The EU method of antitrust enforcement

2020 ◽  
pp. 391-413
Author(s):  
Andreas Stephan
Keyword(s):  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
The Eu

Public Enforcement of EU Antitrust Law: A Circle of Trust?

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-154
Author(s):  
Naida Dzino ◽  
Catalin S. Rusu
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Design ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Soft Law ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
The Public ◽  
Core Elements ◽  
Multi Level ◽  
The Eu

The concept of trust is key to effectively enforcing the EU antitrust prohibitions in the ECN multi-level administration context. The manifestation of this concept is identified at different stages of the public enforcement system, where the Commission and the NCAs share the enforcement workload and assist each other's actions. Various EU legislative, soft-law and case-law landmarks have progressively contributed to developing this idea of trust, culminating with the adoption of Directive 2019/1, which aims to render NCAs as more effective enforcers of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. In this paper, we intend to determine whether the Directive furthers the trust already established in the last fifteen years of enforcement experience. We first track the development of the trust in the NCAs' EU antitrust enforcement work and assesses the building-blocks on which trust is shaped. Next, we evaluate the Directive's core elements (dealing with institutional design, enforcement and sanctioning powers, leniency, mutual assistance, etc.), in order to gauge their trust-enhancing potential, and to test whether the Directive correctly follows through the EU hard-, soft-, and case-law. We also look into any remaining enforcement gaps, which may undermine the trust between the European antitrust enforcers, and consequently the Directive's core objectives.

scholarly journals Private antitrust enforcement in digital market

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-160
Author(s):  
Dominik Wolski
Keyword(s):  
Rapid Growth ◽  
Digital Transformation ◽  
Economic Life ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Eu

The increasing popularity of private antitrust enforcement in the EU is reflected by number of antitrust damages claims in the member states, following the transposition of the Damages Directive. Meanwhile, rapid growth of digitization in every aspect of social and economic life, particularly in business like commerce and services, has taken place. Recently, the above phenomenon was intensified by COVID-19. This paper aims at discussing private antitrust enforcement and antitrust damages claims in the context of digital transformation of the market. To this extent, there are several main characteristics of the market (e.g. multi-sided platforms, the role of third-party sellers, etc.), that have to be taken into consideration in the above discussion.

Part VIII Cooperation in Antirust Enforcement, 22 International Cooperation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Smijter Eddy De ◽  
Gasparon Philipp ◽  
Berghe Pascal
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
International Dimension ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Exchange Of Information ◽  
The U.S ◽  
The Eu

This chapter studies the cooperation between the European Commission and competition authorities and courts outside the EU, at both bilateral and multilateral level, and highlights the importance of that cooperation in the context of proliferation of competition regimes and the continual increase in cross-border business activities. In more than half of its enforcement activities, the Commission cooperates with one or more foreign jurisdictions, obviously with varying degrees of intensity. The bulk of this international cooperation, in the fields of both merger control and anticompetitive practices, is with the U.S. and the Canadian competition authorities. The chapter then sets out the legal framework for international cooperation and explains the principles determining the Commission’s jurisdiction in cases having an international dimension. It also considers cooperation in antitrust enforcement, with particular attention given to the exchange of information and disclosure of evidence.

The Criminalization of European Cartel Enforcement

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Whelan Peter
Keyword(s):  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Criminal Sanctions ◽  
Dynamic Relationship ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Severe Punishment ◽  
The Eu

Cartel activity is prohibited under EU law by virtue of Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Firms that violate this provision face severe punishment (including stiff fines) from those entities responsible for enforcing EU competition law. Such firm-focused punishment is an established feature of the antitrust enforcement landscape within the EU. It is increasingly recognized that punishment for cartel activity should be individual-focused as well as firm-focused. Accordingly, a growing tendency to criminalize cartel activity can be observed in the EU Member States. The existence of such criminal sanctions within the EU presents a number of crucial challenges that need to be met if the underlying enforcement objectives are to be achieved without violating prevailing legal norms. First, the employment of criminal antitrust punishment must be justifiable. Second, antitrust criminalization should only occur in a manner that respects the mandatory legalities applicable to the European jurisdiction in question. Finally, the correct practical measures need to be in place in order to ensure that the employment of criminal antitrust punishment actually achieves its aims while maintaining its legitimacy. This book analyses these three crucial challenges so that the complexity of the process of European antitrust criminalization can be understood more accurately. The book acknowledges that three challenges should not be considered in isolation. There is a dynamic relationship between the theoretical, legal, and practical challenges of European antitrust criminalization and an effective antitrust criminalization policy recognizes and respects this complex interaction.

Part VIII Cooperation in Antirust Enforcement, 19 Cooperation Within the ECN and Strengthening of National Competition Authorities

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arsenidou Elisavet ◽  
Capiau Jeroen ◽  
Sinclair Ailsa ◽  
Stanciute Jurga
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
Mutual Assistance ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Close Cooperation ◽  
Decentralised System ◽  
The Eu

This chapter assesses the cooperation between the European Commission and national competition authorities (NCAs) in a decentralised system of antitrust enforcement. The recent adoption of a Directive to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers (ECN+ Directive) aims at ensuring more effective enforcement and mutual assistance among NCAs throughout the EU by putting in place minimum guarantees and powers to detect and tackle infringements. The chapter then explains the role of the European Competition Network (ECN), how it is organised and governed. The ECN was created in conjunction with the adoption of Regulation 1/2003. It consists of the NCAs and the Commission forming together a network of public authorities applying the EU competition rules in close cooperation.

Abuse of Dominance: How Far are the EU and the US?

2007 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-52
Author(s):  
Alberto Heimler
Keyword(s):  
Economic Analysis ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Discussion Paper ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
The Eu

Abstract In recent years economic analysis has become more and more important in antitrust enforcement in Europe. First in merger control, then in vertical agreements the case by case approach based on a substantive appreciation of the restrictions of competition is becoming more and more prevalent. On abuse of dominance the difference between the US and the EU is still relevant. However, especially after the December 2005 publication by the European Commission of the Discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses the gap has been reduced, at least in terms of the general approach to abuse cases. In practice, even though the role of economic analysis is much more refined and relevant than in the past, the European Commission continues to be more interventionist than US antitrust enforcers. This outcome depends very much on the widespread use of presumptions and truncated analysis on both sides of die Atlantic. A number of examples are provided on predation, discounts, refusal to deal, tying and bundling.

scholarly journals Piecemeal Harmonisation Through the Damages Directive? Remarks on What Received Too Little Attention in Relation to Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 79-98
Author(s):  
Anna Piszcz
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Member States ◽  
European Approach ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
The Eu

On 11 June 2013, the European Commission adopted a package of measures to tackle the lack of an efficient and coherent private enforcement system of EU competition law in its Member States. In particular, a draft Damages Directive was proposed in order to meet the need for a sound European approach to private enforcement of EU competition law in damages actions. The Damages Directive was ultimately adopted on 26 November 2014. This paper explores some aspects of private antitrust enforcement which have not received sufficient attention from the EU decision-makers during the long preparatory and legislative works preceding the Directive. The paper discusses also some of the remedies that have not been harmonised, and shows how these ‘gaps’ in harmonisation may limit the Directive’s expected influence on both the thinking and practice of private antitrust enforcement in Europe. It is argued in conclusion that further harmonisation may be needed in order to actually transform private enforcement of EU competition law before national courts

scholarly journals Private Antitrust Enforcement: A New Era for Collective Redress?

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 11-32
Author(s):  
Silvia Pais
Keyword(s):  
Great Britain ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Forum Shopping ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
New Era ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Class Actions ◽  
Legal Standing ◽  
Collective Redress ◽  
The Eu

It will be argued in this article that the EU Recommendation on common principles for collective redress might have limited impact on the field of competition law due to: several uncertainties regarding the legal standing in class actions; difficulties in their funding; and the risk of forum shopping with cross-border actions. Nevertheless, Belgium and Great Britain have recently introduced class actions into their national legal systems and addressed some of the difficulties which other Member States were experiencing already. It will also be suggested that the Portuguese model – the ‘Popular Action’ – and recent Portuguese practice may be considered an interesting example to follow in order to overcome some of the identified obstacles to private antitrust enforcement.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document