Austin, Grice and Strawson

2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 182-193
Author(s):  
Stephen Rainey ◽  

Austin discusses the supposed opposition between performative and constative utterances in a paper delivered to a French audience in 1962 entitled Performative—Constative. It is his aim in this paper in a sense to recant his earlier views that such a distinction was clear. A translation of this paper made by G. J. Warnock appeared in 1972 in a collection of essays on the philosophy of language, edited by John Searle. Alongside this translation were criticisms and comments by P. F. Strawson and H. P. Grice. Taken altogether, I regard these papers as containing several important insights that have informed contemporary notions regarding meaning and communication, particularly as they are thought of by Brandom and Habermas. I follow the course of Austin's discussion in assessing the status of the distinction that gives his paper its name and consider its merits, as well as drawing upon some of Strawson's and Grice's thoughts on the matter. After these discussions, I hope that it shall be clear how indebted to these past thinkers are those important theorists of our time.

Author(s):  
Anna L. Solomonovskaya

The article reviews different perspectives concerning the status, origin and functions of double translations in European cultural space throughout the period. The term double translation here refers to the translation of one word with two (rarely more) lexemes connected with a conjunction or another linking word. This technique was universal across medieval translation schools, whatever their geographic origin. However, only particular schools or individual translators have been studied in terms of this technique so far, so the author aims to summarize the findings, delineate some controversial issues in the domain under consideration and place the findings in a common perspective. The controversial issues comprise (but are not limited by) the causes of their emergence in translated texts (from almost accidental fixation of the translator’s hesitation to the conscious decision to apply two different methods of translation based on specific philosophy of language). Another widely discussed question is the status of the words in such a pair – whether they were regarded as synonyms or had another status. One more question that causes discussion is their functions in the text, namely whether they were a rhetorical device or a certain means of semantic differentiation. The author of the article supposes that double translation should be considered dynamically and such chronological consideration makes it possible to argue that double translations first appeared to convey the whole range of meanings of a certain word enabling the reader to make their own choice concerning the exact meaning of the word in each particular context. As for the philosophical or theological background of the technique (be it language philosophy of St. Augustine or the theory of images developed by Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite) sometimes assumed to have been intentionally realized by medieval translators, it is hard to verify such claims as the utterances (Prefaces) of the medieval translators themselves hardly mention (with the possible exception of Praefatio Brixiana) either the technique or its presumed theological grounds. Moreover, word pairs (hendyadis) had been used as a rhetorical device both in the literary tradition and the national epic poetry of many European countries. This rhetorical device was widely used for emphasis, so when double translation actually lost its semantic function, it was retained by languages as set phrases or a purely stylistic device.


Author(s):  
Marta Dynel

AbstractThis article gives a comprehensive theoretical account of deception in multimodal film narrative in the light of the pragmatics of film discourse, the cognitive philosophy of film, multimodal analysis, studies of fictional narrative and – last but not least – the philosophy of lying and deception. Critically addressing the extant literature, a range or pertinent notions and issues are examined: multimodality, film narration and the status of the cinematic narrator, the pragmatics of film construction (notably, the characters’ communicative level and the one of the collective sender and the recipient), the fictional world and its truth, the recipient’s film engagement and make believing, as well as narrative unreliability. Previous accounts of deceptive films are revisited and three main types of film deception are proposed with regard to the two levels of communication on which it materialises, the characters’ level and the recipient’s level, as well as the intradiegetic and/or the extradiegetic narrator involved. This discussion is illustrated with multimodally transcribed examples of deception extracted from the American television seriesHouse.In the course of the analysis, attention is paid to how specific types of deception detailed in the philosophy of language (notably, lies, deceptive implicature, withholding information, covert ambiguity, and covert irrelevance) are deployed through multimodal means in the three types of film deception (extradiegetic deception, intradiegetic deception, and a combination of both when performed by both cinematic and intradiegetic narrators). Finally, inspired by the discussion of Hitchcock’s controversial lying flashback scene inStage Fright, as well as films relying on tacit intradiegetic, unreliable narrators (focalising characters) an attempt is made to answer the thorny question of when the extradiegetic (cinematic) narrator can perform lies (through mendacious multimodal assertions) addressed by the collective sender to the recipient, and not just only other forms of deception, as is commonly maintained.


Rhetorik ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Johann Kreuzer

AbstractThe paper discusses the intellectual development of Augustinus by means of his discussion of the status, the sense, the function and his judgement on rhetoric. This discussion let Augustinus be an important station in the history of the philosophy of language. Starting point is the explanation of the dialectics of the topos (or pathos) of the ›ineffabilis‹. Augustinus shows that the antirhetoric meaning of the ineffable leads in selfcontradictions. Therefore he discusses the forms and the conditions of understanding. This begins with the early dialogue De magistro and reaches to De trinitate and one of the central subjects within this theoretical mainwork of Augustinus: the concept of the verbum intimum. With the (at first view) extreme reductionism in the theory of signs, presented in De magistro - a mental ›oracle‹ is claimed as instance and criterion of understanding -, he destructs the naive representation-belief in an 1:1-relation between outer signs and mental contents. The subject of the ›inner word‹ in De trinitate then is the question of understanding signs as signs. It is shown that only the explanation of the inner word as a mental achievement within ordinary language is sufficient to answer the question of understanding. An excursus elucidates that the sermocinalis scientia of Wilhelm v. Ockham in the 14th century continues the discoveries and philosophical innovations, Augustinus made at the end of antiquity. These discoveries are inalienable for present debates concerning the philosophy of language. And they are inalienable for concepts of rhetoric based in the hermeneutics of understanding. The critique of rhetoric as ›fair of talkativeness‹ brings up a purified sight of the art of language: of the art, language ›is‹.


2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (5) ◽  
pp. 463-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
Åsa Burman

This contradiction ”1. The universal right to free speech did not exist before the European Enlightenment, at which time it came into existence. 2. The universal right to free speech has always existed, but this right was recognized only at the time of the European Enlightenment.” (Searle) draws on two common and conflicting intuitions: The human right to free speech exists because institutions, or the law, says so. In contrast, the human right to free speech can exist independently of institutions—these institutions simply recognize a right we already have. John Searle argues that his status function account of human rights can preserve both intuitions by showing that the inconsistency between (1) and (2) is merely apparent. I argue that this solution works for tokens of human rights but not for types, while the contradiction concerns types. Hence, the status function account of human rights fails to preserve both intuitions.


2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-112
Author(s):  
Michiel Leezenberg

AbstractIn Making the Social World, John Searle develops what he calls a "philosophy of society", which explores the ontological status and logical structure of institutional facts like universities and baseball games. This philosophy of society crucially depends on Searle's earlier work in the philosophy of language and mind. In this review, I discuss some aspects of Searle's theory of institutional facts as structured in terms of declaratives that are most relevant to working linguists, like the relation of language to other social institutions, the emergence of normativity in language, the articulation of (legitimate and illegitimate) power in language usage, and the question of whether there should be any restrictions on the allegedly universal human right to free speech.


Phainomenon ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 18-19 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-174
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Alloa

Abstract Philosophical speech is required to reach the core of the things themselves, often at the risk of subsuming the individual thing under the law of a general concept and ruining its singularity. Is another approach available to philosophy at all ? The question of the violence of the discourse has been raised by many thinkers in the 20th century. Just as Wittgenstein, Husserl demanded for a replacement of deduction by description which would let the things appear in their own light. Merleau-Ponty has rephrased the task of a maieutic phenomenology in terms of”letting see through words” (faire voir par les mots), whereas the direct, exhaustive thematization is given up for an indirect speech, letting the world speak in its own “prose”. While the “indirect ontology” in Merleau-Ponty’s last works has received wide attention these last years, little case has been made of the linguistic implications of the figure of its philosophical operator, the “indirect speech”. What is the status of the “ logos” in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomeno-”logy”? By relating Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on the language of philosophy (rather than on philosophy of language) to the linguistic discussion on free indirect speech (Tobler, Kalepky, Bakhtin) as well as to its use in literature, from Dostoyevsky to Claude Simon, a new perspective opens up of an “indirect ethics”, which implies that whoever speaks in the name of the Other is already spoken by him or by her.


2021 ◽  
Vol - (4) ◽  
pp. 13-26
Author(s):  
Anatoliy Yermolenko ◽  
Serhii Yosypenko

The article is devoted to the historical and philosophical analysis of the unique and paradigmatic role of the H.S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in the philosophical life of Ukraine for 75 years since its foundation. The authors outline its role in the process of institutionalizing philosophy in Ukraine from the time of the domination of the dogmas of Soviet Marxism to the introduction of current research traditions in modern Ukrainian philosophy. The continuity and peculiarities of the change of generations of researchers in the field of philosophy and the involvement of Ukrainian philosophical thought in the world intellectual discourse are studied. The article's authors reveal the gradual formation of the Kyiv philosophical tradition, the role of the Institute's leadership in the style and nature of scientific research of certain periods. Particular attention is paid to the institutionalization of new research areas at the Institute, such as political philosophy, philosophy of language and speech, which belong to the leading paradigm of modern philosophy. Attention is paid to the cooperation of the Institute with domestic scientific and educational institutions, its international relations. The status of the leading professional publications, which became significant both in Soviet times and during independence, is highlighted. Finally, the article notes the role and tasks of the Institute in modern social discourse, focuses on the values, the preservation of which is taken care of by representatives of the Institute.


2010 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina Chitanu

Performativity in the philosophy of language means that certain deeds may be done using language, strictly speaking in speech, and the theory has become known as “speech-act theory,” its first theoreticians being J. L. Austin and John Searle. This article investigates the performativity of the text per se, how literature can “perform” for the reader, while also interpreting some related concepts: performance, drama, script, and intermediality through the analysis of three highly popular plays: Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Oscar Wilde’s The Importance of Being Earnest and G. B. Shaw’s Pygmalion.


2020 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 865-891
Author(s):  
LOTTE HOGEWEG ◽  
AGUSTIN VICENTE

Both in linguistics and in psycholinguistics there is some debate about how rich or thin lexico-semantic representations are. Traditionally, in formal semantics but also in philosophy of language as well as in cognitive pragmatics, lexical meanings have been thought to be simple stable denotations or functions. In this paper, we present and discuss a number of interpretational phenomena of which the analysis proposed in the literature makes crucial use of rich meanings. The phenomena in question are cases where the assignment of truth-conditional contents to utterances seems to follow rules that do not operate on simple stable denotations or any other kind of ‘thin’ meanings but where composition takes rich structured representations as input. We also discuss problems for such accounts, which are mostly based on the inability of extant rich meanings accounts to explain many other interpretational phenomena, and we discuss the solutions that have been proposed to solve them. Furthermore, we address the discussion whether the informationally rich meanings are part of semantics, and more specifically part of the lexicon, or whether this information should be ascribed to more general world knowledge.


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