scholarly journals Legal Protection of Minority Shareholders under Corporate Governance Process

2021 ◽  
Vol 04 (04) ◽  
Author(s):  
Suresh Kumar M V ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Minority Shareholder ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Roles And Responsibilities ◽  
Governance Process

In recent days, most of the corporate are failing in managing business effectively and the major cause for this is conflicts between majority and minority shareholders of the company which lead to direct or indirect destruction of business at the end. Even though, there are certain laws and provisions made for the sake of minority shareholders, those are enforced well and needs to make them as utmost safeguards to minority shareholders. In this paper, we will discuss the issues for conflict including rights of minority shareholders as well as roles and responsibilities of shareholders by analyzing possible solution for conflicts between majority and minority shareholder.

scholarly journals O IMPACTO DA PROTEÇÃO AOS ACIONISTAS MINORITÁRIOS: O CASO PETROBRÁS

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (56) ◽  
pp. 270
Author(s):  
Guilherme Amorim Campos SILVA
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Risk Reduction ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
The United States ◽  
Minority Shareholder ◽  
Reduction Factor ◽  
Class Action ◽  
Minority Shareholders

RESUMOA governança corporativa pode ser considerada como fator de redução de risco aos investidores, no entanto, a proteção legal direcionada aos investidores minoritários não se configura de igual maneira no Brasil e nos Estados Unidos, o que acaba por refletir nas ações propostas nesses dois países com o objetivo de ressarcimento a esses investidores frente aos escândalos de corrupção envolvendo a Petrobrás.PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Class Action; Governança Corporativa; Investidores Minoritários; Petrobrás.ABSTRACTCorporate governance can be considered as a risk reduction factor for investors, however, legal protection directed at minority shareholder is not the same in Brazil and the United States, which is reflected in the actions proposed in these two countries with the objective of reimbursing these investors against the corruption scandals involving Petrobras.KEYWORDS: Class Action; Corporate Governance; Minority Shareholders; Petrobras

scholarly journals MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN MALAYSIA: IS THEIR RIGHT PROTECTED?

2010 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Suraiya Ishak ◽  
Ahmad Raflis Che Omar
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Shareholder Activism ◽  
Minority Shareholder ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
The Right

Issues on corporate governance can be deliberate from various dimensions. This study explores the issue of governance related to the minority shareholders’ in Malaysia. The objective of this study is to describe the protection pertaining to the right of minority shareholders’ group through shareholder activism in Malaysia. This study employs a case study technique on two corporate cases selected from banking industry for the year 2008 and 2010. The observation emphasizes on shareholder activism initiated by the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG). It is summarizes that retail and dispersed shareholders in Malaysia are moving towards an improved level of rights’ protection due to shareholder activism. As far as the minority’s right is concern, further improvement is needed to strengthen current legislation framework despite the existence of shareholder activism by MSWG

scholarly journals ”The good, the bad, and the ugly” private benefits of control and their regulatory implications

2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 477-491 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessio M. Pacces
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Corporate Law ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Private Benefits Of Control ◽  
The Law

This paper attempts to shed a new light on the economics and the law of corporate governance. It so does by taking stock of the weaknesses of the standard account of how law ‘matters’ for separation of ownership and control. This account fails to explain comparative corporate governance. Both the ownership structure and the functioning of the market for corporate control do not seem to depend entirely on the strength with which non-controlling shareholders are protected by corporate law. Without claiming that legal protection of minority shareholders does not matter in corporate governance, this paper shows that protection and exchange of corporate control is at least as important and so are the legal institutions that support them. This result is derived by introducing a third category of private benefits of control (idiosyncratic PBC), which supplements the more traditional specifications as inefficient consumption of control perquisites (distortionary PBC) or outright expropriation of shareholder value (diversionary PBC).The implications for corporate law are broader than those of the ‘law matters’ framework. Even though legal institutions effectively constrain expropriation of non-controlling shareholders, they may still make corporate governance inefficient when they fail to provide entitlements to uncontested control in dependently of how much ownership is retained by corporate controllers. Likewise, regulation may undermine the takeover process when it restricts side payments that ultimately support efficient bargaining upon the value of corporate control

scholarly journals Corporate governance, disclosure, and minority shareholder expropriation: the saga of DaimlerChrysler

2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 403-416
Author(s):  
Frederick H. deB. Harris ◽  
Sherry L. Jarrell ◽  
Thomas H. McInish ◽  
Robert A. Wood
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Minority Shareholder ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Growth Opportunities ◽  
Disclosure Requirements ◽  
Flow Of Information ◽  
Governance Disclosure

This paper examines a series of DaimlerChrysler events and finds unique evidence about whether disclosure requirements can compensate for weak corporate governance standards in protecting minority shareholders from expropriation. We show that strict disclosure requirements, though they improve the flow of information to all shareholders, fail фto substitute for strong corporate governance measures. Strict disclosure complements strong corporate governance, and both may be required to create environments in which firms can raise capital and fund growth opportunities most efficiently

Board Effectiveness: An Evaluation based on Corporate Governance Score

Think India ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-23
Author(s):  
Hitesh Shukla ◽  
Nailesh Limbasiya
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Sustainable Growth ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Effective Governance ◽  
Performance Orientation ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Ethical Governance

Growth, progress, and prosperity of any country depend highly on the corporate governance mechanism of that country. Good governance of a country helps it to sustainable growth and consistency in progress. The good governance should contribute towards the improvement in transparency, ethics, morality, and disclosure. The principles of good governance stand on honesty, trust, integrity, openness, and performance orientation. Our honorable Prime Minister Narendra bhai Modi had given the three E for good governance during his speech on Independence Day i.e. Effective Governance, Electronic Governance, and Ethical Governance. The fundamental concern of corporate governance mechanism is to ensure the protection of minority shareholders/owners of specific firms. Mechanism of a corporate governance specifies the relations among the shareholders, board of directors, and managers. The present paper is an attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the board by calculating the corporate governance score. The mandatory and non-mandatory guidelines have been considered while assigning points to specific parameters of the corporate governance.

Minority shareholders and corporate governance

2009 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 206-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Kirkbride ◽  
Steve Letza ◽  
Clive Smallman
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Minority Shareholders

scholarly journals Investor Protection and Agency Theory in Corporate Governance in Pakistan

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-21
Author(s):  
Imtiaz Ahmed Khan ◽  
Altaf Hussain Abro ◽  
Farooque Ahmed Leghari
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Corporate Structure ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Global Trend ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Very High

The paper discusses the minority shareholders’ protection under the quantumof agency cost in corporate governance in Pakistan. The agency theory statesthat in most of the cases, the controlling shareholders and the topmanagement are normally involved in expropriating the funds of the company.This phenomenon increases the agency cost. The agency cost is directlyproportional to the cost of functioning of the company. In other words, theagency cost is inversely proportional to the profit of the company. Accordingto the agency theory, if the agency cost is decreased, the profit for investorincreases. The Pakistani corporate sector is dominated by the businessfamilies, the state and an opportunity to get the private benefits at the cost ofother stakeholders. There are the different mechanisms as discussed andapplied around the world to minimize the agency cost so as to make companyfinancially strong and better profit for the investors. In Pakistan, the agencycost is very high. Hence, there is a need to revamp the corporate governancemechanism to reduce the agency cost in order to provide a better protection tominority shareholders in a particular in the context of the global trend keepingin the view of the nature of corporate structure in Pakistan.

scholarly journals An Interpretive Structural Model of Barriers in Implementing Corporate Governance (CG) in Pakistan

2019 ◽  
Vol IV (I) ◽  
pp. 359-375
Author(s):  
Abdul Aziz Khan Niazi ◽  
Tehmina Fiaz Qazi ◽  
Abdul Basit
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Data Collection ◽  
Literature Review ◽  
Structural Model ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Micmac Analysis ◽  
Modeling Methodology ◽  
Equity Ownership ◽  
Key Barrier ◽  
Interpretive Structural Model

The purpose of this study is to structure a model of relationships among barriers in the implementation of CG in Pakistan. It also points out a key barrier in embarking on the regime of CG. The design of research consists of a literature review, data collection and analyses. Modeling methodology entails ISM coupled with MICMAC. Findings revealed that “lack of investigation about the rights of minority shareholders” is the most critical barrier since this occupies the bottom of the model. Whereas, barriers namely “basic shareholders rights are not often protected, minority shareholders rights are often violated, lack of autonomy on the part of the auditors and rules requiring equity ownership disclosure are not followed” are least critical since they occupy the top of the model. MICMAC analysis revealed that three barriers fall in the independent quadrant, six in the linkage, six independent and two in autonomous. This study is helpful to regulators and corporations to successfully embark on the regime of CG.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document