FRG and Biden's Transatlantic Strategy: Unsolved Problems and New Challenges

2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (9) ◽  
pp. 56-68
Author(s):  
A. Kokeev

This article addresses the most significant changes in German-American relations since the election of J. Biden; unveils the main factors influencing Berlin’s transatlantic policy in relations with Russia and China; analyzes approaches to the climate agenda and problems associated with the fulfillment of Germany’s allied obligations in NATO; reveals new trends in Germany’s approach to the issue of strategic autonomy of the EU; investigates the discrepancies on security issues between the main German parties ahead of the parliamentary elections in September 2021. The first steps of the Biden administration to normalize the transatlantic ties undermined by Trump (the return of the United States to participation in international negotiations and organizations) were seen in Berlin as evidence of significant changes in Washington’s positions on international problems of vital importance to Germany. At the same time, Berlin has no illusion that with the arrival of Biden, transatlantic relations will once again be the same as they were before Trump’s presidency. The most important stumbling block in the beginning process of resetting the transatlantic relations was the set of problems associated with the completion of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline construction. It is clear that Biden is just as harshly rejecting this project as his predecessor did, and will continue to obstruct its commissioning. After the elections to the Bundestag in September 2021, the internal political situation in Germany may change significantly. In any case, the Nord Stream 2 issue will remain a subject of disputes and serious disagreements between Germany, the USA, the EU and Russia for a long time. In Germany it is assumed that in the coming decades, the transatlantic agenda will be largely determined by the growing influence and policy of China, and the relationship between the United States and the EU with China will affect not only the economic interests of the FRG, but also the sphere of its security. The climate agenda today remains one of the few areas where it is possible not only to revive the transatlantic interaction, but also to intensify cooperation between the United States, the EU, China and Russia with an eye to interaction in solving other problems, not necessarily related to the climate agenda. The most important U.S. demand for Germany remains an increase in its material and financial contribution to NATO. Berlin’s readiness to meet these requirements has increased significantly. However, the thesis that the Europeans are faced with a choice – a course towards strategic autonomy or restoration of close ties with Washington and reliance on the United States and NATO – seems simplified. Representatives of all German parties are unanimous in the opinion that the renewal of the transatlantic partnership, which has begun under Biden, will be accompanied by a reduction in American commitments in Europe. Therefore, the EU will have to invest more in its own security and (in the longer term) strategic autonomy.

Author(s):  
Ruth A. Bevan

The basic thesis of this paper is that Southeast Asia will be the crucible and the testing ground for a new Euro-American partnership. Both the United States and the European Union have vital interests in Southeast Asia. These interests certainly involve economics. They definitely concern security issues. And, for both the United States and the European Union, though for similar reasons differently nuanced, these interests aspire to the realm of ideals and idealism, of norms and normativism.


2020 ◽  
pp. 54-64
Author(s):  
Alexander Shumilin ◽  

The article analyzes the state of relations between transatlantic partners in the context of the presidential campaign in the United States, and also attempts to predict their development after November 2020.The presidency of D. Trump thoroughly shook the foundations of Euro-Atlantic solidarity. This applies to the parties' adherence to democratic values (Trump does not hide his sympathy for European leaders with a penchant for authoritarianism), and also applies to the interaction of the US and the EU in the trade, economic and military fields. While most European elites prefer the Democratic candidate Biden to win the presidential election, many analysts believe that his probable arrival in the White House will hardly change much. Transatlantic relations have already entered a stage of serious transformation. We can witness the emergence of a “new normal” in transatlantic relations, accepted by Brussels on the one hand and, apparently, by Biden's team, on the other. It is designed to reduce the previous scale of the EU's dependence on the United States in the field of defense, while fixing issues in relation where the approaches of the allies may not completely coincide or even differ significantly (a striking example is the fate of the “Nord Stream 2”). If implemented, this model of relations may prevent the emergence of new lines of tension between allies in the transatlantic partnership.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2(13)/2019 (2(13)/2019) ◽  
pp. 95-100
Author(s):  
Vadim VOLOVOJ

Today’s world is in transition, and nobody can predict what the future power balance will look like. Transatlantic relations and the EU are in trouble. They may transform significantly, but it seems that many European countries are not ready for fundamental change. The United States of Europe or Europe of Nations – what should be the choice for Lithuania and what can it do in case of NATO disintegration? This article is speculative futurology, with the goal of preparing for the future


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (2/2021) ◽  
pp. 29-44
Author(s):  
Milan Igrutinovic

Over the last decade the EU has faced challenges on numerous fronts: economic crisis and slow recovery, refugee crisis, terrorism, Brexit, lack of effectiveness of its foreign and security policy. In recent years, the EU has put new effort to define its purpose and standing in international relations, and it seeks to become strategically autonomous actor. That means an actor with the ability to set priorities and make decisions. As the role of the United States is still pre-eminent in the security of Europe, the EU-US relations have a special bearing on that EU’s ambition. In this paper we provide an overview of the relations between these two actors with the focus on the first year of Joseph Biden presidency, and we argue that through a complex interaction the EU will seek to define its policies independently of the United States, wishing to expand its space for maneuver and action.


Dixi ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Viktoria Babanina

The article analyzes approaches to the prevention of female fraud in order to identify the best ways to combat fraud committed by women. Theoretical approaches to the measures to prevent crimes committed by women, in particular, female fraud were examined. Peculiarities of the legal regulation of the prevention of female fraud in Ukraine have been studied. The conclusion was made about the insufficiency of normative acts aimed at combating female fraud in Ukraine. In addition, the investigation revealed that measures taken in Ukraine to prevent female fraud were poor and insufficient. In parallel, the experience of the EU countries and the USA in the prevention of female fraud was analyzed in the article. The programs and methods of prevention of crimes committed by women in the USA and the EU have been studied. Based on this analysis, proposals to improve approaches to the prevention of female crime, in particular, female fraud, have been developed. In particular, the conclusion was made that preventive work among the population as well as creation of special programs to work with women would be relevant.


Author(s):  
Michael Smith ◽  
Rebecca Steffenson

This chapter examines the evolution of the European Union's relations with the United States. More specifically, it looks at the ways in which EU–US relations enter into the international relations of the EU as well as the implications for key areas of the EU's growing international activity. The chapter begins with an overview of the changing shape and focus of the EU–US relationship as it enters into economic, political, and security questions. It then considers the impact of EU–US relations on the EU's system of international relations, on the EU's role in the processes of international relations, and on the EU's position as a ‘power’ in international relations. It shows that the EU–US relationship has played a key (and contradictory) role in development of the EU's foreign policy mechanisms.


Politeja ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (6(75)) ◽  
pp. 51-74
Author(s):  
Józef Fiszer

The study is devoted to Poland’s accession to NATO and the European Union (EU) and describes Germany’s stance on Poland’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations after 1989, which, despite various assessments, was not explicit and enthusiastic. However, it evolved gradually and was determined by a difficult internal situation after the reunification of Germany and its new geopolitics and geoeconomics. For Germany that reunified on 3 October 1990, an issue of greater importance than Polish accession to NATO and the EU was the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of the former GDR and normalization of relations with neighbors, particularly with France, Poland, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Both France and the United Kingdom, as well as the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent, the United States initially were afraid of a reunified Germany and opposed Polish membership in Euro-Atlantic structures. At the time, hopes and fears were rife about the future of Europe. A common question was being asked in Paris, London, Moscow, Washington, and Warsaw – would reunified Germany remain a European state, or would Europe become German? Should Germany stay in NATO or leave after the reunification? There were questions also about Moscow’s policy towards reunified Germany and its position on Poland’s accession to Euro-Atlantic structures. Unfortunately, for a long time, it was negative. Today, thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany, we can see that the black scenarios that were outlined in 1989-1990 did not actually come true. Despite the fears, those events opened the way for Poland to “return to Europe” and to gain membership in Euro-Atlantic structures, i.e., NATO and the European Union (EU). The path was not at all simple and it was not easy for Poland to make it through. In the study the author analyses subjective and objective difficulties related to Poland's accession to NATO and the EU and describes the evolution and role of Germany in this process.


2020 ◽  
pp. 114-136
Author(s):  
Vladimir Chernega ◽  

The article considers the views existing in France on the prospects of the European Union becoming a «political power» and the appearance in it of its own military instrument. It is noted that, in the opinion of most French politicians, experts and journalists, the EU is still far from being a full-pledged political subject. Although political and military structures are formed in it, as a kind of «embrio» of quasi statehood, and a «neo-imperial» tendency already exists in it, basically the EU is an economic and «civilian» power which must fight for influence on the international arena only with the help of «soft power». The main reason of its weakness is its internal friability, disagreements between Members States over its future. In addition, the United States, which are not interested in a new global rival, are hampering the achievement of the self-sufficiency, especially in the military-political share. NATO, controlled by the USA, can only allow the creation of a «European pillar» under its umbrella. Eastern European countries are against military integration of the EU, because they are oriented not by Brussels, but by Washington in the security field. However, the rise of China and the election of the nationalist Donald Trump as a President of the United States strengthened the trend in the EU advocating its political independence and the creation of its own «European defence». The article analyzes the initiatives and actions of French President Emmanuel Macron who personifies this trend. It is stated that, with the help of Germany, he managed to achieve certain progress both in terms of general integration and in the field of «European defence». This allowed him to speak about the formation of a «European army». But the question of whether he will be able to go further remains open. Besides the obstacles to political and military integration, which did not disappear, the coronavirus pandemic introduces its «corrections». The newly discovered split in the EU into «South» and «North» called into question its already fragile construction.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (8) ◽  
pp. 226-235
Author(s):  
O. Khlopov

The article is devoted to the study of energy problems in the foreign policy of the EU and the United States. The analysis of the paper is formed on a cognitive approach in analyzing the foreign policy making process and explores the relationship between energy and foreign policy of the EU and the USA. Based on the comparative method, the study races the role of the energy factor in shaping the foreign policy of the European Union and the United States. Although the US is the world's largest hydrocarbon producer and net exporter of energy, mainly due to its shale deposits, the EU remains the world's largest energy importer. This significant difference provides an opportunity to compare the role of energy in the foreign policy process of the two participants with completely different potential for the production and export, mostly of hydrocarbon resources. The author argues that the energy security strategies of both actors are based on interaction of material and ideological factors, but they have different ideas about the interests that generate their foreign policy behavior.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 63-71
Author(s):  
Vladislav Belov ◽  

In mid-July 2021, American-German talks were held in Washington, within the framework of which J. Biden and A. Merkel discussed the prospects for the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline (NS-2). This project under President D. Trump became one of the conflicting factors that significantly worsened relations between the United States and Germany. On July 21, a joint statement by the President and the Bundeskanzlerin was published, containing a description of the conditions for the commercial launch of NS-2. The article analyzes the changes in the position of the new American administration regarding the NS-2, the agreements reached in July on the operating conditions for the new gas pipeline, its significance for Berlin's relations with Washington, Moscow, Kiev and Warsaw. Considering the results of the negotiations as a compromise between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany with ambiguous consequences for Russia, the author concludes that a number of risks remain for the project – the operator of the SP-2 and its owner, Gazprom, during the commercial launch and subsequent operation of the offshore and onshore sections of the gas pipeline, will have to continue to resist the resistance of its opponents in the USA, Germany and several other EU countries.


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