The Individual and International Law: Human Rights

2015 ◽  
pp. 422-453
2020 ◽  
Vol 114 ◽  
pp. 193-199
Author(s):  
Sean D. Murphy ◽  
Claudio Grossman

Our conversation might begin by looking backward a bit. The human rights movement from 1945 onward has been one of the signature accomplishments of the field of international law, one that refocused our attention from a largely interstate system to a system where the individual moved in from the periphery to the center. Human rights champions point to numerous landmark treaties, numerous institutions, and the rise of NGOs as a critical vehicle for developing and monitoring human rights rules. Yet others look at the international human right system and still see the state as overly central, tolerating and paying lip service to human rights, but too easily discarding them when they prove to be inconvenient. The persistence of racism comes to mind. As a general matter, how would you assess the strengths and weaknesses of the system that was built essentially during your lifetime?


Author(s):  
Ipsen Knut

This chapter examines the regulation of combatant status in treaty law and the many challenges for combatant status in recent armed conflicts. The primary status under international law of persons in an international armed conflict will be one of two categories of persons: ‘combatants’ and ‘civilians’. Combatants may fight within the limits imposed by international law applicable in international armed conflict, that is, they may participate directly in hostilities, which members of medical or religious personnel and ‘non-combatants’ may not do because they are excluded—by international law and by a legal act of their party to the conflict—from the authorization to take a direct part in hostilities. The chapter then discusses ‘unlawful combatants’, or what may be considered the better term: ‘unprivileged belligerents’. The term ‘unlawful enemy combatant’ was particularly used after 11 September 2001, to introduce a third category of persons which under existing law may be either combatants or civilians, but are denied such status as not fulfilling essential conditions. To use this third category in order to reduce the individual protection below the minimum standard of human rights is under no circumstances legally acceptable.


2004 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 534-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julie Cassidy

In this article it is contended that state practice, as evidenced in the declarations of the judiciary and the many treaties and conventions guaranteeing human rights, reveals a consensus of opinion acknowledging the individual to be an international juristic entity. So extensive is this practice that it could be seen as marking the emergence of a new customary international norm; or at least a general principle of international law, yet to crystallise into a custom; acknowledging the individual as the beneficiary of international rights. This is important for individuals and minority groups because if they possess international rights independently of the State, enforcement of their rights will no longer depend on the interests of the State. Where the State is often the offender of human rights, international law will not effectively confer any real rights unless the individual is so recognised as an inter- national juristic entity.


Author(s):  
Pat Lauderdale ◽  
Nicholas D. Natividad

The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues estimates that there are over 370 million indigenous people spread across 70 countries worldwide. Practicing unique traditions, they retain social, cultural, economic, and political characteristics that are distinct from those of the dominant societies in which they live. Dialogue and political negotiations with indigenous peoples has a long history that began at least a half a millennium ago when the notion of an inter-national” community and the concept of the nation-state became dominant. Since that time, the concepts of sovereignty, self-determination, rule of law, and human rights have led to the establishment of the frameworks and structures of organization that are now referred to collectively as modern international law. But unlike most modern international human rights law, which emphasizes rights of the individual, indigenous peoples generally think in terms of collective rather than individual rights. Because indigenous peoples’ “law” suggests the importance of collective rights, it renders a culture of responsibility and accountability to the collective. At present, international indigenous rights are a type of superficial bandage, giving the appearance of propriety to the crisis faced by the hegemonic “international system of states.” Therefore, indigenous rights standards propagated by organizations such as the UN currently are largely symbolic. However, they could potentially lead to real change if they are coupled with widespread acknowledgment of the fact that diverse societies exist throughout the world with different forms of social organization and diverse conceptions of law.


Author(s):  
Grant Tom

This chapter considers a particular aspect of the UN Security Council sanctions regime: the procedure for removing individuals or entities from the Sanctions List. The novelty of the delisting procedure justifies considering it in some detail. The delisting procedure is the main response at the international level to the human rights question raised by the Security Council sanctions regime. Because certain consequences for an individual follow at the national level from the fact of the individual having been listed, a procedure that goes to the listing itself holds particular interest for those to whom the regime might apply. The chapter concludes that the delisting procedure will continue to evolve as the Security Council grapples with procedural fairness and individual rights with which it has not historically had much to do.


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