The rise and fall of criticism towards the United States in transatlantic relations

Author(s):  
Tuomas Forsberg
2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (9) ◽  
pp. 871-888
Author(s):  
Andreas Paulus

Robert Kagan's article and book on the future of transatlantic relations have gained much prominence in the debate on the reasons for and impact of the transatlantic rift on the war against Iraq. However, and regrettably, Kagan's work confirms rather than challenges the prejudices and stereotypes of both sides. After putting Kagan's approach in a political perspective, I intend to show that the antinomies used by Kagan and other participants in the debate, such as might and right, unilateralism and multilateralism, prevention and repression, hegemony and sovereign equality, democratic imperialism and pluralism, constitute useful analytical tools, but do not in any way capture the divergence of values and interests between the United States and Europe. However, the result of such an analysis does not lead to the adoption of one or the other extreme, but to the realization that international law occupies the space between them, allowing for the permanent re-negotiation of the place of “Mars” and “Venus” in international affairs.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2(13)/2019 (2(13)/2019) ◽  
pp. 95-100
Author(s):  
Vadim VOLOVOJ

Today’s world is in transition, and nobody can predict what the future power balance will look like. Transatlantic relations and the EU are in trouble. They may transform significantly, but it seems that many European countries are not ready for fundamental change. The United States of Europe or Europe of Nations – what should be the choice for Lithuania and what can it do in case of NATO disintegration? This article is speculative futurology, with the goal of preparing for the future


Author(s):  
Daniel W. B. Lomas

Chapter Five studies Ministerial reactions to the spy scandals that threatened Anglo-American nuclear exchanges. Considering the cases of Alan Nunn May, Klaus Fuchs, Bruno Pontecorvo, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, it argues that Ministers were sensitive to claims from the United States that Britain was weak in the field of security. After the Fuchs and Pontecorvo scandals, Ministers reacted quickly to repair any damage to transatlantic relations by introducing new security procedures known as ‘Positive Vetting’. The chapter also uses newly released archival material to shed light on Ministerial reactions to the disapperance of the Foreign Office diplomats, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, in the spring of 1951. Their defection provoked widespread outrage and, once again, prompted a review of security in government, on this occasion the Foreign Office, on the instructions of the Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, now Foreign Secretary, which is explored here for the first time.


Author(s):  
Reinhild Kreis

This chapter investigates public diplomacy as an attempt to (re)build trust within the Western alliance during the late 1970s and 1980s. Public diplomacy was supposed to help prevent the alleged “drifting apart” of Western Europe and the United States, and to overcome suspicion of and mistrust in the partners' intentions and capabilities, both of which had been shaken during the 1970s and seemed to threaten the cohesion of the Atlantic alliance. Taking West German–American relations as an example, the chapter shows how increased public diplomacy efforts aimed at creating familiarity as a precondition of trust, trying to build on a societal level what is known from interpersonal contacts: trust through familiarity, generated via interaction and shared experiences.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 136-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. Piers Ludlow

Little has been written about transatlantic relations during the presidency of Gerald R. Ford. This article shows that, contrary to what most of the recent historiography suggests, the brief period under Ford did make an important difference in U.S.-West European relations. During the Ford administration, the whole architecture of transatlantic relations was rearranged, creating structures and features that endured well after Ford and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, had left office. In particular, the Ford years witnessed the emergence of a pattern of quadripartite consultation between the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany on foreign policy issues; and the advent of multilateral economic summitry. Each of these innovations transformed the pattern of U.S.-West European dialogue.


2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (9) ◽  
pp. 56-68
Author(s):  
A. Kokeev

This article addresses the most significant changes in German-American relations since the election of J. Biden; unveils the main factors influencing Berlin’s transatlantic policy in relations with Russia and China; analyzes approaches to the climate agenda and problems associated with the fulfillment of Germany’s allied obligations in NATO; reveals new trends in Germany’s approach to the issue of strategic autonomy of the EU; investigates the discrepancies on security issues between the main German parties ahead of the parliamentary elections in September 2021. The first steps of the Biden administration to normalize the transatlantic ties undermined by Trump (the return of the United States to participation in international negotiations and organizations) were seen in Berlin as evidence of significant changes in Washington’s positions on international problems of vital importance to Germany. At the same time, Berlin has no illusion that with the arrival of Biden, transatlantic relations will once again be the same as they were before Trump’s presidency. The most important stumbling block in the beginning process of resetting the transatlantic relations was the set of problems associated with the completion of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline construction. It is clear that Biden is just as harshly rejecting this project as his predecessor did, and will continue to obstruct its commissioning. After the elections to the Bundestag in September 2021, the internal political situation in Germany may change significantly. In any case, the Nord Stream 2 issue will remain a subject of disputes and serious disagreements between Germany, the USA, the EU and Russia for a long time. In Germany it is assumed that in the coming decades, the transatlantic agenda will be largely determined by the growing influence and policy of China, and the relationship between the United States and the EU with China will affect not only the economic interests of the FRG, but also the sphere of its security. The climate agenda today remains one of the few areas where it is possible not only to revive the transatlantic interaction, but also to intensify cooperation between the United States, the EU, China and Russia with an eye to interaction in solving other problems, not necessarily related to the climate agenda. The most important U.S. demand for Germany remains an increase in its material and financial contribution to NATO. Berlin’s readiness to meet these requirements has increased significantly. However, the thesis that the Europeans are faced with a choice – a course towards strategic autonomy or restoration of close ties with Washington and reliance on the United States and NATO – seems simplified. Representatives of all German parties are unanimous in the opinion that the renewal of the transatlantic partnership, which has begun under Biden, will be accompanied by a reduction in American commitments in Europe. Therefore, the EU will have to invest more in its own security and (in the longer term) strategic autonomy.


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