laura Ha Reizman

The Korean War (1950–53) changed the material and affective landscape of the Korean peninsula and ushered in a new era ruled by a military dictatorship dependent on US military power. With bases dotting the South Korean peninsula, former agricultural villages became camptowns that catered to the needs of American soldiers. This article focuses on the South Korean melodrama Chiokhwa (Hellflower, 1958), directed by Shin Sang-ok, which narrates a love triangle between two brothers and Sonya, a camptown prostitute or yanggongju. It examines the role of the postwar environment in constructing the spaces of the subject. Using the yanggongju figure as a technology of postwar memory, this work reevaluates the ecology of ruination left in the wake of the Korean War—as portrayed through Sonya, scenes of the city, the camptown, the base, and the surrounding fields and marshes—to explore the sense of loss and displacement of this period.


2019 ◽  
pp. 127-132
Author(s):  
Suhi Choi

How would the reunification of two Koreans impact the case of memorializing the Korean War? The unified land of Korea itself will present a unique memorial site of the Korean War that is filled with cacophonous sets of objects, rituals, and bodies. Such a site will provoke us to witness many ironic puzzles of memories: one’s oppressive ideology could be another’s legitimate saga; victims at a memorial on one side could be recalled as perpetrators in a memorial on the other side; and heroes of one site could be villains of the other. Surely, the unified land of Korea will increase the chances that we will see not only the enmeshed lines among victims, heroes, and perpetrators of both war realities, but also our acts of remembering themselves. It will become a revived palimpsest that invites us to uncover complex layers of memories that conflict with one another and thus are not wrapped up merely with the narrative in hegemony. In these ways, the reunification of the two Koreas potentially will transform the Korean Peninsula from a topography of terror into a subversive platform of empathic mourning.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-95
Author(s):  
Tae Joon Won

This article examines the discussions and decisions which occurred within the British government concerning Britain's military involvement in the Korean peninsula at a time when Britain was pulling out of its military obligations in Asia – colloquially known as the ‘retreat East of Suez’ – in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. After the end of the Korean War, Britain created the Commonwealth Liaison Mission in Seoul and provided a frigate for use in Korean waters by the American-led United Nations Command and British soldiers for the United Nations Honour Guard. When relations between North and South Korea reached crisis point at the end of the 1960s, London was concerned that Britain could be entangled in an unaffordable military conflict in the Korean peninsula. The Ministry of Defence therefore argued for the abolition of the commitment of the British frigate, but the Foreign Office opposed this initiative so as to mitigate the blow to Anglo-American relations caused by Britain's refusal to commit troops to Vietnam. When Edward Heath's government negotiated a Five Power Defence Agreement with Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand in April 1971, the Ministry of Defence was, despite the objections of the Foreign Office, finally successful in repealing the frigate commitment for reasons of overstretching military resources. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence then called for the abolition of the Commonwealth Liaison Mission altogether when it was then discovered that the British contingent of the United Nations Honour Guard would have to fight under the command of the United Nations Commander in case of a military conflict in the Korean peninsula. But this proposal too was rebuffed by the Foreign Office, concerned that such a move would greatly damage Anglo-Korean relations at a time when Britain was considering establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Sandra Wilson

Abstract In the Korean War of 1950-53, U.S. authorities were determined to pursue atrocities perpetrated by North Korean and Communist Chinese forces through legal channels, in keeping with the standards they believed they had set after the Second World War. Yet, their plans foundered in Korea, despite extensive groundwork for prosecutions. Four factors were responsible. First, it was difficult to find reliable evidence and to identify and apprehend suspects. Second, U.S. officials rapidly lost confidence in the idea of prosecuting national leaders. Third, the lack of clear-cut victory in the conflict necessitated a diplomatic solution, which was incompatible with war crimes trials. Fourth, the moral standing of the West, and hence its authority to run trials, was undermined by the large number of atrocities committed by the United Nations side. Thus, the U.S. plan for war crimes trials was dropped without fanfare, to be replaced by an anti-Communist propaganda campaign.


1977 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 67-77
Author(s):  
James D. D'Ianni

Abstract It is a great pleasure and honor to have this opportunity to share with you some of my experiences in synthetic rubber over the past forty years. I am deeply appreciative of my selection as the thirty-fourth recipient of the Charles Goodyear Medal by the Rubber Division of the American Chemical Society and accept it only as a representative of my many associates at Goodyear who have participated with me in significant developments in synthetic rubber during this period. As the title of this talk indicates, we had both successes and disappointments in our endeavors to develop improved synthetic rubbers. These efforts were greatly stimulated by shortages of natural rubber which occurred in times of national emergencies such as World War II and the Korean War. When we successfully met these challenges it was fun, but to the extent that we were not able to achieve all of our objectives, we suffered a number of frustrations.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-89
Author(s):  
Aman Ullah ◽  
Waseem Ishaque ◽  
Muhammad Usman Ullah

The situation in the Korean Peninsula has generally remained uncertain since the time of the Korean war. President Trumps proverbs of fire and fury, Rocket Man and now a valuable partner are gradual transformations, which have been appreciated by the world at large, yet fragility and lack of trust among the key contenders North Korea (DPRK), USA and South Kora may lead to strategic miscalculation and undo the process of confidence-building. The efforts of Russia and China are commendable as these are contributing to a stable environment; however, the world is witnessing these developments with cautious optimism due to the impulsive nature of opposing leaders. On an optimistic note, Chairman Kim and President Trump want to move forward for a reasonable settlement. The leadership on both sides, the global players and regional organizations will have to work for hand in gloves for sustainable peace as failure is the worst option.


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