Duty

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert L. Frazier
Keyword(s):  
Moral Duty ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Normative Requirement ◽  
As If ◽  
Reason For Action

To have a duty is, above all, to be subject to a binding, normative requirement. This means that unless there are exculpating reasons someone who has a duty is required to satisfy it, and can be justifiably criticized for not doing so. Having a duty to do something is like having been given a command by someone who has a right to be obeyed: it must be done. Sometimes we speak as if we have duties to individuals (such as persons and institutions). So, for example, if Jones makes a promise to Smith, then Jones has a duty to Smith to keep the promise. We also talk as if we have duties to perform, or to refrain from performing, types of actions, for instance, a duty to help those in need. Even if the performance of such a duty involves treating an individual in a certain way, the duty may not be to that individual. For example, a duty to be charitable might not be a duty to anyone, not even the recipient of the charity. An important feature of duties is that they provide some justifying reason for action. If we explain why we did something by saying that it was our duty, we are offering a justification for the action. Such a justifying reason does not depend on the entire nature of the action. For example, if we make a promise, we have some justifying reason for keeping it, regardless of what was promised, or to whom the promise was made. Again it is like a command. If we are given a command by someone with a right to be obeyed, we have some justification for obeying it, no matter what we are commanded to do. On some views, however, the justifying reason we have for doing something because it is required by duty may not be decisive: we may have an even better reason for doing something else. None the less, that something is required by duty provides some justifying reason for doing it. Talk about duties is found in many areas; we speak, for example, of legal duties, moral duties, professional duties, the duties of a scholar and, even, matrimonial duties. This discussion will focus on moral duty, but may have wider application.

Group Duties

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Collins
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Systemic Reform ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Tripartite Model ◽  
Group Level ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Fundamental Categories ◽  
Group Pattern

Moral duties are regularly attributed to groups. We might think that the United Kingdom has a moral duty to defend human rights, that environmentalists have a moral duty to push for global systemic reform, or that the affluent have a moral duty to alleviate poverty. This book asks (i) whether such groups are apt to bear duties and (ii) what this implies for their members. It defends a ‘Tripartite Model’ of group duties, which divides groups into three fundamental categories. First, combinations are collections of agents that do not have any goals or decision-making procedures in common. Combinations cannot bear moral duties. Instead, we should re-cast their purported duties as a series of duties—one held by each agent in the combination. Each duty demands its bearer to ‘I-reason’: to do the best they can, given whatever they happen to believe the others will do. Second, coalitions are groups whose members share goals but lack decision-making procedures. Coalitions also cannot bear duties, but their alleged duties should be replaced with members’ several duties to ‘we-reason’: to do one’s part in a particular group pattern of actions, on the presumption that others will do likewise. Third, collectives have group-level procedures for making decisions. They can bear duties. Collectives’ duties imply duties for collectives’ members to use their role in the collective with a view to the collective doing its duty.

scholarly journals Guns or Food: On Prioritizing National Security over Global Poverty Relief

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco García-Gibson
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
International Relations ◽  
National Security ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Global Poverty ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
Risk Of Death ◽  
Poverty Relief ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
International Anarchy

Political realists claim that international relations are in a state of anarchy, and therefore every state is allowed to disregard its moral duties towards other states and their inhabitants. Realists argue that complying with moral duties is simply too risky for a state’s national security. Political moralists convincingly show that realists exaggerate both the extent of international anarchy and the risks it poses to states who act morally. Yet moralists do not go far enough, since they do not question realism’s normative core: the claim that when national security is really at risk, states are allowed to disregard their moral duties. I contend that there is at least one moral duty that states should not disregard even if their inhabitants are at risk of death by military aggression: the duty to reduce extreme global poverty. The reason is that even granting that national security is about securing individuals’ right to life, global poverty relief is about that as well.

A Puzzle of Enforceability: Why do Moral Duties Differ in their Enforceability?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Christian Barry ◽  
Emily McTernan
Keyword(s):  
Social Costs ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
The Third ◽  
Moral Duties

Abstract When someone is poised to fail to fulfil a moral duty, we can respond in a variety of ways. We might remind them of their duty, or seek to persuade them through argument. Or we might intervene forcibly to ensure that they act in accordance with their duty. Some duties appear to be such that the duty-bearer can be liable to forcible interference when this is necessary to ensure that they comply with them. We’ll call duties that carry such liabilities enforcement-apt. Not all duties seem to be enforcement-apt. Some, for example, accept that a person in a monogamous marriage has a moral duty to refrain from infidelity, but deny that a spouse can be compelled to comply with their duty to be faithful without transgressing her rights. More controversially, some think that our duties to assist others in severe need are not enforcement-apt. What could explain the contrast between duties that are enforcement-apt while and those that are not? We’ll call this the puzzle of enforceability and our paper considers three broad strategies for responding to it. The first strategy takes the form of identifying some substantive feature or features that are necessary and/or sufficient for a duty to possess some enforcement status. We consider a range of candidate explanations of this sort but find that none are plausible. The second strategy rejects the idea that there are genuinely enforcement-inapt duties and instead seeks to explain why there can nonetheless be marked differences amongst duties concerning how they can be enforced and who can enforce them. We find that this strategy too is largely unsuccessful. The third strategy offered seeks an explanation of differences in enforcement status by appeal to the broader social costs of enforcing certain kinds of duties. We find that this approach holds some promise but note that it requires adopting a controversial set of moral commitments. We conclude by considering our options in the absence of a solution to our puzzle.

UNDERIVATIVE DUTY: PRICHARD ON MORAL OBLIGATION

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Hurka
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
External World ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
History Of Ethics ◽  
Central Figure ◽  
Ancient Ethics ◽  
Henry Sidgwick ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
History Of ◽  
Three Stages

AbstractThis paper examines H.A. Prichard's defense of the view that moral duty is underivative, as reflected in his argument that it is a mistake to ask “Why ought I to do what I morally ought?”, because the only possible answer is “Because you morally ought to.” This view was shared by other philosophers of Prichard's period, from Henry Sidgwick through A.C. Ewing, but Prichard stated it most forcefully and defended it best. The paper distinguishes three stages in Prichard's argument: one appealing to his conceptual minimalism, one an epistemological argument that parallels Moore's response to skepticism about the external world, and one arguing that attempts to justify moral duties on non-moral grounds distort the phenomena by giving those duties the wrong explanation or ground. The paper concludes by considering Prichard's critique of ancient ethics and in particular the ethics of Aristotle. The paper is broadly sympathetic to Prichard's position and arguments; its aim is partly to make a case for him as a central figure in the history of ethics.

Social Meaning, Compliance Conditions, and Law’s Claim to Authority

2002 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Edmundson
Keyword(s):  
Social Change ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Fair Play ◽  
Social Meaning ◽  
Social Meanings ◽  
Moral Duties

Political authorities claim to be able to impose moral duties on citizens by the mere expedient of legislating. This claim is problematic -- in fact, among theorists, it is widely denied that political authorities have such powers. I argue that the legitimacy of political authority is not contingent upon the truth of its claim to be able to impose moral duties by mere legislation. Such claims are better seen as exercises of semiotic techniques to alter social meanings. These alterations serve to facilitate desirable social change that may not have been antecedently obligatory because of the nonfulfillment of a compliance condition, which normally attaches to any "fair-play" duty. Where political authority uses the semiotic technique of announcing a legal -- and by implication moral -- duty, thereby altering social meaning as a means of bringing about the satisfaction of a compliance condition, it makes a claim whose literal falsehood (if false it be) does not derogate from the authority’s legitimacy.

The General Nature of a Moral Duty

Philosophy ◽  
1953 ◽  
Vol 28 (104) ◽  
pp. 41-57
Author(s):  
W. J. Rees
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
General Nature ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
The One

I propose in this article to reconsider, in the light of some recent developments in the theory of knowledge, certain general questions about the nature of duty. In particular, I propose to consider the question of the relation between our moral duties on the one hand, and our knowledge or ignorance of facts and of moral principles on the other.

12. Intensive Animal Farming and Moral Status

2021 ◽  
pp. 172-186
Author(s):  
William Abel ◽  
Elizabeth Kahn ◽  
Tom Parr ◽  
Andrew Walton
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
The State ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Human Consumption ◽  
Moral Concern ◽  
Animal Farming ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Relevant Community

This chapter studies which principles should govern the state’s regulation of the treatment of non-human animals raised for human consumption. It defends the claim that it is wrong to inflict pain on or to kill animals, and that the state should prohibit intensive animal farming on these bases. The chapter then considers the objection that there is no moral duty to act in this way because animals are not part of the relevant community of moral concern. It demonstrates that it is implausible to restrict the scope of moral duties in this way. Finally, the chapter explores the claim that it would be wrong for the state to enforce compliance with these duties, but it contends that limiting the state’s role in this way leads to various implausible conclusions regarding how it should regulate the treatment of both animals and humans.

scholarly journals The Universality of Moral Requirements and Duties to Close Persons

2018 ◽  
pp. 103-113
Author(s):  
A. V. Prokofyev
Keyword(s):  
Moral Duty ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Preferential Treatment ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Equality ◽  
Special Obligations ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Political Communities ◽  
High Level ◽  
Moral Requirements

The article traces origins of the contradiction that calls into being the polemics on the moral status of duties to close persons (special obligations). Special obligations are created by the unique life narrative of an actor that makes different recipients of her actions more or less distant. Those who are less distant are “close ones.” Those who are more distant are “strangers.” The basis of this distance can be different: individual sympathy, consanguinity, belonging to cultural, territorial and political communities. Special obligations presuppose that the preferential treatment of “close ones” is not only permissible but obligatory. This feature of moral duties to close persons makes moral philosophers suspicious because they are prone to endow moral requirements with two interrelated properties: universality and the high level of generality. The main reason for this is that the typical moral duty is a duty of every human being to another human being without any further qualifications. Against the background of such duties, any preference to close persons looks like the breach of moral equality and manifestation of impermissible partiality. Though, common moral beliefs persistently include special obligations in the whole system of moral duty. R. Goodin thinks that they have a priority over positive general duties and yield to negative general duties. The empirical researches of moral evaluations which reviewed in this article in general confirm this conclusion. The ethical theory cannot ignore fundamental features of common moral beliefs. That is why it is doomed to look for ways of reconciling the moral equality and impartiality with the preferential treatment of close persons embedded into special obligations.

scholarly journals The Morality of Resisting Oppression

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca Hannah Smith
Keyword(s):  
Academic Work ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Practical Reasons ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Victim Blaming ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Women's Oppression ◽  
Resisting Oppression ◽  
Ethical Responsibilities

This paper reconsiders the contemporary moral reading of women’s oppression, and revises our understanding of the practical reasons for action a victim of mistreatment acquires through her unjust circumstances. The paper surveys various ways of theorising victims’ moral duties to resist their own oppression, and considers objections to prior academic work arguing for the existence of an imperfect Kantian duty of resistance to oppression grounded in self-respect. These objections suggest (1) that such a duty is victim blaming; (2) that it distorts the normative direction of self-regarding duties; and (3) that consequentialist reasons are inapt for justifying self-regarding ethical responsibilities. The paper then argues that the need for normative coherence in our very concept of a moral duty is of paramount importance, and especially so in the fight against patriarchal oppression. Accordingly, we should acknowledge the salient differences between pro tanto or defeasible moral reasons and fully fledged moral duties identifying agent-relative obligatory action. The paper concludes that we better respect and defend women’s rights when first we understand them as having, at best, defeasible moral reasons to oppose their oppression; and second, ensure that we make adequate allowance for a woman’s interpretative right to choose how to respond to her oppressive circumstances.

scholarly journals THE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF CONSCIENCE IN PRIVATE LAW

2018 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 479-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sinéad Agnew
Keyword(s):  
Moral Duty ◽  
Legal Rights ◽  
Private Law ◽  
Explanatory Role ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Valuable Role

AbstractThis article argues that the idea of conscience can play a useful, albeit limited and highly general, explanatory role in private law, if we have regard to two distinctive contexts in which it is used. First, it tells us something about how equitable obligations arise and reminds us that they directly enforce moral duties. Second, it conveys the message that the courts are reluctant to impose primary liabilities which restrict the exercise of legal rights absent a past or prospective breach of moral duty by the defendant. Without further explanation, the indiscriminate invocation of conscience in both contexts can lead to confusion and uncertainty, but if the distinction between obligation and liability is observed, the explanatory force of conscience in relation to each becomes clearer, and it plays a valuable role in bolstering the authority of private law.

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