scholarly journals Breakdowns in the Democratic Process and the Law of Canadian Democracy

2012 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 299-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Pal
Keyword(s):  
The United States ◽  
Structural Theory ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Democratic Process ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Law And Politics ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
Canadian Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law

In this article I seek to develop a theoretical framework through which to view the law of democracy in Canada. Such a framework has been largely absent from the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada. I argue that a defining problem in the law of democracy is the existence of incentives for political actors to manipulate election laws to ensure self-serving ends. I summarize and critically evaluate the main competing theoretical approaches to the law of democracy in the United States, namely structural theory and rights theory. I conclude that structural theory provides a more accurate descriptive understanding of the law of democracy than rights theory and a more convincing normative framework through which to evaluate existing democratic institutions. Applying structural theory to Canadian democracy, I find ample reason to be concerned about self-interested manipulation of the democratic process. I develop a preliminary typology of breakdowns in the democratic process, which I label partisan, incumbent, and interest entrenchment breakdowns, and provide examples from Canadian law and politics. I conclude by suggesting future directions for research, particularly on judicial doctrine and the role of intervening institutions.

scholarly journals A Choice among Values: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives on the Defence of Necessity

1969 ◽  
pp. 848 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin L. Berger
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Historical Perspectives ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
A Value ◽  
Canadian Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Way

The author explores various theoretical approaches to the defence of necessity, rejecting both excusatory conceptions of the defence and those based on the notion of moral involuntariness. Rather, the author argues that necessity is properly understood as a justificatory defence based on a lack of moral blameworthiness. After extensively surveying the history of the defence in Canadian law, the author critiques the way in which the Supreme Court of Canada has restricted the defence. He contrasts the current Canadian approach with the treatment of the defence in other jurisdictions and concludes that Canadian law would be served best by a robust defence of necessity, which would acknowledge that, in some circumstances, pursuit of a value of greater worth than the value of adherence to the law can be justified.

The Emergence and Development of Intellectual Property Law in Canada

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Gervais
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Complex Relationship ◽  
Canadian Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Important Trading Partner ◽  
The Impact

This chapter reviews the emergence of intellectual property (IP) norms in the areas of copyright, trademarks, patents, and designs in Canadian law from the early days of the Dominion’s complex relationship with British IP statutes and policy to a time of progressive independence from those statutes. It then reviews more recent changes, some of which were made to bring Canada’s laws into line with major international registration systems. Canada has also been ready to experiment with variations on IP themes. This is visible both in statutes and in decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada. The impact of the bijural nature of Canada’s legal system and its proximity to the United States are also discussed: Canada has integrated civil law notions into an edifice constructed mostly of common law bricks, and must confront demands from its most important trading partner in adapting its intellectual property framework.

Is Religious Freedom Impossible in Canada?

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 266-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori G. Beaman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Religious Freedom ◽  
Public Discourse ◽  
The United States ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Roman Catholicism ◽  
Canadian Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Nuanced Understanding ◽  
Point Of Departure

The idea of religious freedom is not new in Canadian law or wider public discourse, although it has taken on a life of its own in the post- Charter era (1982 onward) and certainly in the last several years. As the courts wade more fully into the swirling abyss that is religion they find themselves struggling with the issues that preoccupy scholars of religion (and for which they have found no conclusive answer): what is “religion” and how can it be defined in a manner that is inclusive and meaningful? This article takes as its point of departure the provocative and compelling argument made by Winnifred Sullivan in her book, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (2005), that religious freedom as a legal promise is untenable. In this article I argue that while plausible and convincing in the context of the United States, Sullivan’s thesis may be less applicable in Canada for three key reasons. First, the embeddedness of Roman Catholicism in Canadian social structure has resulted in a textured and nuanced understanding of religion, or, at the very least, a recognition that religion is in some measure a multifaceted notion. Secondly, the recognition of group rights, however defined, means that there is a space created for alternative religious discourses, in part because of the constitutional recognition of multiculturalism. Thirdly, the recent turn by the Supreme Court of Canada to an understanding of the subjectivity of religious freedom strengthens the idea that religion must be conceptualized in relation to the ways in which individuals understand and practice it in their day to day lives.

scholarly journals The Law of Forcible Entry

1969 ◽  
pp. 271
Author(s):  
W. F. Foster ◽  
Joseph E. Magnet
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Civil Process ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Criminal Matters

The author considers the two contradictory interests which the law on forcible entry must try to harmonize, namely the inviolability of the citizen's dwelling place as against the effective enforcement of the criminal law and civil process. He discusses the common law attitude towards forcible entry in civil and criminal matters and its view of the need for announcement prior to such entry. He also deals with developments in the United States in this area and considers the present state of the law of forcible entry in Canada in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Eccles v. Bourque [197S\ S.C.R. 739.

Repeat Litigators and Agenda Setting on the Supreme Court of Canada

2002 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 811-833 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roy B. Flemming ◽  
Glen S. Krutz
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Statistical Models ◽  
Comparative Research ◽  
The United States ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
High Courts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Selection Of

The expanding public policy role of high courts heightens concerns over whether societal and political inequalities affect the outcomes of litigation. However, comparative research on this question is limited. This article assesses whether status inequalities between parties and differences in the experience and resources of attorneys influence the selection of cases for judicial review in the Supreme Court of Canada. A series of statistical models reveal that governments are more likely than other parties to influence whether leave is granted but that the experience and resources of lawyers, unlike in the United States, have little impact. The decentralized, low volume and high access features of the Canadian process may explain this finding.

scholarly journals Feu la D.C.D. L'arrêt Miller et la peine de mort

2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 567-576
Author(s):  
Henri Brun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
First Time

The Miller case, decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on October 5, 1976, puts the death penalty under the light of the Canadian Bill of Rights which formulates the right to life and the right to protection against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The following comment on the case relates to the interpretation given specific clauses of the Bill of Rights by the Court on that occasion. But it stresses especially the law that flows from the case about the compelling weight of the Bill of Rights over acts of Parliament enacted after the Bill came into force. In Miller, the Supreme Court expressed itself on the subject for the first time.

scholarly journals Was the Supreme Court right to change the law on the right to a speedy trial?

2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Leonid Sirota
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Reasonable Time ◽  
Canadian Charter ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Speedy Trial

In R v Jordan, the Supreme Court of Canada held, by a 5-4 majority and over the vigorous disagreement of the concurrence, that criminal prosecutions in which a trial does not conclude by a set deadline will be presumed to breach the right to be tried within a reasonable time, protected by section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The acceptable length of proceedings set out in the decision is of 18 months from the day charges are laid for cases that proceed without a preliminary inquiry, and 30 months otherwise. The Crown can still show that exceptional circumstances outside of its control have arisen and can explain — and excuse — a case taking longer than that, but unless it does so, a stay of proceedings will be the automatic consequence of such delay. Meanwhile, an accused will be able to show that delay below these ceilings is unconstitutionally unreasonable, but only by demonstrating not only that the delay is “markedly” greater than reasonable, but also that he or she diligently sought to have the case heard sooner.

Historian and Courts:R. v. Marshall and Mi'kmaqTreaties on Trial

2003 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas C. Harris
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Treaty Rights ◽  
Fishing Rights ◽  
Canadian Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Hunting And Fishing ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Fisheries Act ◽  
Commercial Hunting

In September, 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) released its decision inR v. Marshall. Donald Marshall Jr., no stranger to Canadian law, had been convicted of catching eels out of season, without a licence, and selling them, contrary to the federalFisheries Act. He admitted the offences, but appealed his conviction to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal and then to the SCC on the grounds that the 1760–61 treaties between the Mi'kmaq and the British recognized his right, as a Mi'kmaq, to catch and sell fish, and that this right was protected under the guarantee of Aboriginal and treaty rights in the Canadian constitution. Justice Binnie, writing for the majority of the SCC, overturned the convictions. The Mi'kmaq, he held, did have treaty rights based on the 1760–61 treaties to catch and sell fish, including eels.The Mi'kmaq were delighted. After many years and many appearances before Canadian judges (R. v. Syliboy, R. v. Issac, andR. v. Simon), it appeared that the courts were finally prepared to recognize what the Mi'kmaq had long believed: that the eighteenth century treaties were the foundation of their relationship with Canada, that the treaties were still in force, and that they guaranteed commercial hunting and fishing rights in their traditional territories.

Democracy and the Freedom of Speech: Rethinking the Conflict between Liberty and Equality

2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasmin Dawood
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Other ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Competing Values ◽  
Political Equality ◽  
Normative Claim ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The U.S

This article re-examines the distinction between the libertarian approach and the egalitarian approach to the regulation of campaign finance. The conventional approach (as exemplified by the work of Owen Fiss and Ronald Dworkin) is to reconcile the competing values of liberty and equality. By contrast, this article advances the normative claim that democracies should seek to incorporate both the libertarian and the egalitarian approaches within constitutional law. I argue that instead of emphasizing one value over the other, the ideal position is one that simultaneously recognizes the values of liberty and equality despite the irreconcilable tension between them. Rather than choosing one value over the other, or reconciling these values by redefining them, I claim that it is vital to maintain the tension between liberty and equality by instantiating the conflict in law. Democracy is better served when the law contains an explicit tension between these foundational values.After setting forth this normative framework, I then apply it to the campaign finance decisions of the Supreme Courts of the United States and Canada, respectively. I make two main claims. First, I argue that although the libertarian/egalitarian distinction is usually presented as a binary choice, the laws of a given jurisdiction often simultaneously display both libertarian and egalitarian characteristics. For this reason, I claim that the libertarian/egalitarian distinction is better conceived of as a “libertarian-egalitarian spectrum.” Second, I argue that in recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada, respectively, have privileged one value—liberty or equality—at the expense of the other. The U.S. Supreme Court has over-emphasized the value of liberty (most notably in its Citizens United decision), with the result that political equality is markedly undermined. By the same token, the Supreme Court of Canada’s commitment to equality has become too one-sided in recent cases (Harper and Bryan), with the result that there are significant impairments to free speech liberties. I argue that both of these approaches are detrimental to democratic participation and governance. Finally, this article offers a preliminary proposal for how courts and legislatures can allow for the conflict between liberty and equality to be instantiated in law.

scholarly journals Recent Developments in the Law of Equitable Remedies: What Canada Can Do For You

2002 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff Berryman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Specific Performance ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
The Law

The Supreme Court of Canada has clearly enunciated a distinct equity jurisprudence for Canada. This paper discusses certain aspects of the most recent developments particularly in the area of equitable remedies. The recent "explosion" in the use of Anton Piller decisions is charted, and where appropriate, analogous Commonwealth decisions are discussed. The use of Injunctive remedies is canvassed, as well as specific performance.

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