Author(s):  
Michał Sopiński

This paper traces, examines and demonstrates Neil MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning and its evolution. MacCormick’s views shaped gradually, therefore his theory could be divided into two main stages. Thus, a diachronic approach is justified. The aim of this paper is to analyse the difference between the theses of the theory of legal reasoning explained in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) and general revisions to this theory marked in Rhetoric and the Rule of Law (2005). According to the author, the most important change in MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning is the re-examination of the role of deductive reasoning in the process of judicial reasoning. This change leads to extension of the logical aspects of MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning (legal syllogism) to include rhetorical aspects (argumentative character of law) and ethical aspects (the idea of the rule of law). The evolution of MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning seems to be a model example of the changes in contemporary philosophy of law.


Author(s):  
Michał Sopiński

This paper traces, examines, and demonstrates Neil MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning and its evolution. MacCormick’s views were shaped gradually so his theory could be divided into two main stages. Therefore, the use of the diachronic approach is justified. The aim of this paper is to analyse the difference between the theses of the theory of legal reasoning explained in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) and general revisions to this theory marked in Rhetoric and the Rule of Law (2005). According to the author, the most important change in MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning is an examination of the role of deductive reasoning in the process of judicial reasoning. This change leads to an extension of the logical aspects of MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning (legal syllogism) to include rhetorical aspects (argumentative character of law) and ethical aspects (the idea of the rule of law). The evolution of the MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning seems to be a model example of the changes in contemporary philosophy of law.


Balcanica ◽  
2014 ◽  
pp. 399-434
Author(s):  
Vojislav Stanovcic

The papers discusses the views of Slobodan Jovanovic (1869-1958) on several phenomena of Serbia?s political and institutional development in the hundred years between the First Serbian Uprising in 1804 and the fall of the Obrenovic dynasty in 1903, and on different political systems, looking at the sources on which his thought drew upon, the ideas he was guided by and the theoretical framework of his legal and socio-political thinking. His major work, a legal theory of the state, as most of his other writings, was his own contribution to what he held to be a national mission, the building of a modern state based on the rule of law.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 371
Author(s):  
Marthen Arie

The applicable law (as a result of legislation) is not always a reflection of the society concerned. Local regulations in the area were impressed into law to be “forced” because it does not conform to the spirit and characteristics of the society. The formation of local regulation is increasingly complex and complicated when the process and its substance beside cannot be separated from the political process, it is also cannot be separated from social processes. The problematic of local regulation formation is indicated by the fact that the authorized institution to arrange the local regulation is still not sufficient to produce products of high quality local laws. Legisprudence theory may open new perspectives on the validity of norm or legitimacy of norm and by course using this approach the quality of local regulations will be more qualified. Although a political approach is more into the heart in the legislative process but legislation and regulation can be an important object. Legal theory is not only a basis on enforcement or implementation of the rule of law, but it is very useful theory in law-making.


Author(s):  
Wojciech Sadowski

AbstractInvestment treaty law and EU law began to develop in the same era and share some important philosophical and axiological foundations. The pressure on the CEE countries to enter into numerous bilateral investment treaties in late 80s and early 90s, in the context of the EU accession aspirations of the former communist countries, was likely to result, eventually, in a conflict between EU law and investment treaty law. The conflict could have been managed in three different ways, yet the CJEU decided in Achmea to declare an undefined volume of intra-EU arbitrations to be incompatible with EU law. This important judgment, which delivered an outcome desired by the European Commission and a number of Member States, is based on questionable legal reasoning that creates high uncertainty in this area of law. The doubts include the scope of application of Achmea, which is now a highly debatable issue. The CJEU itself saw it necessary to limit the scope of Achmea by declaring in Opinion 1/17 (CETA) that the legal reasoning of Achmea did not apply to investment protection treaties with third countries. The Member States of the EU remain politically divided in their views as to whether Achmea applies to the Energy Charter Treaty. And while the problems with the rule of law and independence of the judiciary in certain Member States continue to grow, Achmea has left an important gap for which there is no substitute in the current architecture of the EU legal system.


Legal Theory ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 132-152
Author(s):  
Alex Silk

ABSTRACTIt is common to think that what theory of linguistic vagueness is correct has implications for debates in philosophy of law. I disagree. I argue that the implications of particular theories of vagueness on substantive issues of legal theory and practice are less far-reaching than often thought. I focus on four putative implications discussed in the literature concerning (i) the value of vagueness in the law, (ii) the possibility and value of legal indeterminacy, (iii) the possibility of the rule of law, and (iv) strong discretion. I conclude with some methodological remarks. Delineating questions about conventional meaning, legal content determination, and norms of legal interpretation and judicial practice can motivate clearer answers and a more refined understanding of the space of overall theories of vagueness, interpretation, and law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 248-267
Author(s):  
Sławomir Tkacz

The present paper aims to present an outline of the views of the Polish legal theorist Józef Nowacki (1923–2005). The claim put forward is that Nowacki was the chief representative of Hans Kelsen’s normativism in Polish legal theory. The paper begins with a short historical sketch presenting the reception of Hans Kelsen’s views in Polish jurisprudence, noting that in the post-war period the communist authorities believed that normativism was at odds with the then prevailing system of actually existing socialism. Drawing inspiration from German-speaking authors, Nowacki rejected the ideology prevailing in Poland at that time and became a staunch advocate of the normativist stance, in particular with regard to the theory of the legal system. The second part of the paper discusses Nowacki’s views regarding the concept of the rule of law, and the third and last part presents Nowacki’s critique of the case-law of the Polish Constitutional Court.


Daedalus ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 143 (3) ◽  
pp. 140-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan S. Silbey

In American public imagination, courts are powerful but also impotent. They are guardians of citizens' rights but also agents of corporate wealth; simultaneously the least dangerous branch and the ultimate arbiters of fairness and justice. After recounting the social science literature on the mixed reception of courts in American public culture, this essay explains how the contradictory embrace of courts and law by Americans is not a weakness or flaw, nor a mark of confusion or naïveté. Rather, Americans' paradoxical interpretations of courts and judges sustain rather than undermine our legal institutions. These opposing accounts are a source of institutional durability and power because they combine the historical and widespread aspirations for the rule of law with a pragmatic recognition of the limits of institutional practice; these sundry accounts balance an appreciation for the discipline of legal reasoning with desires for responsive, humane judgment.


1984 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 521-535 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. R. Cristi

abstractAccording to Hayek the rule of law constitutes the foundation of liberalism's political and legal theory. General and abstract laws, as opposed to concrete measures, protect individual freedom from prerogative and arbitrariness (normativism versus decisionism). Hayek maintains that Carl Schmitt's decisionism explains his attacks on liberalism and the prominent role he played in support of Hitler's regime. Two general observations should shorten the distance that Hayek seeks to establish between his posture and that of Schmitt. Firstly, Schmitt's critique is primarily aimed against the tendency that neutralizes the state and makes it vulnerable to democratic pressures. Secondly, Hayek's normativism is seen to contain a decisionist potential.


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