scholarly journals A few remarks on East Prussia goldsmith heritage in Lithuania

Menotyra ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dalia Vasiliūnienė

The newly identified goldsmiths’ works of East Prussia are presented in the article: a chalice from Kaunas St. Cross Church forged by Otto Schwerdfeger, a master in Königsberg, in 1704 (?), a ciborium from Vilnius St. Apostles Peter and Paul Church made by goldsmith Johann Kownatzky in Tilsit in the 1760–80s, and a monstrance from Valakbūdis Church made by Michael Greiffenhagen II, a master from Tilsit, in 1795 (?). After the World War II, East Prussia was annexed by the Soviet Union. Destruction of the region and its historical memory and enormous losses of the cultural heritage partly resulted in knowledge gaps in Lithuania about the goldsmithing in this region. For the knowledge of goldsmith history in East Prussia, works by Eugen von Czihak, a German scientist, based on the information collected before the First and Second World Wars are very important. The goldsmithing of Eastern Prussia is pretty seldom mentioned in the Lithuanian historiography. Only sparsely survived works by Königsberg, Tilsit and Klaipėda (Memel) masters from the 17th – 19th century have been published. On the contrary, the context of Lithuanian goldsmith history is described based on data provided by the German writings. According to our knowledge, the goldsmith heritage from Königsberg predominates in Lithuania. Not a few goldsmith works from Tilsit were also identified in Lithuania. The works of Eastern Prussian goldsmiths are of particular value. Because of the dramatic fate of Königsberg region, the survived number of goldsmith works throughout Europe is relatively low.

1952 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 699-722 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Kohn

In spite of later claims that it had been the leader of the anti-fascist camp and of the Slav world from the beginning of the second World War, the Soviet Union followed a strictly Russian policy, neither anti-fascist nor Pan-Slav, from August, 1939, to June, 1941. This policy clearly foreshadowed a nationalist revival of the language and aspirations that had been most characteristic of Old Russia but were assumed to have been definitely buried in the ten November days of 1917 which shook the world. During these two years not the slightest sympathy for the Czechs and Poles suffering under German occupation was expressed. Indeed, although Leninist communism during World War I had conducted a violent defeatist propaganda compaign in both warring camps, the subversive communist propaganda that was resumed in 1939 was directed only against the democratic nations. “Moreover, officially, even ostentatiously, help was granted to the camp of fascism so that, from 1939 to 1941, the Soviet Union could be considered a non-belligerent partner of the Axis. From the policy of benevolent neutrality towards the Axis the Soviet Union was removed against its will. Circumstances made it an ally of the democracies. This change was performed reluctantly, only because no other choice was left.”


Author(s):  
Kal Raustiala

The single most important feature of American history after 1945 was the United States’s assumption of hegemonic leadership. Europeans had noted America’s enormous potential since at least the nineteenth century. After the Civil War the United States had one of the largest economies in the world, but, as noted earlier in this book, in geopolitical terms it remained a surprisingly minor player. By 1900 the United States was playing a more significant political role. But it was only after 1945 that the nation’s potential on the world stage was fully realized. Victory in the Second World War left the United States in an enviable position. Unlike the Soviet Union, which endured devastating fighting on its territory and lost tens of millions of citizens, the United States had experienced only one major attack on its soil. Thanks to its actions in the war America had great influence in Europe. And the national economy emerged surprisingly vibrant from the years of conflagration, easily dominant over any conceivable rival or set of rivals. When the First World War ended the United States ultimately chose to return to its hemispheric perch. It declined to join the new League of Nations, and rather than maintaining engagement with the great powers of the day, America generally turned inward. The years following the Second World War were quite different. In addition to championing—and hosting—the new United Nations, the United States quickly established a panoply of important institutions aimed at maintaining and organizing international cooperation in both economic and security affairs. Rising tensions with the Soviet Union, apparent to many shortly after the war’s end, led the United States to remain militarily active in both Europe and Asia. The intensifying Cold War cemented this unprecedented approach to world politics. The prolonged occupations of Germany and Japan were straightforward examples of this newly active global role. In both cases the United States refashioned a conquered enemy into a democratic, free-market ally—a significant feat. The United States did not, however, seek a formal empire in the wake of its victory.


Worldview ◽  
1971 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 9-11
Author(s):  
Donald Brandon

For a generation now, America has played a significant role in world affairs. Until Pearl Harbor a reluctant belligerent in World War II, this country was also slow to respond to the challenge of the Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of that gigantic conflict. But for almost twenty-five years American Presidents have been more or less guided by the policy of “containment.” Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson all introduced variations on the multiple themes of the policy adopted by Harry Truman. Yet each concluded that the world situation allowed no reasonable alternative to an activist American foreign policy in most areas of the globe.


2006 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 635-644
Author(s):  
MARTIN H. FOLLY

The Second World War continues to be an attractive subject for scholars and even more so for those writing for a general readership. One of the more traditional areas of focus has been the ‘Big Three’ – the alliance of the United States with Britain and the Soviet Union. Public interest in the three leaders – Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin – remains high, and their decisions continue to resonate in the post-Cold War era, as demonstrated by continued (and often ahistorical) references to the decisions made at the Yalta Conference. Consequently, while other aspects of Second World War historiography have pushed into new avenues of exploration, that which has looked at the Grand Alliance has followed fairly conventional lines – the new Soviet bloc materials have been trawled to answer old questions and using the frames of reference that developed during the Cold War. This has left much to be said about the nature of the relationship of the United States with its great allies and the dynamics and processes of that alliance, and overlooked full and rounded analysis of the role of that alliance as the instrument of Axis defeat.


Slavic Review ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 75 (3) ◽  
pp. 606-629 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franziska Exeler

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the search for alleged traitors took place in each country that had been under foreign occupation. The most active country in this regard was the Soviet Union. This article analyzes how the Soviet authorities dealt with people who had lived in German-occupied territory during the war. It discusses divergent understandings of guilt, and examines means of punishment, retribution and justice. I argue that inconsistencies in Moscow’s politics of retribution, apart from reflecting tensions between ideology and pragmatism, resulted from contradictions within ideology, namely the belief that the war had uncovered mass enemies in hiding, and the belief that it had been won with the mass support of the Soviet population. The state that emerged from the war, then, was both powerful and insecure, able to quickly reassert its authority in formerly German-occupied areas, but also deeply ambivalent about its politics of retribution.


2018 ◽  
Vol 216 (2) ◽  
pp. 65-92
Author(s):  
Assist. Prof. Dr. Mohammed Abdul Majid Abdul Baqi

The indicators of Europe returning increasing rapidly as an active part at the current time, where the French differentiation pattern towards the American situation towards Palestinian issue, also the Germany-French-Belgian differentiation pattern towards the American situation during the Military aggression on Iraq in 2003, all of that Allows multiple and diverse indicators for this role Which had declined after the end of World War II and the end of the European occupation of the Arab homeland, Europe has suffered great losses militarily, economically, lose of population and socially  during the World War II, and this loss  had impacted its ability to continue its old strategic role of colonizing in confronting other international poles that had become the first power over Europe account and started to impose its influence on the former colonies of Europe in the Arab region, where America has struggled to impose its full control over the Arab homeland As an alternative for the old European colonialism , where the independence of the situation of the European had declined significantly towards the Arabian issues, so, it turns to the dialogue with  the Arabian governments, Which  had actually embodied as (The Arabian-European dialogue), considering that a new stage has begun to rearrange the international influence in the region, Also, Europe has regained its colonial power that was lost after the World War II particularly  with the decline of the Arab unity factors because of the weakness of governments and systems, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, The level of this orientation has expanded with the launch of '' Middle East" project , according to (American-Zionist) belief that Excludes the European interests, and this pushed the researcher to analyze the constant and the variable in that study towards the Arabian issues as a framework to answer the queries about the future nature of the Arabian-European relations.              


Author(s):  
Steve R. Waddell

With the outbreak of war in Europe, a growing fear of and ultimately a concerted effort to defeat Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany defined American involvement. Competing Allied national and strategic interests resulted in serious debates, but the common desire to defeat the enemy proved stronger than any disagreements. President Franklin Roosevelt, understanding the isolationist sentiments of the American public and the dangers of Nazism and Imperial Japan perhaps better than most, carefully led the nation through the difficult period of 1939–1941, overseeing a gradual increase in American military preparedness and support for those standing up to Nazi Germany, as the German military forces achieved victory after victory. Following American entry into the war, strategic discussions in 1942–1943 often involved ambitious American military plans countered by British voices of moderation. The forces and supplies available made a direct invasion of northern France unfeasible. The American desire to launch an immediate invasion across the English Channel gave way to the Allied invasion of North Africa and subsequent assault on Sicily and the Italian peninsula. The Tehran Conference in November 1943 marked a transition, as the buildup of American forces in Europe and the overwhelming contribution of war materials enabled the United States to determine American-British strategy from late 1943 to the end of the war. The final year and a half of the war in Europe saw a major shift in strategic leadership, as the United States along with the Soviet Union assumed greater control over the final steps toward victory over Nazi Germany. By the end of World War II (May 1945 in Europe and September 1945 in Asia), the United States had not only assumed the leadership of the Western Allies, it had achieved superpower status with the greatest air force and navy in the world. It was also the sole possessor of the atomic bomb. Even with the tensions with the Soviet Union and beginnings of a Cold War, most Americans felt the United States was the leader as the world entered the post-war era.


Author(s):  
Gail Kligman ◽  
Katherine Verdery

This chapter discusses the Soviet blueprint, which established the technology of collectivization that East European leaders followed, with variations, during the 1950s. As the first country in the world to be founded on Marxist–Leninist principles, the Soviet Union had myriad problems to solve. The leaders' ambitious program of social engineering required developing a variety of techniques for carrying out specific tasks, such as obtaining food requisitions, collectivizing agriculture, and so on. These techniques formed the basis for creating “replica” regimes in Eastern Europe following World War II, in a process of technology transfer of almost unparalleled scope. This technological package may be called “the Soviet blueprint,” of which collectivization was a major part. Although the results varied considerably, each East European country was pressed into adopting more or less the same package. Nowhere, however, did the blueprint fully succeed against recalcitrant local realities—not even in the Soviet Union itself.


Author(s):  
N. V. Pavlov

There is no doubt that the most important event of the 20th century was a joint victory of the united front of peoples and states over German fascism. For some that was the victory in the Second World War. For the Russians - the victory in the Great Patriotic War which cost the Soviet Union incredible efforts, enormous sacrifices and material losses. Now when we celebrate the 70thyear since that epoch-making date we turn our attention once more to the lessons of history because the memory of the war has been imprinted deeply on our gene level of Russians and Germans. This is because every family from both sides sustained heavy losses. This memory is alive in literature, in movies and plays, songs, in memorials, biographies and historical dates. The Russian and German descendants of those who fought against each other are doing an important work searching for the killed, looking after the burial places, compensating the damage to the victims of this inhuman massacre, trying to understand critically our common and controversial past. What was the 9th of May for the Germans and the Russians in the perception of Germans and Russians? Was it a victory, a defeat or liberation? This is what the author of the article reflects on, convinced that we are anyway dealing with the greatest event of the 20th century, at least because it prevented the end of civilization.


2021 ◽  
pp. 138
Author(s):  
Konstantin S. Rodionov

This article is a continuation of the one that was published in the journal “State and Law” in 2020 (No. 8). It examines the circumstances of Hitler's decision to attack Poland on September 1, 1939, which began the Second World War. The author decides what influenced his acceptance more - the policy of appeasement, which Britain and France adhered to in relation to Hitler, or the signing by the Soviet Union of an additional secret protocol to the Non-Aggression Pact (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) signed by its parties on August 23, 1939?


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