Author(s):  
Bukhari Bukhari

The existence of a man and woman who have no kinship so that it is lawful to marry her, in a lonely place without being ac companied by a mahram of the male or female side. This khalwat is a crime that is not subject to hudud punishment and kafarah punishment. This form of khalwat crime is included in the category of ta'zir finger whose number of punishment is not limited. In the Qur'an and Sunnah this khalwat act is highly reproached, but not clearly regulated in the Qur'an and Sunnah. So this act can be entered into the ta'zir group. All deeds that should (need) be forbidden to fulfill the common good (community). This prohibition must necessarily be made on the basis of community agreement / consensus in ways that are considered eligible. In North Aceh, the khalwat actors who are close to the power are hard to touch with the law, it is not surprising to all of us to remember that the law in this country is not yet the commander but the law is merely a bargaining position in everyday life.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-142
Author(s):  
Nurnazli Nurnazli

The development of science and technology today is not a reason to remove the provisions about ‘iddah that has been set in the Qur'an and Sunnah. 'Illat law and the purpose of enactment of ‘iddah which has been discussed needs to be reviewed. ‘iddah not only to know the empty uterus of the fetus, self-introspection, condition and period of mourning, but there is a higher purpose, that is belief in Allah and honor the noble covenant at the marriage ceremony. The noble agreement is realized in the ijâb and qabûl between men and women guardians. Consequently, if the marriage breaks up either because of death or divorce, both sides must respect the agreement. They must be equally restricted with the ‘iddah way until the time set by Syar'i, especially for women whose existence is more glorified and also the aim of the law' ‘iddah is for the common good.


2020 ◽  
pp. 325-331
Author(s):  
Raymond Wacks

Do we have a moral duty to obey the law? Do we, in other words, have a moral obligation to comply with legal rules simply because they are legal rules? What about obviously unfair or unjust laws? Or laws that impose unreasonable demands on us? The question of whether we have a duty to follow the demands of the law raises some fundamental issues regarding the nature of law and its moral claims. This chapter examines a number of possible reasons for obeying the law. It will examine the principal justifications for obedience: fair play, consent, the common good, and gratitude.


2018 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-31
Author(s):  
Sandra Regina Martini ◽  
Vanessa Chiari Gonçalves ◽  
Bárbara Bruna de Oliveira Simões

 O artigo trata da terra,  memória e direito com o objetivo de reconsiderar a terra como bem comum da humanidade, as referências jurídico políticas e sociais utilizadas são as brasileiras até a década de 80, pois entendemos que a nova Constituição embora apresente avanços significativos, não é suficiente para enfrentar a complexidade do direito ao bem comum terra. O direito precisa retomar a memória para cumprir sua função de evitar e compor conflitos, ou seja, o direito tem uma função preventiva, deve operar prevenindo e compondo conflitos advindos das mais diversas instâncias, em especial, neste artigo, dos Movimentos Sociais, sem os quais não é possível pensar na terra como bem da comunidade, pois são os movimentos sociais que trazem para o cenário jurídico-político a conflitualidade da sociedade, por isso são sistemas autoreferenciais de comunicação, que se inserem nos sistemas jurídico e político como reação da própria sociedade diferenciada funcionalmente. Assim, constrói-se a ideia de terra como um bem comum da humanidade, passando pela cooperação entre o local e o global. Abstract The article deals with land, memory and law with the objective of reconsidering land as a common good of humanity, the legal and political references used are Brazilian until the 1980s, since we understand that the new Constitution does is sufficient to face the complexity of the right to the common good land. The law needs to retake the memory to fulfill its function of avoiding and composing conflicts, that is, the right has a preventive function, it must operate preventing and composing conflicts arising from the most diverse instances, especially in this article of the Social Movements, without which it is not possible to think of the land as a community good, because it is the social movements that bring to the juridical-political scenario the conflict of the society, for that reason they are self-referential systems of communication, that are inserted in the legal and political systems as a reaction of the own society functionally differentiated. Thus, the idea of land is constructed as a common good of humanity, through the cooperation between local and global.  


2021 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-111
Author(s):  
Aubrey Manthwa ◽  
Paul Nkoane

The deceitful use of trusts has created a fair amount of controversy, specifically where it has appeared that a trust has been employed to limit the rights of third parties. This article argues that it is in the interests of the law to ensure that rights are vindicated when unlawfully limited. Similarly, it is in the interest of the common good that legitimately acquired rights are protected. Trust laws state that there must be a separation between control and enjoyment and, in cases where there is no separation, the courts may scrutinise the affairs of a trust. Recent developments have illustrated that measures that provide relief to spouses upon the dissolution of the marriage may not be readily invoked, especially for marriages in community of property. Family trusts have provided spouses with avenues for hiding assets that would otherwise fall into the joint estate. Courts need to adopt a robust approach when dealing with trust assets upon the dissolution of a marriage, particularly to protect the rights of competing spouses.


Author(s):  
Joshua Ralston

Joshua Ralston observes that the Christian tendency to place law in an oppositional relationship to love, grace, and/or the gospel has had unfortunate byproducts. It denigrates Judaism and Islam and misconstrues their conceptions of the Compassionate One who gives Torah and/or shari‘a for the sake of human flourishing. Thinking beyond such divisions, this essay explores points of convergence and divergence in the thinking of the Protestant reformer John Calvin and the Islamic jurist, mystic, and reformer al-Ghazali. Al-Ghazali’s understanding of shari‘a as a pathway to the common good that is willed by the Compassionate and Merciful One resonates with Calvin’s third use of the law. Together, these revise the adversarial renderings of law in Calvin’s first and second uses. Christian theology might therefore embrace an understanding of gospel and law—or, better, the way or shari’a of God—that focuses on the path to flourishing.


Legal Theory ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Duke

This paper seeks to elucidate the role played by the common good in John Finnis's arguments for a generic and presumptive moral obligation to obey the law.1Finnis's appeal to the common good constitutes a direct challenge to liberal and philosophical anarchist denials of a generic and presumptive obligation to obey the law.2It is questionable, however, whether Finnis has presented the strongest possible case for his position. In the first section I outline Finnis's account of the relationship between basic goods, the common good, and the authority of law. Section II demonstrates how Finnis's emphasis upon the instrumental nature of the common good leaves his position vulnerable to Joseph Raz's objections3that not all cases of law make a moral difference and that governmental authority is often unnecessary to resolve coordination problems. I argue that Raz's critique nonetheless fails adequately to address an alternative defense of the existence of a generic and presumptive obligation to obey the law, suggested by some passages in Finnis's work, according to which the common good is integral, rather than merely instrumental, to the good of individuals. In the final section I consider whether Finnis could strengthen his case for a generic and presumptive obligation to obey the law by adopting a more consistently robust—and hence also more contentious—account of the common good.


2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-65
Author(s):  
Tomasz Sienkiewicz

When dealing with citizens, public administration has numerous opportunities for abuse of its privileged position. The study of public subjective rights of disabled persons in public law is important because the relation under administrative law is not an equal relation. The state is always the stronger party. When a party to this relation is a person with a dysfunction of the body, a situation is created which is highly unfavourable for this person because of the natural tendency of the state system (including public authorities) to use its privileged position. This can result in actual discrimination of persons with disabilities. The purpose of the law is the common good and welfare of individual persons. Respecting the welfare of persons with disabilities in the public law guarantees the realization of the common good. One can not create the law while ignoring the rules governing human life. As Petrażycki wrote, “the highest good to which we should strive in policy in general and legal policy in particular – is the moral development of man and the rule of highest rational ethics among human beings, namely, the ideal of love” (Petrażycki, 1968, translation mine).


Author(s):  
Raymond Wacks

Is there a moral duty to obey the law? Do we, in other words, have a moral obligation to comply with legal rules solely because they are legal rules? This question is particularly demanding when we are faced with laws that are obviously unjust or unfair, or those laws that make irrational or unreasonable demands on us. This subject has long vexed legal and moral philosophers; this chapter examines what possible reasons there are for obeying the law. The moral basis of obedience may spring from one or more of the following four principal sources: fair play, consent, the common good, and gratitude. Each is briefly discussed.


2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 312
Author(s):  
Muhammad Zaki ◽  
Bayu Tri Cahya

Maqas'id  asy-shari’ah  is relevant koredor as a basis for the development of the system, practice, and sharia banking products. The order of maqas'id asy-shari’ah is the way the light for the journey of <br />sharia banking in answer the question dynamic based on the common good and welfare. The concept of Islamic economy is a prerequisite that must be developed further, not only in the conceptual overtones teapi also in practical overtones, especially in the practice of sharia banking. Islam has been providing textual sources that adequate to provide <br />limitations prioritising man, but it is not enough if not balanced with social inferensi.  The theory maqas'id  asy-shari’ah  in the study of the Islamic economy is a step forward in the development of Islamic economic model that most ideal. This is because the maqas'id asyshari’ah can be used as the tool to help resolve the argument in specify a law in order to achieve the goal of shortening the law.


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