Three Transparency Principles Examined

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 ◽  
pp. 111-128
Author(s):  
René van Woudenberg ◽  
Naomi Kloosterboer ◽  

This paper derives, from Richard Moran’s work, three different accounts of doxastic Transparency—roughly, the view that when a rational person wants to know whether she believes that p, she directs her attention to the truth-value of p, not to the mental attitude she has vis-à-vis p. We investigate which of these is the most plausible of the three by discussing a number of (classes of) examples. We conclude that the most plausible account of Transparency is in tension with the motivation behind Transparency accounts: it is disconnected from the deliberative stance.

Author(s):  
Shenshen Wang ◽  
Chao Sun ◽  
Ye Tian ◽  
Richard Breheny

AbstractIn the long history of psycholinguistic research on verifying negative sentences, an often-reported finding is that participants take longer to correctly judge negative sentences true than false, while being faster to judge their positive counterparts true (e.g. Clark & Chase, Cogn Psychol 3(3):472−517, 1972; Carpenter & Just, Psychol Rev 82(1):45–73, 1975). While many linguists and psycholinguists have strongly advocated the idea that the costs and complexity of negation can be explained by appeal to context, context-based approaches have not been able to provide a satisfying account of this polarity*truth-value interaction. By contrast, the alternative theory of negation processing, which says that negation is processed by separately representing the positive, does provide a plausible account. Our proposals provide a means for reconciliation between the two views since we argue that negation is a strong cue to a positive context. Here we present our account of why and when negation is often apparently processed via the positive. We review many of the factors that are seen to be at play in sentence verification involving negation. We present evidence that participants’ adoption of the positive-first procedure in sentence-picture verification tasks is conditioned by context.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (12) ◽  
Author(s):  
I Made Suarta

Local knowledge (local genius) is the quintessence of our ancestors thinking either oral or written traditions which we have received to date. Thought that, in the context of real archipelago has the same thread, which has a valuable values and universal to strengthen the integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. Through our founding genius thought that we should be able to implement it in real life to be able to reach people who "Gemah ripah loh jinawi", no less clothing, food, and shelter!Some of the many concepts of mind for the people of Bali are reflected in the work of puppeteer Ki Dalang Tangsub contributed to the development of Indonesia and has a universal value is the concept of maintaining the environment, save money, and humble. Through mental attitude has not always feel pretty; like not smart enough, not skilled enough, and not mature enough experience, make us always learn and practice. Learn and continue lifelong learning will make a man more mature and a lot of experience. Thus, the challenges in life will be easy to overcome. All that will be achieved, in addition to the hard work is also based on the mental attitude of inferiority is not proud, haughty, arrogant and other negative attitudes. Thought care environment, managing finances, and humble as described above, in Bali has been formulated through a literature shaped geguritan, namely Geguritan I Gedé Basur Dalang Tangsub works, one of the great authors in the early 19th century.  Keywords: Local knowledge, a cornerstone of, the character of the archipelago


Author(s):  
Ellen Winner

This book is an examination of what psychologists have discovered about how art works—what it does to us, how we experience art, how we react to it emotionally, how we judge it, and what we learn from it. The questions investigate include the following: What makes us call something art? Do we experience “real” emotions from the arts? Do aesthetic judgments have any objective truth value? Does learning to play music raise a child’s IQ? Is modern art something my kid could do? Is achieving greatness in an art form just a matter of hard work? Philosophers have grappled with these questions for centuries, and laypeople have often puzzled about them too and offered their own views. But now psychologists have begun to explore these questions empirically, and have made many fascinating discoveries using the methods of social science (interviews, experimentation, data collection, statistical analysis).


Author(s):  
Timothy Williamson

This chapter develops and refines the analogy between knowledge and action in Knowledge and its Limits. The general schema is: knowledge is to belief as action is to intention. The analogy reverses direction of fit between mind and world. The knowledge/belief side corresponds to the inputs to practical reasoning, the action/intention side to its outputs. Since desires are inputs to practical reasoning, the desire-as-belief thesis is considered sympathetically. When all goes well with practical reasoning, one acts on what one knows. Belief plays the same local role as knowledge, and intention as action, in practical reasoning. This is the appropriate setting to understand knowledge norms for belief and practical reasoning. Marginalizing knowledge in epistemology is as perverse as marginalizing action in the philosophy of action. Opponents of knowledge-first epistemology are challenged to produce an equally systematic and plausible account of the relation between the cognitive and the practical.


Author(s):  
Tim Button ◽  
Sean Walsh

This chapter considers whether internal categoricity can be used to leverage any claims about mathematical truth. We begin by noting that internal categoricity allows us to introduce a truth-operator which gives an object-language expression to the supervaluationist semantics. In this way, the univocity discussed in previous chapters might seem to secure an object-language expression of determinacy of truth-value; but this hope falls short, because such truth-operators must be carefully distinguished from truth-predicates. To introduce these truth-predicates, we outline an internalist attitude towards model theory itself. We then use this to illuminate the cryptic conclusions of Putnam's justly-famous paper ‘Models and Reality’. We close this chapter by presenting Tarski’s famous result that truth for lower-order languages can be defined in higher-order languages.


Author(s):  
Jon Robson

This chapter discusses a position it terms ‘belief pessimism concerning aesthetic testimony’ (BP). According to BP (i) judgements of aesthetic value are beliefs and (ii) aesthetic judgements are subject to some additional norm not active with respect to judgements concerning more mundane matters which (inter alia) prevents such judgements from legitimately being formed on the basis of testimony. The chapter argues that BP should be rejected since it faces a number of pressing objections relating to the nature of belief. First, it proposes a fundamental difference between aesthetic beliefs and beliefs of other kinds without properly motivating this distinction. Secondly, BP is in tension with any plausible account of the nature of belief. The chapter concludes, then, that at least one of (i) or (ii) should be rejected.


1961 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 414-417
Author(s):  
Hugues Leblanc
Keyword(s):  

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Camden Alexander McKenna

AbstractI argue for constraining the nomological possibility space of temporal experiences and endorsing the Succession Requirement for agents. The Succession Requirement holds that the basic structure of temporal experience must be successive for agentive subjects, at least in worlds that are law-like in the same way as ours. I aim to establish the Succession Requirement by showing non-successively experiencing agents are not possible for three main reasons, namely that they (1) fail to stand in the right sort of causal relationship to the outcomes of their actions, (2) exhibit the wrong sort of epistemic status for agency, and (3) lack the requisite agentive mental attitude of intentionality. I conclude that agency is incompatible with non-successive experience and therefore we should view the successive temporal structure of experience as a necessary condition for agency. I also suggest that the Succession Requirement may actually extend beyond my main focus on agency, offering preliminary considerations in favor of seeing successive experience as a precondition for selfhood as well. The consequences of the Succession Requirement are wide-ranging, and I discuss various implications for our understanding of agency, the self, time consciousness, and theology, among other things.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Harriet E. Baber

Abstract Modal counterpart theory identifies a thing’s possibly being F with its having a counterpart that is F at another possible world; temporal counterpart theory identifies a thing’s having been F or going to be F, with its having a counterpart that is F at another time. Benovsky, J. 2015. “Alethic Modalities, Temporal Modalities, and Representation.” Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 29: 18–34 in this journal endorses modal counterpart theory but holds that temporal counterpart theory is untenable because it does not license the ascription of the intuitively correct temporal properties to ordinary objects, and hence that we should understand ordinary objects, including persons, as transtemporal ‘worms’. I argue that the worm theory is problematic when it comes to accounting for what matters in survival and that temporal counterpart theory provides a plausible account of personal persistence.


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