scholarly journals Rational Acceptability and Truth

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (0) ◽  
pp. 27-39
Author(s):  
Mikiko YOKOYAMA
Keyword(s):  
Rational Acceptability

Philosophy and Common Sense

Philosophy ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 63 (244) ◽  
pp. 161-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Campbell
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Natural Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Jerry Fodor ◽  
Rational Acceptability ◽  
Three Stages ◽  
The One ◽  
The Relationship

This paper raises once more the question of the relationship between philosophy on the one hand and common sense on the other. More particularly, it is concerned with the role which common sense can play in passing judgment on the rational acceptability (or otherwise) of large-scale hypotheses in natural philosophy and the cosmological part of metaphysics. There are, as I see it, three stages through which the relationship has passed in the course of the twentieth century. There is the era of G. E. Moore, the Quine–Feyerabend period, and now a new and modest vindication of common sense is emerging in the work of Jerry Fodor.

Philosophie in der Welt und für die Welt – Realitätsbezüge einer Disziplin zweiter Ordnung

Methodus ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-47
Author(s):  
Oliver R. Scholz
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Scientific Discipline ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Public Image ◽  
Wide Sense ◽  
Adequate Understanding ◽  
Rational Acceptability ◽  
The One ◽  
Philosophical Understanding

According to a widely accepted conception, philosophy is essentially a second-order discipline raising second-order questions about the procedures and products of first-order reasonings (concepts; principles; theories etc.). While this conception has considerable prima facie plausibility and, carefully put, contains a grain of truth, it also invites serious misunderstandings that may be detrimental to an adequate understanding and public image of philosophy. To work out the grain of truth while avoiding the misunderstandings, I begin by asking: What is philosophical understanding? In answering this question, understanding in philosophy is compared and contrasted with everyday understanding, on the one hand, and scientific understanding, on the other hand. While philosophy itself is a scientific practice in a wide sense, in contrast to normal understanding within a special scientific discipline (physics; chemistry; biology; psychology; etc.) philosophical understanding is characterized by a particular critical attitude and particular principles of rational acceptability.

Liberty, Equality and the Rights of Cultures: The Marching Controversy at Drumcree

2000 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane O'Neills
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Peace Process ◽  
Discourse Theory ◽  
Cultural Conflict ◽  
Good Friday ◽  
Good Friday Agreement ◽  
Rational Acceptability ◽  
Normative Basis ◽  
Theoretical Assessment

This article offers a normative-theoretical assessment of a key aspect of the continuing cultural conflict in Northern Ireland. The marching controversy at Drumcree has had a destabilising effect on the peace process and it represents a serious threat to the achievement of the kind of political accommodation outlined in the Good Friday Agreement. The aim is to apply Jürgen Habermas's discourse theory of rights to this dispute so as to assess which, if any, of the conflicting claims should take priority. By seeking to assess the rational acceptability of the better arguments on either side, I reject the view that these claims are irreconcilable. In the concluding section I outline four principles that provide a normative basis for just resolutions to conflicts over contentious marches in Northern Ireland.

Two incomplete anti-realist modal epistemic logics

1990 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 297-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Williamson
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Variable ◽  
Crude Model ◽  
Rational Acceptance ◽  
Rational Acceptability ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Cognitive Attitude ◽  
Realist Conception ◽  
Sentential Operator

Many phrases have been used to express what are sometimes called anti-realist conceptions of truth: ‘verifiability’, ‘knowability’, ‘rational acceptability’, ‘warranted assertability’. In spite of their obvious differences, all four of these phrases have a common form; each is a cognitive attitude modified by ‘-ability’. They speak of the possibility of verification, knowledge, rational acceptance or warranted assertion. Schematically, it seems to be claimed that it is true that A if and only if it is possible that it is E'd that A, where ‘E’ is to be replaced by some cognitive verb and ‘A’ by any indicative sentence of the class to which the anti-realist conception is being claimed to apply. Since truth is redundant as a sentential operator, this boils down to the following thesis, where ‘p’ is a propositional variable and ‘M’ expresses the appropriate kind of possibility:(*) also formalizes views such as Putnam's: ‘To claim a statement is true is to claim it could be justified’ [11, p. 56]. It is no doubt a crude model for anti-realism, but one has to start somewhere; by seeing how and why more sophisticated versions of anti-realism differ from (*) one should be able to understand them better too. Moreover, if an anti-realist rejects the equation of truth with, say, warranted assertibility, arguing that truth is rather to be identified with the possibility of getting into a position in which one's warrant to assert somehow cannot be overturned, the form of (*) is preserved, for truth is still being identified with the possibility of something.

scholarly journals Resolving Quine's Confict: A Neo-Quinean View of the Rational Revisability of Logic

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Amanda Bryant
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Rational Acceptability ◽  
The One ◽  
Apparent Conflict

There is an apparent conflict in Quine’s work between, on the one hand, his clear commitment to the rational revisability of logic and, on the other, his principle of charitable translation and ‘change of logic, change of subject’ argument.  I argue that the apparent conflict is mostly resolved under close exegesis, but that the translation argument normatively rules out collaborative revision and allows only revision by individuals. However, I articulate a Neo-Quinean view that preserves the rational acceptability of collaborative revision. On that view, everything is rationally revisable in some manner or other — it’s just that the logical principles that laypersons find (actually or potentially) obvious and tacitly use to govern their everyday inferences can’t be rationally revised quickly and all at once. Since, in Quine’s view, what most people find obvious resists change, rational changes to laymen’s logic must be gradual.

scholarly journals Plantinga on warrant and acceptability of Christian Belief

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-117
Author(s):  
Stevan Rakonjac
Keyword(s):  
John Locke ◽  
Christian Belief ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Adequate Understanding ◽  
Rational Acceptability ◽  
Easy Answer ◽  
Relevant Notion

Alvin Plantinga wants to answer the following question: Is Christian belief intellectualy or rationaly acceptable? We will present the answer John Locke gives, based on his evidentialism, to the aforementioned question, as well as Plantinga?s critique of Locke?s evidentialist approach. Plantinga thinks that the question ?Is Christian belief intellectualy or rationaly acceptable?? is best understood as meaning ?Is Christian belief warranted??. We will analyze Plantinga?s argument for the claim that Christian belief probably has warrant if it is true, which implies that we first have to show that Christian belief (probably) is false in order to show that it (probably) has no warrant. But than that means that we have to show that Christian belief is false in order to show that it is unacceptable, making it very hard, if not impossible, to show that Christian belief is unacceptable. We will then present one objection to Plantinga?s argument, ?the Great Pumpkin Objection?. Relying on Linda Zagzebski?s analysis, we will claim that the Great Pupmpkin objection shows that Plantinga?s notion of ?warrant? does not adequately capture the meaning of the relevant notion of ?intellectual or rational acceptability? of beliefs, and that, hence, his conclusion about warrant of Christian belief are not necessary relevant for the claims about intellectual or rational acceptability of Christian belief. We will also analyze a solution given by Kyle Scott. He thinks that if we have, in addition to Plantinga?s argument showing that Christian belief is warranted if true, favouring evidence in support of Christian belief, which he thinks we obviously have, than Christian belief is acceptable. We will point out that Scott does not elaborate what makes adequate favouring evidence in support of some belief, and we will calim that adequate understanding of favouring evidence will, in some respects, be very similar to Locke?s evidentialism. If so, than Scott proposal will reintroduce some elements of Locke?s evidentialism, and the question of whether there is favouring evidence in support of Christian belief will not have an obvious and easy answer.

scholarly journals Plantinga's God and other monstrosities

1979 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Grim
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Rational Acceptability ◽  
New Form

In God, Freedom, and Evil, Alvin Plantinga presents a new form of the ontological argument for the existence of God. Though he has reservations concerning its evangelical efficacy, Plantinga considers the proof both valid and sound, and presents it as a defence of the rational acceptability of theism.

Another look at Hume's treatment of the argument from design in the Natural History of Religion

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 461-474 ◽  
Author(s):  
EMILY KELAHAN
Keyword(s):  
Natural History ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
History Of Religion ◽  
Epistemic Evaluation ◽  
Psychological Analysis ◽  
Rational Acceptability ◽  
History Of ◽  
Argument From Design

AbstractThis article argues that Hume's seemingly peculiar treatment of the argument from design in his Natural History of Religion is not indicative of a radical, or even modest, shift in his overall epistemic evaluation of it. His focus is on the argument's impact on the psychology of religious believers, and not its rational acceptability. Hume never strays far from his stated intention for the work, to engage in a socio-psychological analysis of the nature of religious belief, including a thorough assessment of the role of the argument from design. Hume concludes that the argument is inconsequential to religious belief formation.

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