scholarly journals G.E. Moore and the Problem of the Criterion

2021 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-60
Author(s):  
Joshua Anderson ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
External World ◽  
Epistemological Problem ◽  
Problem Of The Criterion ◽  
Actual Point

In this paper, I offer an understanding of G.E. Moore’s epistemology as presented in, “A Defence of Common Sense” and “Proof of an External World.” To frame the discussion, I look to Roderick Chisholm’s essay, The Problem of the Criterion. I begin by looking at two ways that Chisholm believes one can respond to the problem of the criterion, and, referring back to Moore’s essays, explain why it is not unreasonable for Chisholm to believe that he is following a line of reasoning that Moore might take. I then show why I believe Chisholm is actually trying to do something quite different from what Moore was, and thus misses Moore’s actual point. I conclude that Moore is best understood as rejecting traditional epistemological concerns. By forcing Moore to deal with a traditional epistemological problem, it will become clear how bold Moore’s “epistemology” is.

Some thoughts on lexemes, the dome, and inner speech

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
William Benzon
Keyword(s):  
Language Development ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Cognitive Structure ◽  
External World ◽  
Inner Speech ◽  
Neural Systems ◽  
The Common

Sydney Lamb’s model focuses our attention on the physicality of language, of the signs themselves as objects in the external world and the neural systems the support them. By means of the metaphor of a cognitive dome, he demonstrates that there is no firm line between linguistic and cognitive structure. In this context, I offer physically grounded accounts of Jakobson’s metalingual and emotive functions. Drawing on Vygotsky’s account of language development, I point out that inner speech, corresponding to the common sense notion of thought, originates in a circuit that goes through the external world and is then internalized.

Explaining Perceptual Knowledge

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Stroud
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
External World ◽  
Satisfactory Explanation ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Epistemological Problem ◽  
The Way

This chapter offers a response to Quassim Cassam’s ‘Seeing and Knowing’, which challenges some of the conditions Cassam thinks the author has imposed on a satisfactory explanation of our knowledge of the external world. According to Cassam, the conditions he specifies can be fulfilled in ways that explain how the knowledge is possible. What is at stake in this argument between Cassam and the author is the conception of what is perceived to be so that is needed to account for the kind of perceptual knowledge we all know we have. That is what must be in question in any promising move away from the overly restrictive conception of perceptual experience that gives rise to the hopelessness of the traditional epistemological problem. The author suggests that we should explore the conditions of successful ‘propositional’ perception of the way things are and emphasizes the promise of such a strategy.

Linguistic Philosophy and Perception

Philosophy ◽  
1953 ◽  
Vol 28 (107) ◽  
pp. 311-324
Author(s):  
Margaret MacDonald
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
External World ◽  
Physical World ◽  
Sense Experience ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Senses ◽  
Perceptual Variation ◽  
Linguistic Philosophy ◽  
As If

Philosophical theories of perception are generally admitted to be responses to certain problems or puzzles allied to the ancient dichotomy between Appearance and Reality. For they have been mainly provoked by the incompatibility of the common–sense assumption that an external, physical world exists and is revealed to the senses with the well–known facts of perceptual variation and error. If only what is real were perceived just as if only what is right were done it is possible that many of those questions would never have been asked which lead to moral philosophy and a metaphysics of the external world. But sense perceptions of the same object vary so that it appears to have contradictory qualities and are sometimes completely deceptive. Nor do illusory differ internally from veridical perceptions. Moreover, perceptual variation and error can be unmasked only by such procedures as looking more carefully, listening harder, trying to touch, asking others, in short by more sense experience. So the senses are, as it were, both accused and judge in these disputes and why should a venal judge be trusted more than the criminal he tries? Such “correction” of one experience by another of the same kind seems no more reliable than the original “error.” Philosophers have found all this very puzzling.

Stewart and Hamilton

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas McDermid
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
External World ◽  
Stewart’S Approach ◽  
The Subject

How did the cause of common sense realism fare in Scotland in the decades immediately following Thomas Reid’s death in 1796? This chapter explores the contributions of the two Edinburgh-based philosophers introduced at the end of Chapter 1: Dugald Stewart (1753–1828) and Sir William Hamilton (1788–1856). Stewart’s approach to the problem of the external world is less intellectually adventurous than what we find in Hamilton, who attempted something difficult and hitherto untried—namely, to arrive at a synthesis of the insights of Reid and Kant. Hamilton’s willingness to learn from Kant and the post-Kantian idealists opened up Scottish philosophy to foreign authors and fresh influences, and this contributed to the backlash against common sense realism which is the subject of Chapters 5 and 6.

Die Gewissheit der Orientierung

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-71
Author(s):  
Werner Stegmaier
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Language Game ◽  
External World ◽  
Language Games ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
The Earth ◽  
Closing The Gap ◽  
New Interpretation

AbstractIn his treatises A Defence of Common Sense (1925), Proof of an External World (1939), and Certainty (1941), G.E. Moore wanted to put an end to the modern doubts about the certainty of reality and the ‘external world’ by pointing to the undeniable plausibilities of ‘empirical propositions,’ such as ‘I know that this is my hand’ or ‘I know that the earth had existed before my body was born.’ Wittgenstein, who was intensely grappling with Moore’s proofs during the last one and a half years before his expected death, still questioned these proofs and countered them with his concept of language games – including a different logic of the ‘connection with reality.’ Philosophically, he thereby left many loose ends in all places and admittedly a ‘gap’ between them, which he was no longer able to close. But he prepared for closing the gap by means of his concept of orientation, which he had initiated in his Philosophical Investigations without defining it in this term. In a new interpretation of On Certainty from the perspective of the Philosophy of Orientation, this paper tries to show how the attention to the phenomenon of orientation and the language game in which it is expressed can close this gap and thus carry on Wittgenstein's late philosophy to a certain point.

The Non-existence of Matter

Philosophy ◽  
1928 ◽  
Vol 3 (12) ◽  
pp. 495-504
Author(s):  
C. E. M. Joad
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
External World ◽  
The Universe

It is probably true to say that the majority of philosophers have considered the universe to be mental. If the universe is really mental, it follows that matter cannot be quite real, and many philosophers have in fact brought forward cogent reasons for regarding matter as in some sense illusory. Those who hold this view are called Idealists. Idealism has historically assumed a number of different forms, between some of which there is little in common, but all forms of Idealism agree in maintaining that objects, such as chairs and tables, of which common sense believes the external world to exist, are not material.

Buffier, Claude (1661–1737)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
James W. Manns
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
External World ◽  
Inner Experience ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
External Reality ◽  
The Common ◽  
Early Eighteenth Century ◽  
Common Sense Philosophy

A French Jesuit who flourished in the early eighteenth century, Buffier developed an outlook that he referred to as common-sense philosophy. While deeply influenced by the philosophies of Descartes and Locke, he saw their reliance on the testimony of inner experience to be conducive to scepticism concerning the external world. In reaction to this, he sought to establish the irrevocable claims of various ‘first truths’, which pointed towards external reality and qualified it in various respects. His work anticipates certain themes that surfaced later in the common-sense philosophy of Thomas Reid.

Vagueness

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Tye
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
External World ◽  
Ways Of Thinking

It seems obvious that there are vague ways of speaking and vague ways of thinking – saying that the weather is hot, for example. Common sense also has it that there is vagueness in the external world (although this is not the usual view in philosophy). Intuitively, clouds, for example, do not have sharp spatiotemporal boundaries. But the thesis that vagueness is real has spawned a number of deeply perplexing paradoxes and problems. There is no general agreement among philosophers about how to understand vagueness.

The “Perplexity” of George Campbell's Rhetoric: The Epistemic Function of Common Sense

2000 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lois Agnew
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
External World ◽  
Rhetorical Theory ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Scottish Enlightenment ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
Objective Truth ◽  
Individual Perception ◽  
Epistemic Function ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract: George Campbell's rhetorical theory is based upon a philosophical tradition that has ancient roots—common sense philosophy. Campbell's interest in common sense emerged through his association with Scottish Enlightenment philosophers such as Thomas Reid. However, Campbell's beliefs about the relationship between individual perception and social knowledge at the same time reveal a philosophical affinity with Aristotie and the Stoics. For Campbell, as for the ancients, common sense represents both the intuitive ability that individuals use in apprehending the reality of the external world and the shared human capacity to make necessary collective judgments. Although Campbell believes that there is objective truth that is apprehended through coinmon sense, he at the same time perceives common sense as providing a foundation for making decisions about the contingent circumstances that people face from day to day. Campbell's rhetoric has frequentiy been described as managerial, but his interest in common sense creates an epistemic function for rhetoric, as it provides the means for negotiating the principles of moral evidence in order to resolve the specific questions that arise in the life of the community.

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