Left-wing generation, right-wing generation. Ivan Meshekov and Ernst Jünger (preliminary notes)

Proglas ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladimir Sabourin ◽  
◽  
◽  

This article is an introduction to the comparison between the constituting of the “left-wing generation” of the Bulgarian literary critic Ivan Meshekov (1891–1970) and the “right-wing generation” of the German writer Ernst Jünger (1895–1998) in the frontline experience of World War I. Both authors are emblematic figures of the leftwing and the right-wing intellectual spheres respectively, being, at the same time, black sheep in their own political camp. In the well-grounded existential and conceptual temerity of decisions which led them to a categorical generational binding of the aesthetical with the political, Ivan Meshekov and Ernst Jünger are shown to be brothers in arms in a decesionistic situation of the “lost generation” which seeks and finds itself (or finds death) on the battlefields of World War I.

Author(s):  
Boris I. Kolonitskii

The article examines the cultural forms of legitimation / delegitimation of authority of the Provisional Government. Particular attention is paid to the personal authority of Alexander Kerensky, including rhetorical (persuasive) devices and visual images which underlay the tactics of praising or condemning him. As the main source, the article uses the newspapers of A.A. Suvorin, namely Malen'kaya gazeta [Little newspaper], Narodnaya gazeta [People’s newspaper], Rus' [Rus], Novaya Rus' [New Rus]. These newspapers are compared with resolutions, letters and diaries, and with publications in other periodicals. The study clarifies some aspects of political isolation of the Provisional Government in the fall of 1917. By this time, the propaganda attack on Kerensky was conducted not only by the Bolsheviks and other left-wing groups but also by the right-wing and conservative publications. The propaganda of the left- and right-wing opponents was significantly different but they had a point of contact: both of them created the image of the “traitor” who was unworthy to remain in power.


Author(s):  
Laurențiu Ștefan

In Romania, a highly segmented and extremely volatile party system has contributed to a predominance of coalition governments. Alternation in power by coalitions led by either left-wing or right-wing parties used to be a major feature of Romanian governments. Thus, until a short-lived grand coalition in 2009, ideologically homogeneous coalitions were the general practice. Since then, parties from the right and left of the political spectrum have learned to work together in government. Given the semi-presidential nature of the political regime and the exclusive power to nominate the prime minister, the Romanian president plays an important role in coalition formation. The president also plays a pivotal role by shadowing the prime minister and therefore influencing the governance of coalitions. She has the power to veto ministerial appointments and therefore she can also shape the cabinet line-up. Pre-election coalitions are a common feature, more than two-thirds of Romanian coalition governments have been predicated on such agreements. Coalition agreements dealt with both policy issues and coalition decision-making bodies and the governance mechanisms that have been in most cases enforced and complied with—until the break-up of the coalition and the downfall of the respective government. One very common decision-making body is the Coalition Committee, which has been backed on the operational level by an inner cabinet made up of the prime minister and the deputy prime ministers, which usually are the heads of the junior coalition parties.


2004 ◽  
Vol 65 ◽  
pp. 173-175
Author(s):  
Reiner Tosstorff

This is a very useful bibliographical tool produced by the efforts of the International Association of Labour History Institutions (IALHI). This association comprises more than one hundred archives, libraries and research centers all over the world, though the vast majority are located in Europe, and not all of them have the same importance, reflecting the geographical and political unevenness of socialism's history. This particular volume aims to list all the publications of the social-democratic internationals after 1914, i.e. from the time of the political split due to the support for World War I by most social-democratic parties. This means that the left-wing, beginning with the Kienthal-Zimmerwald movement during the war and leading to the “Communist International” from 1919 on, is not represented here. But also left-wing splits from social democracy in later years, as in the 1930s with the “London Bureau” of left-wing socialist parties (and also the Bureau's predecessors) are excluded here, as they openly campaigned against social democracy. Also, a few international workers' institutions (mainly in the cultural field) that had been founded before 1914, but tried to maintain their independence after 1914 faced with the political split, are therefore not listed as well.


2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthijs Rooduijn ◽  
Tjitske Akkerman

How is populism distributed over the political spectrum? Are right-wing parties more populist than left-wing parties? Based on the analysis of 32 parties in five Western European countries between 1989 and 2008, we show that radical parties on both the left and the right are inclined to employ a populist discourse. This is a striking finding, because populism in Western Europe has typically been associated with the radical right; only some particular radical left parties have been labeled populist as well. This article suggests that the contemporary radical left in Western Europe is generally populist. Our explanation is that many contemporary radical left parties are not traditionally communist or socialist (anymore). They do not focus on the ‘proletariat’, but glorify a more general category: the ‘good people’. Moreover, they do not reject the system of liberal democracy as such, but only criticize the political and/or economic elites within that system.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Karina Bénazech Wendling ◽  
Matthew Rowley

Populism, like nationalism, can be found on the right as well as on the left-wing of the political spectrum. However, current political debates demonstrate how in recent years, nationalist and populist movements have advanced the preservation of Christian “roots” against a global cosmopolitanism. Right-wing populism thus tends to present itself as a guardian of Christian culture, or Judeo-Christian culture. However, there is a struggle over the definition and the ownership of this religious heritage. Whilst it is certainly possible to identify sources within the Protestant tradition that may legitimise support for right-wing populism, the questions this struggle raises often relate to particular intersections of culture, theology, perspectives on history as well as political thought. This special issue explores and critiques these intersections, employing theological, historical, and sociological methods. While the main perspective is that of cross-disciplinary reflections on the fraught relationship between Protestantism and right-wing populism, it also examines the evolution of broader connections between Christianity and nationalism through time.


2019 ◽  
pp. 115-168
Author(s):  
Philipp Nielsen

This chapter describes the ways in which right-wing Jews, whether they described themselves as “royalist,” “nationally minded” (nationalgesinnt), or “conservative,” attempted to make sense of the political and social changes around them following Germany’s defeat in the First World War and amid revolution at home. None of them were mere bystanders but active participants in their environment. The extent to which they could remain integrated into the Right in the years between 1918/1919 and 1924, on what terms, and in which parts of it, reflects the wider development of social and political circles they moved in, and thus the development of the wider Right, in the first five years of the Weimar Republic. It traces the rise of new concepts of belonging, namely the community of the trenches and the people’s community.


2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 291-301
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Chrisidu-Budnik

The 1944–1949 Greek civil war between the supporters of the monarchy with the right-wing government and the left-wing forces with the Democratic Army of Greece resulted in the death of approximately 100,000 people and forced partisans and their families to migrate to countries of “people’s democracy.” It is estimated that the Polish People’s Republic accepted approximately 14,000 people (children and adults). The article describes the genesis of the conflict that led to the outbreak of the civil war as well as the increasing polarization of the Greek population. It presents the (political and social) complexity of the processes of emigrating from Greece to the people’s democracies and selected aspects of the organization of the Greek community’s life in the Polish People’s Republic.


1994 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Jarzombek

Joseph Goebbels' famous claim about the connection between politics and art in his letter to Wilhelm Furtwängler in 1933 epitomizes Nazi theories concerning the cultural benefits of art. In it he attempts both to legitimize and cunningly obscure an underlying reactionary agenda: We who are giving form to modern German politics, see ourselves as artists to whom has been assigned the great responsibility of forming, from out of the brute mass, the solid and full image of the people. Though there are many studies of post-World War I cultural aesthetics, especially in the context of Hitler's final solution, little has been done to trace that concept back to its nonreactionary, Wilhelmine roots. This paper, which looks at the discourse on cultural aesthetics as it emerged in the first decade of the twentieth century, also challenges some received notions about the Werkbund, an organization of artists, architects, and industrialists founded in 1907. With the Werkbund, the utopian potential of cultural aesthetics that emerged in the context of liberal bourgeois theory long before it was co-opted by the right wing revealed itself for the first time as a powerful instrument of cultural definition. This paper will also discuss some of the early formulators of Wilhelmine cultural aesthetics in various disciplines, Karl Scheffler (art critic), Heinrich Waentig (economist), Hermann Muthesius (architect), and Georg Fuchs (playwright), among others.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 917-940
Author(s):  
Tomasz Rawski

The article discusses a shift, of the paradigm structuring Polish official memory of World War II and the state-socialist period from antifascist to anticommunist, that took place in the post-1989 Polish parliament. Based on the example of the political struggle in parliament over the memory of May 1945 (Victory Day) that occurred on three consecutive major anniversaries of this event (1995, 2005, and 2015), the article shows how the right-wing post-Solidarity camp dismantled and eliminated the antifascist narrative that was based on a symbolic continuity between 1945 and 1995–2005, respectively, and was promoted by the postcommunists, replacing it with a primarily anticommunist narrative about “two totalitarianisms,” founded on a symbolic continuity between 1939 and 1989. Within this new paradigm, May 1945 was made into a merely formal commemorative point of reference devoid of any symbolic power.


2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 43-60
Author(s):  
Yechiam Weitz

This article examines the major changes in the Israeli political arena, on both the left and right, in the two years before the 1967 War. The shift was marked by the establishment in 1965 of the right-wing Gahal (the Herut-Liberal bloc) and of the Labor Alignment, the semi-merger of Israel’s two main left-wing parties, Mapai and Ahdut HaAvodah. Some dissatisfied Mapai members broke away from the Alignment and formed a new party, Rafi, under the leadership of David Ben-Gurion. They did not gain nearly enough Knesset seats to take power in the November 1965 election, but Rafi did become part of the emergency national unity government that was formed in June 1967, due largely to the weak position of Levi Eshkol as prime minister. This enabled Rafi’s Moshe Dayan to assume the minister of defense position on the eve of the Six-Day War, which began on 5 June 1967.


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