The US Navy Period

2020 ◽  
pp. 124-139
Author(s):  
Courtney A. Short

With the end of the Pacific War, responsibility for military government on Okinawa transferred to the U.S. Navy. American combat troops on Okinawa adjusted their priority from enemy engagement to demobilization, and military government changed its mission from amassing the population to full occupation of a prefecture from a defeated country. Overwhelmed by a large, displaced population who still had urgent needs for basic sustenance and medical treatment, the Navy issued ad hoc directives and did not build strategically toward a defined, long-term goal. Early Navy military government failed to adapt to the new peacetime environment; it did not attempt to rebuild and its assumptions of Okinawan identity remained stagnated in a wartime state. Navy military government struggled so profoundly in completing day to day requirements that any developments toward improvement in the program failed to reach fruition in 1945.

Author(s):  
Etsuko Takushi Crissey

The Battle of Okinawa, which began in late March and ended in late June, 1945, took the lives of 94,000 Japanese soldiers, 28,000 Okinawans in local defence corps, which included middle school boys, 12,500 Americans, and an estimated 122,000 civilians, between one-fourth and one-third of the prefecture’s wartime population. Most of the survivors ended up in refugee camps for several months. It was the only battle of the Pacific War fought in a Japanese prefecture. With the congealing of the Cold War in the late 1940’s, the U.S. government decided to hold strategically located Okinawa for the long term, stationing some 30,000 troops there. The U.S. created civilian administrative agencies, but the military maintained ultimate authority until reversion to Japanese sovereignty in 1972. The result was an economy heavily dependent on jobs and incomes generated by the bases, such as auto mechanic, janitor, maid, taxi driver, bar hostess, and prostitute. To make room for the rapidly expanding bases, the U.S. military forcibly evicted Okinawans from their land with “bayonets and bulldozers.” Massive protests led to Congressional hearings and marginally increased, though still wholly inadequate, “rental payments” to landowners. Reversion restored Japanese administration to Okinawa, but the bases remain to this day,


Author(s):  
Putut Widjanarko

The Japanese occupation of East Asia during World War II was accompanied by its propaganda targeted to the local population. In Indonesia, the military government, among other things, published Djawa Baroe, a fortnightly magazine published from January 1, 1943 to August 1, 1945.Compared to other magazines, this bilingual magazine (in Japanese and Bahasa Indonesia) Djawa Baroe was unique: it featured ample photographs and illustrations. Qualitative content analysis method enables this study to find the meaning of a theme in its holistic political, social, and cultural contexts beyond the number of its occurrences in the text offered by quantitative content analysis. All the issues of Djawa Baroe are examined in detail and reiteratively. Six themes can be found in Djawa Baroe, i.e., the friendship between Japanese and Indonesians, the description of Japanese military prowess, the exaltation of nationalism and the preparation for the war, the evil nature of Western power, the role of women in society, and entertainment. The study concludes that along with the development of the Pacific War that turned against the Japanese, Djawa Baroe moved its emphasis on long-range goals at the high psychological level to influence and win the hearts and minds of Indonesian people, to a more immediate result and practical guide in facing the imminent war. On the other hand, against the original intention of the Japanese propaganda, Djawa Baroe may have helped its educated readers to imagine their future nation-state, Indonesia. Keywords: Djawa Baroe; Wartime propaganda; Japanese occupation; nation-building


2021 ◽  
pp. 239-250
Author(s):  
Peter Kornicki

The Allies were making plans to invade the Japanese main islands in late 1945 and spring 1946 when the Japanese government, following the dropping of the atomic bombs and the Soviet Union’s declaration of war on Japan, decided to bring the war to an end and the Emperor broadcast the decision on the radio on 15 August. On 27 August a fleet of Allied ships entered Tokyo Bay and the surrender ceremony took place on 2 September on board the battleship USS Missouri. On board the British battleship HMS King George V was a British naval officer who had learnt Japanese at the US Navy Japanese Language School: he acted as interpreter when a Japanese pilot came on board to guide the ship to its anchorage. Other surrender ceremonies took place in Hong Kong, Singapore and other places which had been captured by Japanese forces: on each occasion Allied linguists were present to act as interpreters.


2018 ◽  
pp. 199-238
Author(s):  
Montgomery McFate

This chapter concerns the wartime civil affairs experience of John Useem, a US Navy officer who became the military governor of a small island in Micronesia. While the post-World War II, military government established in Germany and Japan are often offered as examples of successful governance operations, the partially successful case of Micronesia better exemplifies the paradoxes at the heart of the military government enterprise. These issues which plagued the US military government in Micronesia, and which John Useem wrote about in the 1940s and 1950s, were the exact same issues that have plagued the intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq more than a half century later. What happens when the policy of democratization is incompatible with the existing social order? What happens when American social norms conflict with the society they intend to govern? What happens when the core principle of military government non-interference cannot be implemented in practice and outright contradicts the imperatives of ‘nation building’?


2020 ◽  
pp. 51-58
Author(s):  
Courtney A. Short

U.S. military forces spread across the globe in various states of preparation. While some military government personnel attended Civil Affairs training schools, many only received training onboard the transport ships heading across the Pacific. Soldiers received training that instructed them to approach the Okinawans with caution and to view them as potential enemies, yet they also were granted the authority to assess their own interactions with the civilians on their own merits. Marines training finalized Okinawan identity and left no room for debate or reconsideration.


2003 ◽  
Vol 176 ◽  
pp. 1097-1098
Author(s):  
Reinhard Drifte

This monumental work is in many ways the essence of Professor Kindermann's 50 years' research on East Asia, theoretically based on the Munich school of neo-realism (of which he is the pre-eminent representative) and inspired by his many personal encounters with those Asian leaders who shaped the region's rise in world politics. It also introduces interesting research by other German scholars, which is often excluded from the English-language literature that dominates the Asian studies field. The focus of the analysis is on the foreign policy of the states in the West Pacific region (including Myanmar and Indochina), their interactions and their place in world politics. It is impossible to summarize the 34 chapters within this review. The books offer a superb chronological and contextual overview of a crucial period in East Asia that is highly readable and illustrated with relevant photos. The most space is devoted to China, documenting its rise from imperial victim to major economic power. The coverage of China's interaction with foreign powers and the domestic background is very detailed, especially concerning the Kuomintang before and after 1949, and the Taiwan issue. The account of the era after the Pacific War focuses mostly on the People's Republic of China. Several pages are devoted to the Quemoy crisis of 1954–55, which revealed the complexities of the US–PRC–Taiwan triangle. Kindermann demonstrates how this crisis was the first application of Washington's “calculated ambiguity” towards the PRC concerning Taiwan. A whole chapter is devoted to the second Taiwan crisis of 1958 and its aftermath in 1962. Kindermann's interviews in Taiwan show how the US actively prevented Chiang Kai-shek's plan of occupying two mainland Chinese cities to start the “liberation” of the PRC. There are four chapters on how the Communist Party established and maintained its rule over China, but the majority deal with China's foreign interactions. On Tibet, Kindermann argues that the 17-item agreement of 1951 between Tibetan leaders and the Communist government may have served as a tolerable solution to the Tibet issue and thus have prevented a lot of hardship for the Tibetan people, even though the Tibetan representatives had been coerced into signing it.


2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik J. Reaves ◽  
Michael Termini ◽  
Frederick M. Burkle

AbstractThe US Department of Defense continues to deploy military assets for disaster relief and humanitarian actions around the world. These missions, carried out through geographically located Combatant Commands, represent an evolving role the US military is taking in health diplomacy, designed to enhance disaster preparedness and response capability. Oceania is a unique case, with most island nations experiencing “acute-on-chronic” environmental stresses defined by acute disaster events on top of the consequences of climate change. In all Pacific Island nation-states and territories, the symptoms of this process are seen in both short- and long-term health concerns and a deteriorating public health infrastructure. These factors tend to build on each other. To date, the US military's response to Oceania primarily has been to provide short-term humanitarian projects as part of Pacific Command humanitarian civic assistance missions, such as the annual Pacific Partnership, without necessarily improving local capacity or leaving behind relevant risk-reduction strategies. This report describes the assessment and implications on public health of large-scale humanitarian missions conducted by the US Navy in Oceania. Future opportunities will require the Department of Defense and its Combatant Commands to show meaningful strategies to implement ongoing, long-term, humanitarian activities that will build sustainable, host nation health system capacity and partnerships. This report recommends a community-centric approach that would better assist island nations in reducing disaster risk throughout the traditional disaster management cycle and defines a potential and crucial role of Department of Defense's assets and resources to be a more meaningful partner in disaster risk reduction and community capacity building.ReavesEJ,TerminiM,BurkleFMJr.Reshaping US Navy Pacific response in mitigating disaster risk in South Pacific Island nations: adopting community-based disaster cycle management.Prehosp Disaster Med.2014;29(1):1-9.


Author(s):  
Steve Tsang

Hong Kong entered its modern era when it became a British overseas territory in 1841. In its early years as a Crown Colony, it suffered from corruption and racial segregation but grew rapidly as a free port that supported trade with China. It took about two decades before Hong Kong established a genuinely independent judiciary and introduced the Cadet Scheme to select and train senior officials, which dramatically improved the quality of governance. Until the Pacific War (1941–1945), the colonial government focused its attention and resources on the small expatriate community and largely left the overwhelming majority of the population, the Chinese community, to manage themselves, through voluntary organizations such as the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals. The 1940s was a watershed decade in Hong Kong’s history. The fall of Hong Kong and other European colonies to the Japanese at the start of the Pacific War shattered the myth of the superiority of white men and the invincibility of the British Empire. When the war ended the British realized that they could not restore the status quo ante. They thus put an end to racial segregation, removed the glass ceiling that prevented a Chinese person from becoming a Cadet or Administrative Officer or rising to become the Senior Member of the Legislative or the Executive Council, and looked into the possibility of introducing municipal self-government. The exploration into limited democratization ended as the second landmark event unfolded—the success of the Chinese Communist Party in taking control of China. This resulted in Hong Kong closing its borders with China on a long-term basis and the local Chinese population settling down in the colony, where it took on a direction of development distinctly different from that of mainland China. The large influx of refugees to Hong Kong in the late 1940s was transformed by a pragmatic colonial administration into a demographic bonus, as all were allowed to work freely and become part of the community. Those refugees, particularly from Shanghai, who arrived with capital, management knowhow and skills gave some industries, such as textile and shipping, a big boost. With the entrepreneurial spirit of the Chinese community unleashed and the colonial administration now devoting most of its resources to support them, Hong Kong became an industrial colony and developed increasingly strong servicing sectors. By the 1980s, local entrepreneurs had become so successful that they took over some of the well-established major British companies that had been pillars of the local economy for a century. As Hong Kong developed, it looked to the wider world—something originally necessitated by the imposition of trade embargos on China by the United States and the United Nations after the start of the Korean War in 1950—and eventually transformed itself into a global metropolis. In this process, the younger generations who grew up after the Sino-British border was closed developed a common identity that made them proud citizens of Hong Kong, and they became agents of change in reshaping how their parents’ generation felt about Hong Kong and China. The great transformation of postwar Hong Kong happened in the shadow of a dark cloud over its long-term future, which is a legacy from history. Hong Kong in fact consists of three parts: the island of Hong Kong, the tip of the Kowloon peninsula, and the New Territories, which amounts to 90 percent of the overall territory. The first two were ceded by China to Britain in perpetuity, but the New Territories was only leased in 1898 for a period of 99 years. As the three parts developed organically they could not be separated. During the Pacific War the nationalist government of China successfully secured an agreement from the British government that the future of the New Territories would be open to negotiation after the defeat of Japan. When victory came, the British recovered Hong Kong, and the Chinese government was distracted by the challenges posed by the Communist Party. After it won control of mainland China in 1949 the Communist government left Hong Kong alone, as it was a highly valuable opening for China to reach out beyond the Communist bloc during the Cold War. In 1979 the British raised the issue of the New Territories lease, as the remainder of the lease was getting too short for comfort. Formal negotiations started in 1982, and it took two years for an agreement to be reached. The British government ultimately agreed to hand over the entirety of Hong Kong as a going concern to China, which undertook to maintain the system and way of life there unchanged for fifty years. The transitional period saw controversies over democratic developments in Hong Kong, which were limited at China’s insistence. The formal handover went smoothly in 1997, and the colony became a Chinese Special Administrative Region. At first it appeared that Hong Kong enjoyed a high degree of autonomy, as promised by the Chinese government, but the scope for its autonomy was eroded gradually. The increase in interactions between the local people and the mainland Chinese, as well as the Chinese authorities’ refusal to let Hong Kong develop genuine democracy, nurtured a strong sense of Hong Kong identity, which started to transform into a kind of national identity that is different and distinct from that of China. By the mid-2010s this gave rise to a small but vocal movement that advocates independence.


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