Managing the Threat of Regulatory Capture under the European Energy Union

Author(s):  
Rafael Emmanuel Macatangay ◽  
Volker Roeben
Author(s):  
Juliane B. Wutzler

This study aims to shed light on the determinants and consequences of the revolving door at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). While revolvers may be good monitors due to their SEC experience and, thus, continuously create benefits for the economy ("schooling"), it is possible that they exploit their insights into the enforcement process and private connections to undermine enforcement ("regulatory capture"). Using a newly created dataset of revolvers who moved from the SEC to company boards, this study shows that not all revolvers are appointed for the same reasons and create the same benefits for their new employers. I demonstrate that those revolvers most closely involved in the enforcement process are associated with fewer future enforcement actions while accounting quality does not improve. Contrarily, external revolvers seem to use their monitoring and advising duties to improve accounting quality.


Author(s):  
Georg Menz

Despite the state being such a central actor in establishing and policing the rules of the game of any given political economy, its role is often neglected. In this chapter, we briefly review relevant state theories and explore changes to the nature and appearance of the capitalist state. The awesome increase in the political fire power of the financial service sector has unfortunately led to regulatory capture. The state can no longer be considered a neutral umpire, being heavily influenced by the prerogatives of major banking institutions. This state of affairs corrupts the hopes that liberals place in the self-policing powers of the marketplace and reflects certain fears on the political left regarding the pernicious effects of ‘financialization’.


2014 ◽  
Vol 74 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-542 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Lodge
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Ana-Maria Iulia Şanta

Abstract The European Commission has the initiative to foster the sector of renewable energy and to build an Energy Union, with a common energy market at the level of the European Union, but is this only an utopic vision or is this possible to achieve? The topic of clean energy is very new and of great interest for the European Union, which is shown by the fact that the European Commission recently adopted on the 30th November 2016 the package “Clean Energy for All Europeans”, which contains proposals for the modernization of the energy market at the level of the European Union. But which are the challenges such a project is confronted with? According to the literature, such challenges are related to the process of liberalization of electricity markets. Conflicts between national interest and international actors of the energy market might occur. Due to the oligopolistic structure of the energy market, there are several barriers to the market entry. In order to answer to the research questions, case studies regarding the liberalization of the energy market will be analyzed in a comparative manner, offering an international overview. Furthermore, the legal provisions on which the common energy policy of the European Union relies, will be analyzed, as well as their economic and social impact. The package “Clean Energy for All Europeans” comprises a proposal of the revised Renewable energy Directive, energy efficiency measures and issues related to the Energy Union Governance. It contains as well proposals for the electricity market design, which will be analyzed and the present paper outlines the contribution of this proposal in building a common energy market of the European Union. What role does competition play in implementing the common energy market of the European Union? Which role do competition authorities have in this context? These are interesting aspects to be analyzed in the present paper.


2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (5) ◽  
pp. 2064-2093 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Hadani ◽  
Jonathan P. Doh ◽  
Marguerite A. Schneider

Socially oriented shareholder activism is an increasingly important mechanism through which social movement organizations seek to influence the private sector by exerting pressure on corporate activities in areas such as human rights, environmental protection, and labor policies. This activism challenges the status quo of targeted firms and potentially their institutional field, disrupting “business as usual” and often drawing negative attention to the firms. We theorize that some firms might use corporate political activity (CPA) as an indirect, nonmarket strategy aimed at regulatory capture to reduce the impact of such disruptions. We focus on one popular avenue of shareholder activism—the proxy proposal mechanism—and the role the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) plays in allowing omission of socially oriented shareholder proposals from the proxy ballot. Using two distinct data sources, we find evidence that for S&P 500 firms, the SEC allows for the omission of the proposals from proxy ballots more frequently for those firms more active in CPA. These findings inform the growing scholarship on socially oriented activism as well as suggest the indirect influence of CPA on government agency decision making.


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