scholarly journals MINDING THE GAP BETWEEN EXPECTATIONS AND PERCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY

Author(s):  
Todd Donovan ◽  
Jeffrey Karp

Studies of perceptions of democratic performance and satisfaction with democracy may over estimate effects of electoral rules on attitudes if country-level corruption and income inequality are not accounted for.  We use mixed-level models to estimate evaluations of democracy using data from Wave 6 of the European Social Survey.  We use new measures of democratic expectations about elections and party systems along with the 'satisfaction with democracy' item to test for effects of electoral rules on perceptions of democracy.  We replicate previous studies and find multipartyism and preferential ballot structure correspond with positive evaluations of elections and parties, and greater satisfaction with how democracy is functioning in a person's country.  However, these relationships dissipate when we account for corruption and income inequality. This suggests we should exercise caution when linking electoral systems and electoral reforms to democratic legitimacy and perceptions of democratic performance.

2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 227-234
Author(s):  
Kláara Vlachová

For decades, research on democracy has produced evidence that the peoples of countries in Central Europe are less satisfied with the way democracy works in their countries than people in Western Europe. Using the data from the European Social Survey (ESS) I explore, how satisfaction with the way democracy works (SWD) changed in these countries between 2004 and 2014 and test the impact of satisfaction with the present state of the economy and trust in parliament on SWD. Results of the analysis reveal that people in Central Europe are still less satisfied with the democratic performance on average than people in Western Europe, but their satisfaction is on the rise especially in countries where the economy performs well, economic performance brings better standard of living, and people share a sense of economic optimism. Results also suggest that in countries where economic optimism is low, political evaluations of “crises in democracy” may play a larger role in explaining satisfaction with democratic performance.


2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pietari Kujala ◽  
Johanna Kallio ◽  
Mikko Niemelä

Studies of fear of crime in Europe associate country-level income inequality with fear of crime. However, by considering only income inequality these studies do not account for the effects of poverty. This article provides a more comprehensive perspective through multiple country-level indicators of income inequality and poverty and thereby provides important insights into fear of crime. The research data consist of the European Social Survey, Round 7 (2014), and country-level indicators provided by Eurostat. The results show that the Gini coefficient, S80/S20 ratio, and material deprivation are positively associated with fear of crime. The association is statistically significant but is moderate at best. However, the association between the relative median at-risk-of-poverty risk gap and fear of crime is not statistically significant. Education and income only appear to be mediators between material deprivation and fear of crime. Trust appears to be a mediator between the country-level indicators and fear of crime.


2019 ◽  
Vol 682 (1) ◽  
pp. 186-203
Author(s):  
Mark Visser ◽  
Maurice Gesthuizen ◽  
Gerbert Kraaykamp

This study examines to what extent extrinsic and intrinsic work values are associated with nonelectoral political participation, such as signing a petition and taking part in a public demonstration. We examine whether individualism and economic factors at the country level moderate the relation between work values and political participation. Using data from two rounds of the European Social Survey covering thirty-one countries ( N = 55,927), results show that people who are extrinsically motivated are less politically active, while people who are intrinsically motivated are more politically active. Comparatively low national wealth weakens these relations. Findings also reveal that people who highly value extrinsic job rewards are even less politically active in individualist countries, whereas people who highly value intrinsic job aspects are more politically engaged in those countries. Overall, this study adds to understanding who is politically active and under which conditions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 14
Author(s):  
Mai Beilmann ◽  
Laur Lilleoja

The article is dedicated to explaining why value similarity fosters generalised social trust in high-trust societies. Previous findings by Beilmann and Lilleoja suggest that value similarity is more important in generating individual-level social trust in countries where the overall levels of social trust are higher, while in countries with a low level of social trust, congruity of the personal value structure with the country-level value structure tends to be coupled with lower trustfulness on the part of individuals. The article explores the meso-level indicators that could explain this relationship. The relationship between social trust and human values was examined in a sample of 2,051 people in Estonia, using data from the European Social Survey, round 7. The results suggest that when differences in socio-economic factors are controlled for, value similarity remains a significant factor in fostering generalised social trust in Estonian society. However, its direct effect is relatively low when compared with predictors such as trust in certain institutions, economic well-being, and ethnicity. Trust in the legal system and the police plays a particularly important role in fostering generalised social trust in a high-trust society wherein people believe that other people in general treat them honestly and kindly.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
MARIUS R. BUSEMEYER ◽  
ALEXANDER H. J. SAHM

Abstract Rapid technological change – the digitalization and automation of work – is challenging contemporary welfare states. Most of the existing research, however, focuses on its effect on labor market outcomes, such as employment or wage levels. In contrast, this paper studies the implications of technological change for welfare state attitudes and preferences. Compared to previous work on this topic, this paper adopts a much broader perspective regarding different kinds of social policy. Using data from the European Social Survey, we find that individual automation risk is positively associated with support for redistribution, but negatively with support for social investment policies (partly depending on the specific measure of automation risk that is used), while there is no statistically significant association with support for basic income. We also find a moderating effect of the overall size of the welfare state on the micro-level association between risk and preferences.


2008 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dana Hamplova

In this article, educational homogamy among married and cohabiting couples in selected European countries is examined. Using data from two waves (2002 and 2004) of the European Social Survey, this article compares three cultural and institutional contexts that differ in terms of institutionalization of cohabitation. Evidence from log-linear models yields two main conclusions. First, as cohabitation becomes more common in society, marriage and cohabitation become more similar with respect to partner selection. Second, where married and unmarried unions differ in terms of educational homogamy, married couples have higher odds of overcoming educational barriers (i.e., intermarrying with other educational groups).


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liana Christin Landivar

In all developed countries, women, especially mothers, work fewer paid hours than their spouses. However, the magnitude of the gender gap varies significantly by country, ranging from 2 to 20 hours per week in this study. Using data from the 2002 International Social Survey Programme, this article investigates whether work-hour regulations have a significant effect on household allocation of paid labour and gender work-hour inequality. Two main types of work-hour regulations are examined: standard weekly work hours and the maximum allowable weekly work hours. Results show that households in countries with shorter maximum weekly work hours had less work-hour inequality between spouses, as each additional allowable overtime hour over the standard workweek increased the work-hour gap between couples by 20 minutes. These results indicate that couples’ inequality in work hours and gender inequality in labour supply are associated with country-level work-hour regulations.


Author(s):  
Dimiter Toshkov

AbstractThe link between age and happiness has been the subject of numerous studies. It is still a matter of controversy whether the relationship is U-shaped, with happiness declining after youth before bouncing back in old age, or not. While the effect of age has been examined conditional on income and other socio-demographic variables, so far, the interactions between age and income have remained insufficiently explored. Using data from the European Social Survey, this article shows that the nature of the relationship between age and happiness varies strongly with different levels of relative income. People in the lowest decile of the income distribution experience a ‘hockey stick’: a deep decline in self-reported happiness until around age 50–55 and a small bounce back in old age. The classic U-curve is found mostly in the middle-income ranks. For people at the top of the income distribution, average happiness does not vary much with age. These results demonstrate the important role of income in moderating the relationship between age and happiness.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 485-502
Author(s):  
Enrique Hernández

AbstractThere is a growing interest in analyzing what citizens think about democracy. However, gauging citizens’ opinions about a complex concept such as democracy might be hindered by the apparent low levels of political sophistication of mass publics. This paper contributes to the emerging literature on citizens’ views and evaluations of democracy by analyzing to what extent ordinary citizens are capable of developing structured opinions about democracy and its constitutive principles. For this purpose, the paper adapts Converse’s notion of political belief systems to analyze the articulation of individuals’ democracy belief systems (DBS). The first goal of this paper is to conceptualize and operationalize the main components of individuals’ DBS: cognitive availability, horizontal constraint, and vertical constraint. Drawing on data from the sixth round of the European Social Survey, the second goal is to describe the articulation of DBS in Europe. The third and final aim of this paper is to trace the most relevant individual- and country-level correlates of the articulation of the three components of DBS. In line with recent findings about political belief systems in other policy domains, the results indicate that most Europeans have coherently structured attitudes about democracy. However, even if the results imply that Europeans have a relatively articulated DBS, the empirical analysis also reveals some individual- and country-level variation in the articulation of specific components of DBS.


2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 389-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cornelius Cappelen ◽  
Yvette Peters

AbstractWe examine whether intra-EU migration affects welfare chauvinistic attitudes, i.e. the idea that immigrants’ access to the welfare system should be restricted. According to the in-group/out-group theory, migration can unleash feelings of insecurity and thus trigger welfare chauvinism. According to intergroup contact theory, welfare chauvinism should decrease when immigration is higher, because contact reduces prejudice and softens anti-immigrant stances. We test these theories using data from the European Social Survey 2008/2009, supplemented with country-level data, and analyse these data using a multilevel ordered logit approach. We find a negative relation between intra-EU immigration and welfare chauvinism, supporting the intergroup contact theory: in countries with more intra-EU migration, welfare chauvinism tends to be lower. Furthermore, the higher the percentage of East European immigrants compared to other EU immigrants, the higher the level of welfare chauvinism.


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