Brentano, Franz Clemens (1838–1917)

Author(s):  
Roderick M. Chisholm ◽  
Peter Simons

Brentano was a philosopher and psychologist who taught at the Universities of Würzburg and Vienna. He made significant contributions to almost every branch of philosophy, notably psychology and philosophy of mind, ontology, ethics and the philosophy of language. He also published several books on the history of philosophy, especially Aristotle, and contended that philosophy proceeds in cycles of advance and decline. He is best known for reintroducing the scholastic concept of intentionality into philosophy and proclaiming it as the characteristic mark of the mental. His teachings, especially those on what he called descriptive psychology, influenced the phenomenological movement in the twentieth century, but because of his concern for precise statement and his sensitivity to the dangers of the undisciplined use of philosophical language, his work also bears affinities to analytic philosophy. His anti-speculative conception of philosophy as a rigorous discipline was furthered by his many brilliant students. Late in life Brentano’s philosophy radically changed: he advocated a sparse ontology of physical and mental things (reism), coupled with a linguistic fictionalism stating that all language purportedly referring to non-things can be replaced by language referring only to things.

Pyrrhonian skepticism is defined by its commitment to inquiry. The Greek work skepsis means inquiry—not doubt, or whatever else later forms of skepticism took to be at the core of skeptical philosophy. The book proposes that Sextus Empiricus’s legacy in the history of epistemology is that he developed an epistemology of inquiry. The volume’s authors investigate epistemology after Sextus, both ways in which he has influenced the history of philosophy and ways in which he and the Pyrrhonian tradition he represents ought to contribute to contemporary debates. As a whole, the book aims to (re)instate Sextus as an important philosopher in these discussions in much the same way that Aristotle has been brought into discussions in contemporary ethics, action theory, and metaphysics. Sextus provides a fresh take on contemporary debates because he approaches issues of perception, disagreement, induction, and ignorance from the perspective of inquiry. The volume’s contributions address four core themes of Sextus’s skepticism: (1) appearances and perception, (2) the structure of justification and proof, (3) belief and ignorance, and (4) ethics and action. These themes are explored in some historical authors whose work relates to Sextus, including Peripatetic logicians, Locke, Hume, Nietzsche, and German idealists; and they are explored as they figure in today’s epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and ethics.


Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael P. Wolf ◽  
Jeremy Randel Koons

Wilfrid Sellars (b. 1912–d. 1989) did some of the most interesting and challenging work in Western philosophy in the 20th century. At a time when most philosophers were moving toward increasingly narrow specialization in their scholarship, he produced a large corpus that was both systematic and extensive in scope. Sellars is also a difficult philosopher to read, however. “I revise my papers until only I can understand them,” he is rumored to have said, “and then I revise them once more.” His prose is both idiosyncratic and ambitious, striking out in novel directions while striving to address the concerns of the past on every page. This article strives to address his most significant contributions to epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and ethics. Most of the details of his work in the history of philosophy, particularly his work on Kant, are passed over. Wherever possible, original dates and sources of publication are included to give the reader a sense of the progression of Sellars’s work, but nearly all of these papers are included in one or more of the anthologies listed.


Author(s):  
Randall A. Poole

In 1911 the Moscow Psychological Society celebrated the accomplishments of Lev Lopatin, a major Russian idealist and personalist philosopher. Lopatin was lauded for his chairmanship of the Psychological Society, the oldest learned society ‘uniting the philosophical forces of Russia’, and for his contributions to Russian philosophy: to the critique of positivism, to the development of Russian philosophical language and the history of philosophy in Russia, to the defence of idealism through his theories of ‘creative causation’ and the soul’s substantiality, to philosophical psychology, and to the strength and independence of Russian philosophic culture. Twenty-five years earlier the appearance of the first volume of Lopatin’s main work, Polozhitel’nye zadachi filosofii (The Positive Tasks of Philosophy), was indeed a milestone in the philosophical revolt against positivism and the development of Russian neo-idealism. In this and subsequent works Lopatin advanced his ‘system of concrete spiritualism’. His idea of the person as an ontologically grounded spiritual entity relates him to Leibniz’s monadology, and he is regarded as one of the main representatives of ‘neo-Leibnizianism’ in Russia, following Aleksei Kozlov. Another source of his ideas was his long-time friend the Russian religious philosopher Vladimir Solov’ëv, despite certain philosophical differences between them.


2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Zahavi ◽  
Andrei Simionescu-Panait

This time around, we have the chance of getting to know Prof. Dan Zahavi of the University of Copenhagen, one of phenomenology's top researchers, whose thought expresses a particular voice in the philosophy of mind and interdisciplinary cognitive research. Today, we shall explore topics regarding phenomenology in our present scientific context, Edmund Husserl's takes on phenomenology, the influence of the history of philosophy on shaping contemporary cognitive research and the links and possibilities between phenomenology and psychology, in both method and practice.


Author(s):  
James Dodd

This chapter sketches the trajectory of Jan Patočka’s philosophical development against the background of the conflicts and crises that marked the history of the twentieth century, and which profoundly affected the Czech philosopher. The relevant period spans from the 1930s, when Patočka studied under Edmund Husserl in Freiburg, to the philosopher’s activities as a dissident in 1970s Czechoslovakia. Particular attention is paid to Patočka’s deep reading of the history of philosophy; the complexities of his appropriation of the phenomenological philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger; and the philosophy of history developed late in his career. The chapter ends with a consideration of Patočka’s influence on contemporary phenomenological philosophy, suggesting that his most promising contribution lies in his challenging engagement with the problem of Europe, above all his call for a post-European philosophical perspective.


2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-101
Author(s):  
Ermylos Plevrakis

AbstractAlthough Hegel does not pass up the opportunity to express his deep admiration for specific aspects of the Aristotelian notion of God, he is not interested in giving a concrete account of its systematic significance for his Philosophy of Mind as a whole. In this article, I seek to take an overarching perspective on both the Aristotelian God and the Hegelian mind. By contrast to the common practice of focusing on Hegel's interpretation of Aristotle in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, I first examine the Aristotelian text itself and then focus on Hegel's Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Mind, in order to explore the coincidence between the two conceptions from a systematic point of view. With regard to Aristotle, I argue that ‘God’ represents the conceptual vanishing point of his philosophy at which all philosophical sciences appear to converge. With regard to Hegel, I show that it is precisely such conceptual convergence of all philosophical sciences that constitutes both the starting and ending points of the Philosophy of Mind. The result is a novel meta-scientific and non-theistic conception of ‘God’ that provides the means not only to re-evaluate the systematic relation between Hegel and Aristotle but also to reconsider the character, content and aim of speculative philosophy in general.


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