On the Power of the Constitutional Court to Rule on the Compliance of Mixed Agreements with the Constitution

De Jure ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Viktoria Mingova ◽  
◽  
◽  
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Specific Situation ◽  
The European Union ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
Member States ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
The One ◽  
Mixed Agreements

This study aims at examining the general characteristics of constitutional review of international treaties and highlighting its specificities with regard to mixed European Union agreements. Legal issues stem from the fact that, in this case, we are faced with international treaties concluded not only by the Bulgarian State but by the European Union together with the Member States and third countries. Since the competence of the European Union is exclusive in certain fields, the Union has to ‘mix’ its competences in external relations with that of the Member States in order to be able to act in all aspects of international relations. Although, the review of the constitutionality of mixed agreements does not reveal any specific situation with regard to the power of the Constitutional Court to rule on the compliance of the international treaties with the Constitution, the main issue is about the limitations of the Court, exercising a preliminary and ex post review of the constitutionality of international treaties in the case of a mixed agreement, in the light of the obligation of sincere cooperation, on the one hand, and the safeguarding of the constitutional identity of the Bulgarian State’s participation in the establishment and development of the European Union, on the other hand.

scholarly journals Relationship between national, international and European law within the constitutional review in Romania

2016 ◽  
pp. 91-107
Author(s):  
TUDOREL TOADER ◽  
MARIETA SAFTA
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
European Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Exclusive Jurisdiction ◽  
Constitutional Identity

The Constitutional Court has ruled that, by adhering to the legal order of the European Union, Romania agreed that, in those areas where exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on the European Union, regardless of the international treaties priorly signed, implementation of its obligations arising therefrom is subject to the rules of the European Union. Otherwise, this would result in the undesirable situation where, through bi or multilateral internationally assumed obligations, Member State would seriously affect the Union’s competence and, in practice, would act in its place in the aforementioned areas. For this reason, in the field of competition, any State aid falls within the competence of the European Commission and appeal proceedings fall within the jurisdiction of the European Union. Therefore, pursuant to Article 11 para. (1) and Article 148 para. (2) and (4) of the Constitution, Romania applies in good faith the obligations resulting from the Accession Instrument, without interfering with the exclusive competence of the European Union and, by virtue of the compliance clause contained in the text of Article 148 of the Constitution, Romania cannot adopt a legislative act contrary to the obligations assumed as a Member State. All those already highlighted are subject to certain limitations, expressed in what the Court described as “national constitutional identity”.

Foreign Affairs Federalism in the European Union

2019 ◽  
pp. 331-351
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
International Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
European Court ◽  
Treaty Of Rome ◽  
Formed Part ◽  
Mixed Agreements

The European Union was born as an international organization. The 1957 Treaty of Rome formed part of international law, although the European Court of Justice was eager to emphasize that the Union constitutes “a new legal order” of international law. With time, this new legal order has indeed evolved into a true “federation of States.” Yet how would the foreign affairs powers of this new supranational entity be divided? Would the European Union gradually replace the member states, or would it preserve their distinct and diverse foreign affairs voices? In the past sixty years, the Union has indeed significantly sharpened its foreign affairs powers. While still based on the idea that it has no plenary power, the Union’s external competences have expanded dramatically, and today it is hard to identify a nucleus of exclusive foreign affairs powers reserved for the member states. And in contrast to a classic international law perspective, the Union’s member states only enjoy limited treaty-making powers under European law. Their foreign affairs powers are limited by the exclusive powers of the Union, and they may be preempted through European legislation. There are, however, moments when both the Union and its states enjoy overlapping foreign affairs powers. For these situations, the Union legal order has devised a number of cooperative mechanisms to safeguard a degree of “unity” in the external actions of the Union. Mixed agreements constitute an international mechanism that brings the Union and the member states to the same negotiating table. The second constitutional device is internal to the Union legal order: the duty of cooperation.

Review by Constitutional Courts of the Obligation of National Courts of Last Instance to Refer a Preliminary Question to the Court of Justice of the EU

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Member States ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Judicial Remedy ◽  
The Eu

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.

Core of State Sovereignty and Boundaries of European Union's Identity in the Lissabon – Urteil

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-418
Author(s):  
Elisabetta Lanza
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
State Sovereignty ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Treaty Of Lisbon ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Eu

In the 2009 judgment dealing with the Treaty of Lisbon, the German Federal Constitutional Court urges to modify a domestic statute in order to guarantee the rights of the internal rule-making power and also provides a reasoning on the role of the European Union (EU) as an international organization, the principle of sovereignty and the relations between European Institutions and Bodies and the EU Member States. According to the German Court the Treaty of Lisbon does not transform the European Union into a Federal State (Staatsverband), but into a Confederation of States (Staatenverbund). In spite of the 1993 landmark judgment, the so-called “Maastricht Urteil”, the Court steps forward and focuses also the subject-matters that necessarily have to pertain to the Member States jurisdiction, the so-called “domain reserve”. The German Federal Constitutional Court decision on the Lisbon Treaty arouses the reflection on the core of State sovereignty and on the boundaries of the EU legal system and focuses on the force of the right to vote of every citizen, the basis of democracy.Furthermore, the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court highlights the well-known issue of the EU's identity and the balancing between EU democracy and Member State sovereignty. In the light of the German Constitutional Court statements, the present work aims to understand which could be actually the EU's identity and how could be approached “democratic deficit” of the EU.

scholarly journals Are traditional minority languages a bench marking for the rights of migrant languages in the European Union?

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 40-60
Author(s):  
Christopher Houtkamp ◽  
László Marácz
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Linguistic Diversity ◽  
Comparative Approach ◽  
Minority Languages ◽  
Language Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Linguistic Rights ◽  
The Status ◽  
The One

In this paper a normative position will be defended. We will argue that minimal territorial minority language rights formulated in terms of the personality principle referring to traditional minority languages granted in the framework of the European Union (EU) are a benchmark for non-territorial linguistic rights. Although territorial minority languages should be granted collective rights this is in large parts of Europe not the case. Especially in the Central and Eastern European Member States language rights granted to territorial languages are assigned on the basis of personal language rights. Our argumentation will be elaborated on the basis of a comparative approach discussing the status of a traditional territorial language in Romania, more in particular Hungarian spoken in the Szeklerland area with the one of migrant languages in the Netherlands, more in particular Turkish. In accordance with the language hierarchy implying that territorial languages have a higher status than non-territorial languages both in the EUs and Member States’ language regimes nonterritorial linguistic rights will be realized as personal rights in the first place. Hence, the use of non-territorial minority languages is conditioned much as the use of territorial minority languages in the national Member States. So, the best possible scenario for mobile minority languages is to be recognized as a personal right and receive full support from the states where they are spoken. It is true that learning the host language would make inclusion of migrant language speakers into the host society smoother and securing a better position on the labour market. This should however be done without striving for full assimilation of the speakers of migrant languages for this would violate the linguistic rights of migrants to speak and cultivate one’s own heritage language, violate the EUs linguistic diversity policy, and is against the advantages provided by linguistic capital in the sense of BOURDIEU (1991).

Non-EU Legal Instruments (EFSF, ESM, AND Fiscal Compact)

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Martucci
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
Fiscal Discipline ◽  
Member States ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Fiscal Compact ◽  
Angela Merkel

‘Another Legal Monster?’ That was the question asked by the Law Department of the European University Institute on 16 February 2012 in a debate about the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), also known as the Fiscal Compact Treaty. On 2 March 2012, twenty-five Member States of the European Union minus the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic signed the TSCG. A month before, on 2 February 2012, the euro area Member States signed the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM Treaty), another legal monster. In both cases, the monstrosity lies in the fact that Member States have preferred to conclude an international treaty, rather than to use the European Union (EU) institutional system. Why did the European Commission not propose a legislative act to establish a financial assistance mechanism in the Eurozone and strengthen the fiscal discipline in the EU? Does this mean the end of community method and a victory for the intergovernmental method? As Herman Van Rompuy commented about the crisis; ‘often the choice is not between the community method and the intergovernmental method, but between a co-ordinated European position and nothing at all’. In 2010, Angela Merkel defended her vision of a new ‘Union Method’ in a speech held at the College of Europe. This approach can be defined by the following description: ‘co-ordinated action in a spirit of solidarity–each of us in the area for which we are responsible but all working towards the same goal’. Each of us means the European institutions and Member States. The new ‘Euro-international’ treaties (or inter se treaties) raise a number of questions regarding their compatibility with EU law, implications for the Union legal system, institutional balance, national sovereignty and democratic accountability. These questions are all the more important because international treaties raise a number of questions on their compatibility with EU law, implications for the Union legal system and institutional balance.

Mixed Agreements: The EU Law Fundamentals

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Case Law ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Basic Characteristics ◽  
Mixed Agreements ◽  
The Eu

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union

The First Preliminary Reference of the French Constitutional Court to the CJEU:Révolution de Palaisor Revolution in French Constitutional Law?

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1471-1490
Author(s):  
François-Xavier Millet ◽  
Nicoletta Perlo
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Major Change ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Face ◽  
First Time

A preliminary reference on the part of the Constitutional Council was, in several respects, not to be expected. It was debatable whether it would consider itself as a “court or tribunal” within the meaning of Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and, therefore, whether it would refer a case to the European Court of Justice (CJEU) at all. The French constitutional court could also have resorted to theacte clairdoctrine so as to escape from their obligation to ask for the interpretive guidance of the CJEU. However, the main reason why a reference was not awaited by legal actors lies in the limited jurisdiction of the Constitutional Council. Until the introduction in 2008 of the so-called QPC, that is,question prioritaire de constitutionnalité(the Priority Preliminary Reference mechanism on issues of constitutionality), theConseil constitutionnelhad a very limited jurisdiction compared to its European counterparts. Its main mission was to assess the conformity of parliamentary bills and treaties with the Constitution and only with the Constitution. Its review could only take placeex ante, between the adoption and the promulgation of a text. By opening the way to anex postreview of statutes with regard to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, the QPC brought about a major change in the French adjudication system: statutes are no longer immune from constitutional challenge once they are in force. However, treaties and other international or European commitments are no parameters of constitutional review. TheConseil constitutionnelmade this clear in 1975 and never seriously changed track, despite minor qualifications to the rule. In their seminalIVGruling on the Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy Act, they held that it was not up to them to review the compatibility of bills with treaties, in spite of Article 55 of the Constitution. Consequently, the task of the constitutional judges does not go beyond the assessment of laws with regard to the Constitution. This is the main reason that explains why, on the face of it, theConseil constitutionnelwas unlikely to refer a case to the CJEU. Why would it seek the interpretation or ask for the review of a European text if this text is immaterial for it and if the yardstick of its examination is the Constitution and only the Constitution? Yet, it happened. For the first time, theConseilreferred a case to the CJEU on 4 April 2013. Although this is undoubtedly a major legal breakthrough, we will see in due course that this is probably more arévolution de palaisthan a true revolution in French constitutional law.

Hungarian Constitutional Court: Keeping Aloof from European Union Law

ICL Journal ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
László Blutman ◽  
Nóra Chronowski
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Tier System ◽  
Domestic Law

AbstractWhile the European Union is in the process of carefully navigating among the various forms of sub-federalism, Member States - including recent ones like Hungary, trying to find an equilibrium between their sovereignty and European supranationalism - have to cope with possible conflicts between their national legal systems and EU law. Since Hungary's accession to the European Union, the Hungarian Constitutional Court has faced questions regarding the constitutionality of EU legal rules and conflicts between European and national legal norms. This article examines these issues and analyzes criteria of constitutional review that the Court has gradually set out in dealing with some of these conflicts. So far, it has established two principles marking the boundaries of future constitutional practice. First, it will treat the founding and amending treaties of the European Union as part of domestic law for the purposes of constitutional review, thereby setting up a two-tier system of legal rules applicable within Hungarian legal practice instead of a possible three-tier construction that would distinguish between national, international and European law. Second, in the absence of jurisdiction to review substantive (un)constitutionality (as opposed to procedural constitutionality), the Constitutional Court does not regard a conflict between domestic law and EU law as a constitutionality issue and this mandates the ordinary courts to resolve such conflict of a sub-constitutional nature. Taking these conclusions as starting points, this article sets out the possible types of conflicts that may occur between EU rules and other legal rules applicable in Hungary, weighing the constitutional relevance of these conflicts; it also outlines the directions along which the practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court may develop in this respect.

Variable Geometry or Concentric Circles: Patterns for the European Union

1997 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. Usher
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
The Other ◽  
Variable Geometry ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Judicial Control ◽  
Community Institutions ◽  
European Court ◽  
Private Citizens ◽  
The One

Once upon a time, a Professor of European Institutions, at least if a lawyer by training, could simply assert that the European Communities are based on the rule of law, that they create institutions with autonomous powers, which are able to issue legislation binding as law throughout every member State of the Community, and that they create courts which have power to exercise judicial control over a complex network of relationships between the Community institutions, the member States and private citizens. While these statements are still true, however, they must now be laced in a rather more complex context. Furthermore, there is a contrast between on the one hand the intensification (to borrow a word from the Common Agricultural Policy) of certain fundamenta s of the EC legal order in the recent case law of the European Court, and on the other hand attempts by member States to escape this through non-EC forms of cooperation in the framework of the European Union, the development of the idea that not all the rules of the EC Treaty apply to all the member States, and the entry by the majority of the member States into a separate Treaty, the Schengen Agreement, dealing with matters which might be thought to fall under the EC Treaty or the Home Affairs and Justice pillar of the Treaty on European Union—all of which might generically be referred to as variable geometry. In the other direction, it may be observed that large amounts of substantive

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