scholarly journals Response to “Misunderstanding the Match: Do Students Create Rank Lists Based on True Preferences?”

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 1021-1022
Author(s):  
Benjamin Schnapp ◽  
Katie Ulrich ◽  
Jamie Hess ◽  
Aaron Kraut ◽  
David Tillman ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
True Preferences

n/a

Some Remarks on Preference Revelation for Public Goods

2012 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-168
Author(s):  
Domenico da Empoli
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
The People ◽  
True Preferences

Abstract This paper questions the long-established view in the Musgrave-Samuelson public goods theory about voters’ incentives to misrepresent their preferences for public goods. The arguments are structured as follows: The concept of‘democracy’ as ‘government by the people’ presupposes that voters freely express their own views in order to influence government's decisions; the idea of governments introducing demand-revealing mechanisms to detect people's ‘true’ preferences seems inconsistent with this view. Voters’ disclosure of their preferences typically is not immediately related to their tax obligations, whose enforcement takes place after approval of the budget, which makes unprofitable any strategic behavior by the voters. From an historic viewpoint, the ‘preference revelation problem’ for public goods goes back to Wicksell's essay on «A New Principle of Just Taxation» and, through Musgrave, it was conveyed to Samuelson. However, the Wicksellian statement was based on an incorrect interpretation of Mazzola's theory.

scholarly journals Choice in experiential learning: True preferences or experimental artifacts?

2017 ◽  
Vol 174 ◽  
pp. 59-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathaniel J.S. Ashby ◽  
Emmanouil Konstantinidis ◽  
Eldad Yechiam
Keyword(s):  
Experiential Learning ◽  
True Preferences

When Misperception Matters

1982 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 505-526 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. A. Stein
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Formal Analysis ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
The Other ◽  
International Crises ◽  
True Preferences

This essay is an analysis of the implications of misperception—the inaccurate assessment by one actor of the other actor's preferences—in international relations. The author finds that misperception cannot affect the choice of an actor with a dominant strategy, although it can affect that actor's expectations as long as both actors are self-interested and seek to maximize their own payoffs. Misperception creates conflict only in a narrowly circumscribed range of situations, and even then the misperceived actor has no incentive to mask its true preferences. An actor who deceives does so in order to facilitate coordination through the other's misperception of its preferences, and thus to avoid conflict—not to create it. Three possible outcomes can occur when both actors misperceive, and in only one of the three does misperception cause conflict that would otherwise be avoidable. In a formal analysis of the limited set of situations that characterize international crises, misperception is found neither to create conflict nor to lead to the escalation of crisis into war.

Costly Adjustments, Markets and International Reassurance

2012 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 679-704 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes Urpelainen
Keyword(s):  
Status Quo ◽  
The Other ◽  
Market Imperfections ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Information Revelation ◽  
The Status ◽  
Efficient Information ◽  
Implementation Stage ◽  
True Preferences

Two leaders engaged in international co-operation must each build trust by credibly signalling that they will not exploit the other by defecting at the implementation stage. Previous research does not reveal the difficulty and cost of such international reassurance. The role that costly adjustments by markets play in international reassurance is analysed, showing that fully efficient information revelation can be achieved when market actors under intense competitive pressures undergo sufficiently costly adjustments in expectation of international co-operation. ‘Nice’ leaders can reveal their true preferences simply by saying they intend to co-operate, because ‘mean’ leaders are unwilling to mislead market actors into undergoing futile costly adjustments. However, market imperfections prevent full information revelation unless market actors prefer international co-operation to the status quo.

Freedom of Choice About Incidental Findings Can Frustrate Participants' True Preferences

Bioethics ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 203-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Viberg ◽  
Pär Segerdahl ◽  
Sophie Langenskiöld ◽  
Mats G. Hansson
Keyword(s):  
Incidental Findings ◽  
Freedom Of Choice ◽  
True Preferences

scholarly journals Manipulating Gale-Shapley Algorithm: Preserving Stability and Remaining Inconspicuous

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rohit Vaish ◽  
Dinesh Garg
Keyword(s):  
Stability Result ◽  
Single Woman ◽  
Preference List ◽  
True Preference ◽  
The Stability ◽  
True Preferences

We study the problem of manipulation of the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm by a single woman via permutation of her true preference list. Our contribution is threefold: First, we show that the matching induced by an optimal manipulation is stable with respect to the true preferences. Second, we identify a class of optimal manipulations called inconspicuous manipulations which, in addition to preserving stability, are also nearly identical to the true preference list of the manipulator (making the manipulation hard to be detected). Third, for optimal inconspicuous manipulations, we strengthen the stability result by showing that the entire stable lattice of the manipulated instance is contained inside the original lattice.​

scholarly journals Implicit attitudes matter for social judgments of others’ preference, but do not make those judgments more or less accurate

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Martin Lees
Keyword(s):  
Implicit Attitudes ◽  
Social Judgment ◽  
Social Judgments ◽  
Large Dataset ◽  
Judgment Accuracy ◽  
Explicit Attitudes ◽  
Componential Analysis ◽  
Attitude Measures ◽  
Implicit And Explicit ◽  
True Preferences

Drawing from a large dataset of responses to implicit and explicit attitude measures and social judgments of others’ preferences (N = 97,176) across 95 distinct attitude domains, this Registered Report utilized a componential analysis of judgment accuracy to examine whether implicit attitudes affected the accuracy of social judgment. I found evidence that judgments of the population’s preferences were associated with the population’s true implicit (but not explicit) attitudes, and that individuals projected their implicit attitudes in addition to the projection of explicit attitudes when judging the population’s true preferences. However, I found no evidence that stronger or weaker implicit attitudes were uniquely associated with greater or less accuracy in judging the population’s true preferences. These results provide generalizable evidence that implicit attitudes matter greatly for social judgment accuracy in distinct and nuanced ways.

scholarly journals A Consequential Contingent Valuation Referendum: Still Not Enough to Elicit True Preferences for Public Goods!

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (49) ◽  
pp. 73-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ewa Zawojska
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Contingent Valuation ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Stated Preference ◽  
Survey Result ◽  
Practical Application ◽  
The Public ◽  
Value Elicitation ◽  
True Preferences

Abstract Whether respondents disclose their preferences truthfully in surveys that are used to assess the values of public goods remains a crucial question for the practical application of stated preference methods. The literature suggests that in order to elicit true preferences, respondents should see a valuation survey as consequential: they must believe in the actual consequences that may follow from the survey result. Drawing on recent empirical findings, we develop a model depicting the importance of the consequentiality requirement for truthful preference disclosure in a survey that evaluates a public policy project based on a referendum-format value elicitation question. First, we show that a respondent’s belief that his vote may influence the outcome of the referendum plays a central role for revealing his preferences truthfully. Second, we find that the subjectively perceived probabilities of the successful provision of the public good and of the collection of the payment related to the project implementation not only need to be positive but also to be in a particular relationship with each other. This relationship varies in respondents’ preferences towards risk.

scholarly journals A Neural Network Auction For Group Decision Making Over a Continuous Space

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoram Bachrach ◽  
Ian Gemp ◽  
Marta Garnelo ◽  
Janos Kramar ◽  
Tom Eccles ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Neural Network ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Group Decision ◽  
Network Models ◽  
Individual Utility ◽  
Neural Network Models ◽  
Continuous Space ◽  
Total Utility ◽  
Pricing Rule ◽  
True Preferences

We propose a system for conducting an auction over locations in a continuous space. It enables participants to express their preferences over possible choices of location in the space, selecting the location that maximizes the total utility of all agents. We prevent agents from tricking the system into selecting a location that improves their individual utility at the expense of others by using a pricing rule that gives agents no incentive to misreport their true preferences. The system queries participants for their utility in many random locations, then trains a neural network to approximate the preference function of each participant. The parameters of these neural network models are transmitted and processed by the auction mechanism, which composes these into differentiable models that are optimized through gradient ascent to compute the final chosen location and charged prices.

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