Verteilung knapper lebensrettender Ressourcen. Überlegungen zur Debatte um die „Triage“

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 400-424
Author(s):  
Friederike Wapler

The article deals with the ethical justification of distribution procedures in case of a shortage of life-saving resources, as they have been discussed since spring 2020 under the keyword ‘triage’. Considering individual human dignity and the equal right to life for all people, widespread approaches to justification are critically reflected. The author examines arguments for an overall benefit-maximising distribution (saving the greater number at the expense of the smaller number) as well as some of the qualitative distribution criteria discussed in the current debate. The article concludes that there are narrow ethical and constitutional limits to both the utilitarian maximisation of life interests and the application of qualitative criteria such as age or presumed “remaining lifespan” after recovery.

2002 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nesbitt ◽  
Sayers

AbstractIn the United Kingdom, the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force on 2 October 2000. This Act has implications for the National Health Service, that are speculative and to date largely untested in the Courts. The area considered here, is the way in which the Act may impact on age discrimination as it relates to provision of health care. Ageist policy and decision-making is analysed in conjunction with the Human Rights Act and Articles 2, 3, 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.The rationality of ageism and the justifications used to support its practice are challenged. The equal right to life-saving treatment of elderly patients is defended as inviolable, unless offset by other reasonable considerations, which as argued should not be age per se.


Author(s):  
Ali Mehdi

Children have been guaranteed an equal right to life, yet millions of them continue to die due to preventable causes. Their deaths are widely perceived as a biomedical issue, with vaccinations being presented as the ultimate life-saving intervention. This book argues that a clear and consistent pattern of preventable child deaths is primarily a problem of justice. It engages with the debate on ‘equalisandum’—what (metric) needs to be equalized across individuals in a just society—in modern theories of justice in the context of trends in child survival and access to its determinants among selected groups in India. It argues that Amartya Sen’s multifocal metric of justice—with a central focus on ‘maximal potentials’ or ‘capabilities’—is more plausible than its counterparts since it allows equity considerations to be met without compromising the potentials of the better-off or aggregative concerns. It concludes that such an approach to justice is relevant for affirmative action policies too, which have long been a source of enormous resentment, especially in India and the United States.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-117
Author(s):  
Billy Holmes

Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights facilitates inequality regarding the imposition of the death penalty and thus, it cannot ensure universality for the protection of the right to life. Paragraph two of this article states: ‘sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes.’ This article argues that the vagueness of the phrase ‘the most serious crimes’ allows states to undermine human rights principles and human dignity by affording states significant discretion regarding the human rights principles of equality and anti-discrimination. The article posits that this discretion allows states to undermine human dignity and the concept of universal human rights by challenging their universality; by facilitating legal inequality between men and women. Accordingly, it asserts that the implications of not expounding this vague phrase may be far-reaching, particularly in the long-term. The final section of this article offers a potential solution to this problem.


2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 143-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatjana Hörnle ◽  
Mordechai Kremnitzer

Human dignity can be a protected interest in criminal law. This paper starts with some reflections about the meaning of human dignity and then examines offense descriptions in the German Penal Code and the Israeli Penal Code. These codes are used as sources for identifying possibly relevant prohibitions. One can indeed find numerous examples of offense descriptions that can be justified by pointing to human dignity, either as a main protected interest or as a protected interest in addition to other interests. The protected interest can be either the individual victim's right to human dignity or human dignity as an objective value. Offense descriptions that can be connected to “protection of human dignity” should, for analytical purposes, be divided into three groups: violations of the dignity of individual human beings through acts other than speech; violations of the human dignity of individuals through speech; and media content that does not contain statements about individuals but shows scenes of severe humiliation (e.g., fictional child pornography). Questions that need further discussion primarily concern the second group (what role should free speech play in cases of human dignity violations?) and the third group (does the acknowledgement of human dignity as an objective value mean to endorse a re-moralization of the criminal law?).


Author(s):  
Janilce Silva Praseres ◽  
Marcelo Ramos Saldanha

Abstract: human rights are a set of ethical values whose purpose is to protect and enable the realization of human dignity in its various dimensions and also prevent the reduction of the individual to the condition of object or, above all, the reduction of his condition as subject of rights, such as the right to life, freedom, security, equality. The universal character of human rights protection demonstrates some weaknesses, especially in the transposition into concrete legal systems, so what we propose is a brief analysis of human rights from Hannah Arendt.Uma Breve Análise Acerca dos Direitos Humanos a partir da Crítica de Hannah ArendtResumo: os direitos humanos são um conjunto de valores éticos que têm por finalidade proteger e possibilitar a realização da dignidade humana em suas várias dimensões e, ainda, impedir a redução do indivíduo à condição de objeto ou, sobretudo, a diminuição da sua condição na qualidade de sujeito de direitos, a exemplo o direito à vida, à liberdade, à segurança, à igualdade. O caráter universal de proteção aos direitos humanos demonstra algumas fragilidades, principalmente, na transposição para ordenamentos jurídicos concretos, assim, o que propomos é uma breve análise acerca dos direitos humanos a partir de Hannah Arendt.


Prismet ◽  
1970 ◽  
pp. 245-260
Author(s):  
Per Anders Aas

Approaching the 500-year Reformation anniversary, the article discusses what might legitimize Luther as a topic in today’s society and educational practice. Are his crucial ideas an exclusively religious heritage, or could they be converted to issues of common relevance? Referring to the ways Luther was used by the GDR state and church in the 1983 anniversary, the article questions the potential for recontextualizing his specifically theological issues. By this, it relates to a current debate in religion didactics whether stories could be taught according to their religiously specific or universal, existential dimensions – cf. the question of learning about or from religion. The cultural and political impact of Luther’s theology obviously makes it relevant as common heritage. His theological issue, however – man’s lack of free will (De servo arbitrio), and his view on «theological man» as defined solely by God’s justification (De homine), which Luther considers to be his primary concern – appears to be counter-intuitive, i.e. different from what seems right or natural. Hence, it challenges the concept of cultural heritage, but proves a critical corrective to common, essentialist justifications of human dignity, cultural identity and superiority – which makes it an issue to be learnt from and not only about.Emneord: Luther, reformasjonen, kulturarv, fagdidaktikk, religionsdidaktikk.


Author(s):  
Pitsou Anastasia

In this chapter, the authors negotiate the fact that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) missed the opportunity to recognize the right to abortion under specific criteria that are harmonized with the right to life and the right to privacy. It obviously remains a triumph of nationalism and of religious power over human dignity.


Author(s):  
Peter G. Kirchschlaeger

Abstract Human rights and their universality can lead to restrictions for individuals resulting from duties, which correspond to human rights of all human beings. This characteristic of human rights emphasizes the need for an ethical justification. Addressing the question of how human rights can be justified represents, therefore, an expression of respect for pluralism and particularity. Beyond that, human dignity and human rights lay the foundation for pluralism and particularity as they see all human beings as individuals that are all different and unique, and not as members of a collective. Only human rights protection of the autonomy of each individual allows all human beings to be particular and fosters pluralism. Finally, the concept of “adaptation” contributes to an understanding of the interaction between pluralism and particularity and human dignity and human rights as their foundation by capturing the relationship between human dignity and human rights and religious and worldview-based communities.


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