scholarly journals The Comparative of Study Culpable Rights in Preliminary Investigation in Iran and Turkey

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 65
Author(s):  
Mina Mehrvand ◽  
Khalil Afandak

<p><span lang="EN-US">The preliminary investigation to determine the fate of the victims and the defendants ' judicial rights of the victims and the criminal justice is of special importance. The preliminary investigation of the center of gravity of the interrogation of suspects. Considering the necessity of supporting the principle of presumed innocence and preserve human dignity in the hearing process, the main lines of the meanwhile defensive rights defendants at the stage of preliminary investigation determined. Examples of the rights of the defense and legal formalities and job maker Iran and Turkey in the interrogation system varied. However, what is the condition for this is that a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of this extension should be anticipated and mandated. The legal rights of the accused is guaranteed set in the level of national, regional or international, and with the aim of adopting a decision in a fair and judicial errors than to keep away from people who are offence, in order to be exposed to. Including these rights can be charge with its reasons, the right to have a lawyer, the right to silence, a prohibition of delay and procrastination in charge after arrest or summons, the right note, the right to health in statements against torture questioned. Meanwhile, In the system of criminal procedure if what legislator to some of the aforementioned rights in its rules on match point but the hearing system in Turkey, including in particular anticipating the unconditional right to have a lawyer, the right to prohibit the delay in charges and the right to an annulment of the flawed investigation and classified problems. Obviously fix the defects and its assignment to investigation compliance under the law is just and fair hearing flow will be extremely helpful.</span></p>

2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherine Biber

A long-held and fundamental principle of our criminal justice system is that people accused of crimes have a right to silence, arising from the presumption of innocence. Rules of evidence try to protect this ‘right’ during trial, by ensuring that juries understand that adverse inferences cannot be drawn from the silence of the accused. Silence, in court, can mean nothing, and we are not to speculate about what might motivate an accused person to remain silent, or what they might have said had they spoken. However, an examination of the jurisprudence in this area shows that the law is often not dealing with actual silence; sometimes when the law refers to the ‘right to silence’, it seems to mean a ‘refusal to hear’. In other instances, there is actual silence, and yet the law refuses to subject that silence to any critical interpretation, insisting that we cannot infer anything from it. While we have learned, from theatre, music, linguistics, religion and psychology, to develop sophisticated means for interpreting silence, the law demands that we set aside these interpretive tools, hearing silence that isn’t there, and inferring nothing about something.


Author(s):  
Martin Hannibal ◽  
Lisa Mountford

This chapter explains the substantive law governing a defendant’s silence at the police station under ss. 34, 36, and 37 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (CJPOA) 1994. It covers the risks associated with s. 34 CJPOA 1994; drawing inferences from a failure to account under ss. 36 and 37 CJPOA 1994; and the practical aspects associated with remaining silent.


Author(s):  
Martin Hannibal ◽  
Lisa Mountford

This chapter explains the substantive law governing a defendant’s silence at the police station under ss. 34, 36, and 37 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (CJPOA) 1994. It covers the risks associated with s. 34 CJPOA 1994; drawing inferences from a failure to account under ss. 36 and 37 CJPOA 1994; and the practical aspects associated with remaining silent.


Author(s):  
Martin Hannibal ◽  
Lisa Mountford

This chapter explains the substantive law governing a defendant’s silence at the police station under ss. 34, 36, and 37 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (CJPOA) 1994. It covers the risks associated with s. 34 CJPOA 1994; drawing inferences from a failure to account under ss. 36 and 37 CJPOA 1994; and the practical aspects associated with remaining silent.


Evidence ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew L-T Choo

Chapter 5 deals with the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination. It considers relevant provisions of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. These include sections 34, 36, and 37, which permit adverse inferences to be drawn from certain failures of the defendant at the pre-trial stage. Section 34, in particular, has generated a substantial body of case law. The manner in which the Court of Appeal has resolved the issue of silence on legal advice has been subjected to particular criticism. The operation of section 34 has been held to be compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights so long as a sufficiently watertight direction is given to the jury. The precise extent to which the privilege against self-incrimination applies to real evidence also remains uncertain and is an issue requiring resolution.


2017 ◽  
Vol 81 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-111
Author(s):  
Cathál MacPartholán

This article critically examines the development of statutory restrictions on the common law right to silence in the UK, providing insight from common law, jurisprudence and historical legal contexts, and considering the broader context of the privilege against self-incrimination, and critically evaluates the development restriction of the right, by ss 34–38 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.


2021 ◽  
pp. 203228442110283
Author(s):  
Diletta Marchesi ◽  
Michele Panzavolta

The present article aims to discuss the protection of the right to silence in the Italian criminal justice system for an international audience. In Italy, the right to silence is a right that stems directly from the protection offered by the Constitution to the right of defence. Much debate revolves around the extent to which the right deserves to be safeguarded. Although the majority of scholarship favours the broadest extension of the right possible, this view is not endorsed unanimously. The legislature has introduced some limits, the most important being that which confines the right to silence to the facts concerning one’s own responsibility, save for exceptions. The courts, in turn, have taken a softer approach in the protection of the right to silence, which may allow the possibility of using the suspect’s silence to draw adverse consequences. Although the Italian system offers comparatively strong protection to the right to silence, it nonetheless leaves some openings that undermine the effectiveness of the right. This article therefore argues that compensating for the possible side effects of the rules on cooperation, removing some negative consequences of silence and the strengthening of remedies are the main fronts where the Italian system can still improve the protection of the right to silence.


2002 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Candace Johnson Redden

The political importance of rights in liberal democracies, and of universally accessible health care in Canada, are trite observations. However, the increasing use of the language of rights to defend existing patterns of health care in Canada is a curious if not alarming phenomenon. What do citizens mean when they say that they have the right to health care? How can health care rights be defined philosophically and politically? This article examines the increasing popularity of rights claiming for health care, and argues that the ''right to health care'' has a non-possessive, normative nature that is at odds with legalistic individualistic rights claiming. This is a significant philosophical finding, one that informs the political debate over health care by revealing that legal rights claims are not sufficient to defend social entitlements. The conceptual project undertaken in this article illuminates directions of reform and suggests that differentiated citizenship provides a better model than legal rights to guide reform efforts.


2002 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 781-815 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacqueline Hodgson

The recent reform adopted by the French Parliament, the Loi of 15 June 2000, touches upon a wide range of matters from investigation and detention through to trial and appeal, all within a project designed to ‘reinforce the presumption of innocence and the rights of victims’.1 It is part of a broader reform package which originally included strengthening the independence of the procureur2 from the hierarchical control of the Minister of Justice and changing the way in which magistrats3 are selected,4 together with the measures already enacted in June of 1999 to simplify and clarify aspects of criminal procedure and to reduce delay.5 A large part of the June 2000 reform seeks to strengthen the rights of the accused and the safeguards designed to ensure her proper treatment at all stages of the criminal process. Such rhetoric and aspirations stand in contrast to the Home Office and government discourse to which we have become accustomed on this side of the Channel, a discourse dominated by macho language expressing a desire to ‘get tough’ and ‘crackdown’ on crime and presumed criminals.6 Against the backdrop of almost mandatory defence disclosure and the curtailment of the right to silence in this jurisdiction, provisions which strengthen the rights of the accused and provide her with more information about the case against her together with greater opportunities to influence the pre-trial investigation, will make English criminal justice scholars nostalgic for a time when the rights of the accused were seen as something other than ‘a criminal's charter’.


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