Coming to Know by Asking Questions

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-102
Author(s):  
Rosen Lutskanov ◽  

The paper explores the intricate interplay of two parallel developments: on the one hand, the Socratic turn in epistemology with its shifting focus on information retrieval, evidence-based reasoning, and the cognitive relevance of questions; and the advance of dynamic epistemic logic with its accent on knowledge-acquisition. Both are relevant for any realistic model of knowledge which pays due attention to learning. It is argued that the formal models are still wanting in some key respects, but the development of alternative and mutually complementing logical systems marks a promising trend for re-establishing the close links between epistemology and epistemic logic.

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 451-489
Author(s):  
Yuri David Santos

Abstract Epistemic logic is usually employed to model two aspects of a situation: the factual and the epistemic aspects. Truth, however, is not always attainable, and in many cases we are forced to reason only with whatever information is available to us. In this paper, we will explore a four-valued epistemic logic designed to deal with these situations, where agents have only knowledge about the available information (or evidence), which can be incomplete or conflicting, but not explicitly about facts. This layer of available information or evidence, which is the object of the agents’ knowledge, can be seen as a database. By adopting this sceptical posture in our semantics, we prepare the ground for logics where the notion of knowledge—or more appropriately, belief—is entirely based on evidence. The technical results include a set of reduction axioms for public announcements, correspondence proofs, and a complete tableau system. In summary, our contributions are twofold: on the one hand we present an intuition and possible application for many-valued modal logics, and on the other hand we develop a logic that models the dynamics of evidence in a simple and intuitively clear fashion.


2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (S1) ◽  
pp. 10-10
Author(s):  
Vigdis Lauvrak ◽  
Kelly Farrah ◽  
Rosmin Esmail ◽  
Anna Lien Espeland ◽  
Elisabet Hafstad ◽  
...  

IntroductionIn 2019, the Norwegian Institute for Public Health and Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health (CADTH) received support from HTAi to produce a quarterly current awareness alert for the HTAi Disinvestment and Early Awareness Interest Group in collaboration with the HTAi Information Retrieval Interest Group. The alert focuses on methods and topical issues, and broader forecasts of potentially disruptive technologies that may be of interest to those involved in horizon scanning and disinvestment initiatives in health technology assessment (HTA).MethodsInformation specialists at both agencies developed search strategies for disinvestment and for horizon scanning in PubMed and Google. The template for the alert was based on an e-newsletter developed by the Information Retrieval Interest Group. Information specialists and researchers reviewed the monthly (PubMed) and weekly (Google) search results and selected potentially relevant publications. Additional sources were also identified through regular HTA and horizon scanning work.ResultsAlerts are posted quarterly on the HTAi Interest Group website; members receive an email notice when new alerts are available. While the revised PubMed searches are identifying relevant information, Google alerts have been disappointing, and this search may need to be revised further or dropped. When the one-year pilot project ends, in Fall 2020, interest group members will be surveyed to see if the alerts were useful, and whether they have suggestions for improving them.ConclusionsCollaborating on this alert service reduces duplication of effort between agencies, and makes new research in horizon scanning and disinvestment more accessible to colleagues in other agencies working in these areas.


Author(s):  
Alexandru Baltag ◽  
Aybüke Özgün ◽  
Ana Lucia Vargas Sandoval

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Lefebvre

Various models, based on a filtered Poisson process, are used for the flow of a river. The aim is to forecast the next peak value of the flow, given that another peak was observed not too long ago. The most realistic model is the one when the time between the successive peaks doesnothave an exponential distribution, as is often assumed. An application to the Delaware River, in the USA, is presented.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrica von Thiele Schwarz ◽  
Gregory A. Aarons ◽  
Henna Hasson

Abstract Background There has long been debate about the balance between fidelity to evidence-based interventions (EBIs) and the need for adaptation for specific contexts or particular patients. The debate is relevant to virtually all clinical areas. This paper synthesises arguments from both fidelity and adaptation perspectives to provide a comprehensive understanding of the challenges involved, and proposes a theoretical and practical approach for how fidelity and adaptation can optimally be managed. Discussion There are convincing arguments in support of both fidelity and adaptations, representing the perspectives of intervention developers and internal validity on the one hand and users and external validity on the other. Instead of characterizing fidelity and adaptation as mutually exclusive, we propose that they may better be conceptualized as complimentary, representing two synergistic perspectives that can increase the relevance of research, and provide a practical way to approach the goal of optimizing patient outcomes. The theoretical approach proposed, the “Value Equation,” provides a method for reconciling the fidelity and adaptation debate by putting it in relation to the value (V) that is produced. The equation involves three terms: intervention (IN), context (C), and implementation strategies (IS). Fidelity and adaptation determine how these terms are balanced and, in turn, the end product – the value it produces for patients, providers, organizations, and systems. The Value Equation summarizes three central propositions: 1) The end product of implementation efforts should emphasize overall value rather than only the intervention effects, 2) implementation strategies can be construed as a method to create fit between EBIs and context, and 3) transparency is vital; not only for the intervention but for all of the four terms of the equation. Summary There are merits to arguments for both fidelity and adaptation. We propose a theoretical approach, a Value Equation, to reconciling the fidelity and adaptation debate. Although there are complexities in the equation and the propositions, we suggest that the Value Equation be used in developing and testing hypotheses that can help implementation science move toward a more granular understanding of the roles of fidelity and adaptation in the implementation process, and ultimately sustainability of practices that provide value to stakeholders.


2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arkadiusz Wójcik

The dynamic epistemic logic for actual knowledge models the phenomenon of actual knowledge change when new information is received. In contrast to the systems of dynamic epistemic logic which have been discussed in the past literature, our system is not burdened with the problem of logical omniscience, that is, an idealized assumption that the agent explicitly knows all classical tautologies and all logical consequences of his or her knowledge. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for this logic.


2005 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. P. Ditmarsch ◽  
W. Van Der Hoek ◽  
B. P. Kooi

This contribution is a gentle introduction to so-called dynamic epistemic logics, that can describe how agents change their knowledge and beliefs. We start with a concise introduction to epistemic logic, through the example of one, two and finally three players holding cards; and, mainly for the purpose of motivating the dynamics, we also very summarily introduce the concepts of general and common knowledge. We then pay ample attention to the logic of public announcements, wherein agents change their knowledge as the result of public announcements. One crucial topic in that setting is that of unsuccessful updates: formulas that become false when announced. The Moore-sentences that were already extensively discussed at the conception of epistemic logic in Hintikka’s ‘Knowledge and Belief ’ (1962) give rise to such unsuccessful updates. After that, we present a few examples of more complex epistemic updates.


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