XII—The Distinction in Kind between Knowledge and Belief

Drawing inspiration from a well-attested historical tradition, I propose an account of cognition according to which knowledge is not only prior to belief; it is also, and crucially, not a kind of belief. Believing, in turn, is not some sort of botched knowing, but a mental state fundamentally different from knowing, with its own distinctive and complementary role in our cognitive life. I conclude that the main battle-line in the history of epistemology is drawn between the affirmation of a natural mental state in which there is a contact between ‘mind’ and ‘reality’ (whatever the ontological nature of this ‘reality’) and the rejection of such a natural mental state. For the former position, there is a mental state which is different in kind from belief, and which is constituted by the presence of the object of cognition to the cognitive subject, with no gap between them. For the latter position, all our cognition is belief, and the question becomes how and when belief is permissible.

Epistemology After Sextus Empiricus

Pyrrhonian skepticism is defined by its commitment to inquiry. The Greek work skepsis means inquiry—not doubt, or whatever else later forms of skepticism took to be at the core of skeptical philosophy. The book proposes that Sextus Empiricus’s legacy in the history of epistemology is that he developed an epistemology of inquiry. The volume’s authors investigate epistemology after Sextus, both ways in which he has influenced the history of philosophy and ways in which he and the Pyrrhonian tradition he represents ought to contribute to contemporary debates. As a whole, the book aims to (re)instate Sextus as an important philosopher in these discussions in much the same way that Aristotle has been brought into discussions in contemporary ethics, action theory, and metaphysics. Sextus provides a fresh take on contemporary debates because he approaches issues of perception, disagreement, induction, and ignorance from the perspective of inquiry. The volume’s contributions address four core themes of Sextus’s skepticism: (1) appearances and perception, (2) the structure of justification and proof, (3) belief and ignorance, and (4) ethics and action. These themes are explored in some historical authors whose work relates to Sextus, including Peripatetic logicians, Locke, Hume, Nietzsche, and German idealists; and they are explored as they figure in today’s epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and ethics.

Correlation of logical and intuitive knowledge in cognition

The article examines the philosophical problems of classical logic and intuition, which is a necessary tool for the cognitive process. The role and significance of logic in the history of philosophy, the relationship between logic and intuition, their role in cognitive activity. The significance, role and stages of creativity in the aspect of modern problems of cognition, as well as the relationship between creativity and intuition are considered. The insufficiency of discursive thinking in scientific problems is proved, and intuitive thinking is considered as heuristic knowledge that generates new ideas. The analysis of definitions of intuition by philosophers in the history of epistemology is carried out. The classification of intellectual intuition is given. Logic and intuition are considered not as antipodes, but as forms of thinking closely related and complementary to each other.

Lessons from Gettier

This chapter argues that the literature surrounding the Gettier Problem arises from a kind of methodological false consciousness in the epistemology of the middle part of the twentieth century. The underlying methodology is contrasted with two paradigms within the history of epistemology: one prompted by the conversational context of scrapes with the skeptic and the other on the scientific project of trying to understand the universe and our place in it. These competing paradigms call for two quite different epistemological projects and we can separate the two projects in a way that sees them as complementary, unlike the picture that emerges from within the presuppositions of the Gettier literature. The resulting picture does not make the Gettier Problem go away, but implies a weaker claim, that it should not now be and never should have been a primary focus of epistemology.

The Sensory Domain

The history of epistemology displays a long quest for the elusive domain of sensory privilege, the place where sensory indubitability finds vindication in some measure of infallibility. There have been the most dramatic disagreements and reversals and confusions regarding where in the world this domain is to be found, disagreements that in turn fuel the notorious disputes over the cognitive value of perception. The focus of this chapter is on those who take there to be some external locus of sensory privilege, beginning with Aristotle and the surprisingly different story among later Aristotelians, then moving on toward the crisis that emerges when the privileged sensory domain of scholastics philosophers turns out to be illusory. From this crisis emerge the various modern theories of perception: subjective, reductive, and dispositional.

The ‘Do It Yourself’ Paradigm: An Inquiry into the Historical Roots of the Neglect of Testimony

In contemporary social epistemology, the claim has been made that there is a traditional “neglect of testimonial knowledge,” and that in the history of epistemology, first-hand self-knowledge was invariably prioritised over secondary knowledge. While this paper acknowledges some truth in these statements, it challenges the given explanations: the mentioned neglect of testimonial knowledge is based not so much on a primacy of self-knowledge, but that of self-agency. This article retraces some crucial chapters of this ‘do-it-yourself’ paradigm: it considers the imperative of autopsia in early Greek epistemology, history and medicine, and the early modern refashioning of the privilege of self-generated and self-taught (autodidactic) knowledge. A new picture emerges of how the emphasis on (self-)agency progressively shifted towards a focus on the self as the source of ultimate knowledge.

Augustine

At the heart of Augustine’s intellectual and spiritual autobiography is a search for wisdom that demands of him sophisticated epistemological reflection. The results—in particular, his identification of the category of rational or justified assent on less-than-certain grounds and his inquiry into the nature and epistemic value of testimony—break dramatic new ground in the history of epistemology. He articulates a concept of belief (as assent to a proposition on the basis of testimony) and distinguishes it from understanding (assent to a proposition on the basis of reasoned insight). Exploiting that distinction, he develops both a rationale for and a detailed account of a systematic method for the rational investigation of theological matters, which he characterizes as belief seeking understanding. Augustine’s famous reflections on the paradox of evil and on the nature of the divine Trinity provide compelling illustrations of his application of this rational method and its results.