scholarly journals State of Emergency: Powers and the Responsibility of the President Under the Slovenian Constitution

Author(s):  
Matija Žgur
2020 ◽  
pp. 239965442095421
Author(s):  
Ben Anderson

The paper traces the development of UK ‘state of emergency’ legislation through three ‘scenes of emergency’: the introduction of the Emergency Powers Act in 1920, a revision to the Act in 1964, and discussion within government departments about possible changes to emergency powers in 1973. Through these scenes, and contra to existing work on the state of emergency as an occasion for the intensification of sovereignty, I show how the introduction of and revision to ‘state of emergency’ legislation were occasions for a double concern – with the excessiveness of the state, as per Foucault’s analysis of liberalism, but also for the excessiveness of events. In ‘scenes of emergency’ a specific ‘state effect’ was dis/re-assembled: the promise of the providential state that protected life through control of events. As emergency legislation was subject to deliberation and contestation, other versions of the state surfaced: beginning with the interested, classed, state and the tyrannical state as emergency powers were introduced and ending with the anxious state that loses faith in the efficacy of emergency powers in a world of changing events. As well as arguing that work on governing emergencies should be orientated to ‘scenes of emergency’ in which that which governs relates to excess, the paper suggests that assemblage approaches to the state should be concerned with dis/re-assembly.


1985 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-58
Author(s):  
John Hatchard

There comes a time during the life of almost every nation when situations arise which threaten its peace and security. At such a time the government may need to acquire certain additional powers to help it combat the danger and this is frequently achieved by the declaration of a state of emergency. This enables it to utilise wide-ranging emergency powers and in this situation national security and public order considerations are placed above the constitution. As a result, among the first casualties of an emergency proclamation are the guarantees of personal liberty and protection of the law which are often abrogated or at least severely curtailed.The use of detention without trial during periods of emergency has now become commonplace, particularly in developing countries, a point which is defended by President Nyerere of Tanzania on the grounds that:“Our Union has neither the long tradition of nationhood, nor the strong physical means of national security, which older countries take for granted. While the vast mass of people give full and active support to their country and its government, a handful of individuals can still put our nation in jeopardy, and reduce to ashes the efforts of millions.”The need for a nation to protect itself in this way cannot be denied and this is widely recognised. For example, Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) recognises the rights of governments


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Musa Njabulo Shongwe

Having been confronted with the COVID-19 pandemic, the Kingdom of Eswatini has had to adopt both soft and hard response measures. The constitutional emergency response framework had not envisaged the type of emergency brought about by COVID-19, forcing the state to enact extraordinary regulatory measures. Unprecedented emergency powers have been conferred on state functionaries. Questions have arisen as to the nature of these emergency powers, the manner in which these powers have been exercised and the absence of special oversight mechanisms. The response measures and regulations have had an unparalleled impact on lives and livelihoods of Emaswati. This article explores the nature of emergency powers in the laws of Eswatini, and the particular effects of the COVID-19 regulations on human rights. This article commences with an analysis of constitutional emergency powers in Eswatini and the limitations thereof, and considers the question of why the state did not invoke a constitutional state of emergency. The article proceeds to examine the nature of statutory emergency powers under the Disaster Management Act, and considers whether there are effective legal limitations on the exercise of executive authority and effective safeguards against the abuse of power. The article then deals with the particular impact of the COVID-19 response legal framework on human rights protection. In this regard, the article advances examples of situations where rights have been infringed. Finally, the article proposes that the state's response measures should continuously endeavour to mitigate the long-term impact on human rights.


Author(s):  
Sadiq Reza

The Arab Republic of Egypt has been in a declared state of emergency since 1981 and for all but three of the past fifty years. Emergency powers, military courts, and other "exceptional" powers are governed by longstanding statutes in Egypt and authorized by the constitution, and their use is a prominent feature of everyday rule there today. This essay presents Egypt as a case study in what is essentially permanent governance by emergency rule and other exceptional measures. It summarizes the history and framework of emergency rule in Egypt, discusses the apparent purposes and consequences of that rule, mentions judicial limitations on it, and notes the many targets of its exercise over the years, particularly the government's two most prominent and persistent groups of opponents: Islamists and liberal political activists. It also explains how the country's March 2007 constitutional amendments, much decried by humanrights organizations inside and outside Egypt, further entrench emergency rule there. The thesis of the essay is that the existence and exercise of emergency powers have been far from exceptional in Egypt; instead they have been a vehicle for the creation of the modern Egyptian state and a tool for the consolidation and maintenance of political power by the government.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Jonsson Cornell ◽  
Janne Salminen

Within Scandinavia, Sweden stands out for not having gone to war in over 200 years. Its neighboring states—Finland, Denmark, and Norway—have not been as fortunate. Their respective constitutions each provide insight into their different experiences. The Swedish Constitution remains silent on emergency situations that do not rise to the predefined level of “war.” The Finnish constitution differs from the Swedish in that it allows for time-limited restrictions to protect fundamental rights and freedoms during a state of emergency, aggression, or any other situation that poses a severe threat to the nation, if stipulated by law and in congruence with international obligations of Finland. Importantly, when and how a government can declare a state of emergency is a question of ordinary law, rather than a constitutional one. This Article offers a comparative constitutional law analysis of the relative constitutional silence in Sweden and Finland as concerns emergency powers. The analysis takes as its starting point Böckenförde'sThe Repressed State of Emergency: The Exercise of State Authority in Extraordinary Circumstances.


2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 644-671 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan Rooney

Scholars argue that institutions in democracies constrain leaders and prevent international conflict. However, many democracies specify rules of governance in times of emergency that divert substantial power to the head of state. The manipulation of these “emergency powers” provides a rational motivation for conflict. Using a novel data set of emergency provisions within democracies, I test the relationship between emergency power strength and conflict propensity using several steps to achieve causal inference, including an instrumental variable analysis that exploits the specificity of the state’s constitution as a plausibly exogenous determinant of emergency power strength. I find that emergency power strength is a strong predictor of conflict onset in democracies in each test and that states with strong emergency powers are substantially more likely to enact a state of emergency due to an international conflict. I conclude with a discussion of my findings and avenues of future research using these data.


Author(s):  
Andrea Scoseria Katz

Abstract Can courts check presidential power exercised in a crisis—and should they? The case of Colombia, which recently turned on its head a history of presidential overreach and judicial rubber-stamping, provides an answer in the affirmative. As in much of Latin America, throughout Colombia’s post-independence history, bloodshed fueled authoritarian tendencies, with presidents exploiting the need for “order” to centralize power. One critical weapon in the presidential toolkit was the power to declare a state of emergency. During the twentieth century, these decrees became a routine pretext for the President to govern unilaterally, acquiesced to by the legislature and rarely challenged by the courts. That pattern has since come to an end. Since 1992, the Constitutional Court has proven an unexpectedly strong counterweight to presidential power, especially in its strict review of presidential emergency decrees. Under a model of substantive judicial review, the Constitutional Court has taken for itself the authority to review the factual basis giving rise to a crisis, and the adequacy of the President’s rationale for declaring it. Decrees that, as in the past, attempted to manufacture a crisis or which would exceed the President’s constitutional powers have been struck down. This paper discusses some of the Court’s successes in that ambit, and argues for the portability of this model to other national contexts.


2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 62-91
Author(s):  
Emre Turkut

This article seeks to illuminate the use of exceptional national security and emergency powers in the fight against terrorism in Turkey. The article is organized in four parts. Section i looks at the role of terrorism in the activation and justification of a state of emergency and introduces the Turkish case within this context. Section ii explores the historical origins of the Turkish state of emergency regime and analyses the principles regulating emergency regime at the Turkish domestic level. Section iii examines the operation of governmental emergency powers by providing an analysis of the state of emergency practices in Turkey, both past and present. A principal focus is necessarily directed at the state of emergency and the measures deployed within this framework in Turkey’s predominantly Kurdish southeast, where emergency rule was in force from 1987 to 2002, and the recent nationwide state of emergency in the wake of the 15 July attempted coup. Section iv presents concluding remarks.


Pravni zapisi ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-145
Author(s):  
Teodora Miljojković

Relying on the Madison-Schmitt dichotomy in the theory of emergency governance, this article will explore to what extent constitutional courts of Southeast Europe imposed warranted limits to the executive power in their responses to the Covid-19 global pandemic. The specific aim of this article is to illustrate how the constitutional courts of Croatia and Serbia responded to the question of whether the Covid-19 pandemic called for the introduction of the state of emergency. The dilemmas that emerged in the Covid-19-related rulings of these courts reflect the heated constitutional theoretical debates on emergency powers, which could be roughly reduced to three main points of examination: (1) Is the executive de facto Schmitt's sovereign , who decides on the case of exception even when the constitution states other-wise? (2) Should the courts, following the historically repetitive practice, demonstrate special deference to other branches of government in the time of crisis such as the Covid-19 pandemic? (3) Are the courts in the position to assess the constitutionally envisaged facts and conditions for introducing the emergency regime, e.g., to go into a formal and substantive review of the declaration of the state of emergency? The analysis will conclude that the constitutional courts of Serbia and Croatia failed to set out a robust doctrine of emergency powers and constrain other branches of governments effectively. In Serbia, that resulted in a constitutionally legitimized NEO-Schmittian model, which presupposes that in the time of a crisis, the powers of emergency decision making significantly shift to the executive. On the other hand, the Croatian Constitutional Court missed the chance of entrenching a strong Madisonian model based on the interbranch checks and balances and cooperation.


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