scholarly journals INVESTOR CONFIDENCE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, STOCK LIQUIDITY AND DIVIDEND POLICY

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Rizwan ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Practical Implication ◽  
Stock Exchanges ◽  
Growth Opportunities ◽  
Stock Liquidity ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Investor Confidence ◽  
Liquidity Constraint ◽  
The Impact

Purpose: The objective of this study is to examine the impact of investor confidence, corporate governance and stock liquidity on dividend policy of firms listed on Pakistan stock exchanges from 2010-2015. The liquidity constraint enabled a superior association with the interests of the controlling shareholders, particularly outside investors, which make a significant enhancement in firms’ liquidity and governance. Findings: Our results indicate that dividends have a less significant impact on investor confidence after the corporate governance. Practical Implication: Our interpretation is that the improvement in corporate governance, especially the improvement in the alignment between growth opportunities and cash dividends, may take longer time to emerge. These findings provide strong evidence that shift in corporate governance and stock liquidity influence dividend policy of a firm in a substantial manner. Another implication is that stock liquidity matters in firms’ dividend decision-making; the liquidity deficiency is compensated by large cash dividends.

Islamic law, corporate governance, growth opportunities and dividend policy in Indonesia stock market

2019 ◽  
Vol 55 ◽  
pp. 110-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nur Imamah ◽  
Tsui-Jung Lin ◽  
Suhadak ◽  
Siti Ragil Handayani ◽  
Jung-Hua Hung
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Stock Market ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Islamic Law ◽  
Growth Opportunities

scholarly journals Agency Costs, Corporate Governance and the Nature of Controlling Shareholders: Evidence From French Listed Firms

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dabboussi Moez
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Investment Horizon ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Indirect Benefits ◽  
The Impact

This paper examines the impact of internal corporate governance on agency costs for French firms from 2000 to 2015. Our results reveal that shareholders themselves are not a homogenous group since they have no single common investment horizon. We found that managerial ownership is more effective in mitigating operational expenses. However, they take advantage of excessive spending on indirect benefits. We show that board of directors does not serve as a significant deterrent to excessive discretionary expenses. Finally, we found that dividend policy is a useful tool to reduce agency conflicts by reducing cash that is available for discretionary uses.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy in the Presence of Controlling Shareholders

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (8) ◽  
pp. 162
Author(s):  
Ricardo Rodrigues ◽  
J. Augusto Felício ◽  
Pedro Verga Matos
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Data Analysis ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Listed Firms

Based on agency theory, we focused on the influence of corporate governance in the dividend policy of large listed firms with headquarters in continental Europe countries. Previous research focused on the influence of corporate governance on the performance and risk of listed firms, but the influence of corporate governance on the dividend policy has rarely been addressed despite the importance of dividends for shareholders and the implications on the free cash-flow, whose application may be a source of conflicts between managers and shareholders. In this paper, we study the influence of a set of governance mechanisms on the dividend policy over 12 years (2002 to 2013). The results, based on a panel data analysis, support the importance of governance mechanisms toward the protection of shareholders’ interests, and reveal that the decisions on whether to pay dividends and how much to pay are grounded on different antecedents.

scholarly journals Impact of Corporate Governance on Dividend Policy: Evidence from Pakistan

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-366
Author(s):  
Abdul Hameed ◽  
Farheen Zahra Hussain ◽  
Khawar Naheed ◽  
Muhammad Sadiq Shahid
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Payout Policy ◽  
Least Square ◽  
Political Connection ◽  
Dividend Payment ◽  
The Impact

Purpose: The objective of the paper is to examine the impact of corporate governance on the dividend payout policy of firms listed on the Pakistan stock exchange during 2010-2020. As Pakistani investors face issues regarding their return in the shape of dividends and depend upon the firm’s corporate governance strength. To test whether changes in firm code of corporate governance have a significant influence on dividend policy. Design/Methodology/Approach: The panel data has been used for the period 2010-2020 and panel least square has been applied. Further, to test the association, following factors such delisting risk, government tenure, political connection with institutional shareholding as many political firms hold corporate shares which influence the decision to pay dividends. Findings: Findings from the fixed effect model show that corporate governance has a negative impact on dividend policy while government tenure, politically connected firm has a positive impact on the dividend. The study also concludes that firm size, profitability, tax, asset turnover, leverage, and firm shareholding also influence firm dividend payment behavior. Implications/Originality/Value: The implication of study reveals that firms must focus on strong their governance and include more independent directors on the board which leads to favorable strategies regarding investors. The investor must invest in those firm where lower political connection, pay continuous dividend either high or low decease/increase delisting chances, strong corporate governance and firm specific factors also lead to make decision of dividend payment.

scholarly journals The impact of corporate governance legislation on the market for corporate ownership

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-146
Author(s):  
Joseph Canada ◽  
Tanya Benford ◽  
Vicky Arnold ◽  
Steve G. Sutton
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Stock Exchanges ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
Managerial Control ◽  
Corporate Structure ◽  
Corporate Scandals ◽  
Traditional Markets ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Impact

Over the past few years, the number of corporate scandals and failures throughout the world has escalated, prompting new legislation designed to enhance corporate governance. While the efforts to legislate corporate governance policies are designed to protect the public interest, they have altered the relationship between shareholders and management (Canada et al. 2008). Rather than be subjected to new corporate governance requirements, many companies have indicated an interest in not being traded on the various stock exchanges and have chosen to alter their corporate structure. The purpose of this study is to examine how a company‟s decision to shift corporate ownership and/or corporate control in the face of new corporate governance legislation and regulatory requirements can alter the traditional markets for ownership and control. In order to examine this issue, the paper first develops a typology for predicting the type of organizational restructuring that might occur. This typology incorporates factors from prior research and disentangles the market for ownership from the market for corporate control. The typology is then used as a basis for an in-depth examination of an organization whose corporate structure changed in response to mandated changes in corporate governance. The results provide evidence that corporate governance legislation can potentially induce incumbent management to voluntarily compete in the market for ownership, notwithstanding the associated exposure in the market for managerial control

scholarly journals Pengaruh Corporate Governance Dan Manajemen Laba Terhadap Kebijakan Dividen

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 151
Author(s):  
Agustina Ratna Dwiati ◽  
Muhammad Bisyri Effendi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Multiple Regression ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Investment Opportunity ◽  
Financial Firms ◽  
Investment Opportunity Set ◽  
The Impact

AbstractThe aim of this study is to test the impact of corporate governance and investment opportunity set toward dividend policy with earnings management as intervening variable. The sample of this study is non-financial firms listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange and also a member of Corporate Governance Perception Index on 2012 and 2013. The method that used in this study is multiple regression. The results showed that company with strong corporate governance really cared about shareholders interests by giving high dividend for them. Meanwhile, earnings management has no impact toward dividend policy.

scholarly journals An Investigation Of The Relation Between Corporate Governance And Liquidity: Empirical Evidence From France

2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 631 ◽  
Author(s):  
Majdi Karmani ◽  
Aymen Ajina ◽  
Rym Boussaada
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Best Practices ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Market Liquidity ◽  
Significant Determinant ◽  
Global Effect ◽  
Stock Liquidity ◽  
Governance Effectiveness ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Effective Spread

This study investigates the impact of corporate governance effectiveness on the market stock liquidity. It is innovative, since we study, on an order driven market, the global effect of corporate governance and the effect of specific governance sub-indexes. Drawing on a sample of 287 French firms from 2007 to 2012, we find that corporate governance is a significant determinant of stock liquidity. Indeed, companies with an effective corporate governance have a narrower spreads. Thats mean that corporate governance may alleviate information asymmetry and improve the market stock liquidity of French companies. Our results are remarkably robust to other set of measures of liquidity as the effective spread measure and illiquidity ratio. These results suggest that firms may improve stock market liquidity by adopting best practices of corporate governance that mitigate informational asymmetries.

The Impact of Stock Exchange Rules on the Federalization of Corporate Governance

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc I. Steinberg
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Codes Of Ethics ◽  
Stock Exchanges ◽  
Significant Component ◽  
Board Committees ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
Nominating Committees ◽  
The Impact

This chapter focuses on the important role that the national stock exchanges play in the federalization of corporate governance. Responding to federal legislative and SEC directives and, at times, acting on their own initiative, the stock exchanges have promulgated meaningful rules that comprise a significant component of the corporate governance landscape. Although technically not government regulation, the national stock exchanges play a central role in the enhancement of sound corporate governance practices and policies. Examples include the emphasis by the exchanges on independent directors, board committees (including audit, compensation, and nominating committees), and corporate codes of ethics. Hence, when addressing the federalization of corporate governance, stock exchange regulation is to be given prominent status.

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