Dai Zhen’s Choice Between Philosophy and Philology

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying-shih Yü
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Correct Understanding ◽  
Constituent Elements ◽  
Basic Constituent ◽  
Confucian Moral

This study examines philosophy (moral principles) and philology (evidential investigation) as the two basic constituent elements in Dai’s system of Confucian learning. It shows that for Dai his philology and his philosophy were inseparable. His philosophy is seen as an inevitable outgrowth of his philology and his philology was close to the Confucian Dao and thus necessary to a correct understanding of Confucian moral philosophy.

scholarly journals 從儒家倫理學到“儒家生命倫理學”的距離

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-42
Author(s):  
Shuai WANG
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Confucian Ethics ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Standards ◽  
Digital Commons ◽  
Moral Choices ◽  
Confucian Moral

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.生命倫理學由於強調平等和尊重的價值而使個體在道德困境中的抉擇顯得尤為重要，同時道德困境本身也要求個體具有一定的道德抉擇能力。就此而言，構建“儒家生命倫理”可能面臨兩個挑戰：從生命倫理學科性質而言，儒家面臨的是關於西方式“個體”概念缺失的問題；另外從個體抉擇方面而言，儒家似乎又面臨著缺乏道德抉擇能力的困境。前者是生命倫理學科的本質要求，後者則似乎是儒學內部的理論困境。二者似乎表明，儒家與生命倫理學科不能相容。面對當下中國令人憂慮的道德現狀，澄清上述問題就顯得必要。本文將通過分析儒家倫理思想來澄清上述兩個挑戰。由於儒家理解世界的方式不同於西方，我們就不能以西方流行的生命倫理學科標準來衡量儒家倫理學說。文章指出，儒家將一般人與儒者區別開來，也並不以要求君子的道德標準來要求一般人。儒家將承擔道義的責任更多的賦予了代表“天命”的儒者，以道在倫常日用之中的實用理性精神為本質特徵，開創了儒家理解道德和解決道德困境的獨特維度。然而，鑒於當代儒家的遭遇，構建“儒家生命倫理”依舊任重道遠。Contemporary bioethics and moral principles often emphasize values such as human dignity, equality, and individual autonomy, particularly in the case of moral dilemmas. Given that traditional Confucian ethics does not speak of these values, the effort to construct “Confucian bioethics” today may face challenges from two aspects: (1) the notion of individualism, and (2) individual autonomy that makes moral choices possible. The paper contends that there is an ethical incommensurability between traditional Confucian moral philosophy and contemporary bioethics. This leads to the argument that one cannot simply apply the moral principles of bioethics to assess and judge Confucian ethics. It also contends that the Confucian ethical viewpoint represents a kind of elitism that sets up moral standards for a minority, rather than for everyone in society. Therefore, Confucianism by default will not be able to answer many of the questions raised by bioethics, which has been highly influenced by a modern democratic system.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 673 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

scholarly journals To the question of scientific basis for the concept establishment of social rehabilitation of convicts

2020 ◽  
pp. 409-413
Author(s):  
Igor Chalyi
Keyword(s):  
Social Services ◽  
Scientific Basis ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Social Rehabilitation ◽  
The Social ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Correct Understanding ◽  
Constituent Elements ◽  
Goals And Objectives ◽  
Broad Approach

It is generally accepted that the precision of terminology is essential for a correct understanding of the concept meaning beingdefined. Considering the problem of a place for the social rehabilitation of convicted and released and other activities connected with it,firstly, it is necessary to determine what is being understood by this concept and to indicate the goals and objectives for its realization.Only this way it can be ascertained whether it is true and correctly stated (interpretated). It is generally accepted that the precision ofterminology is essential for a correct understanding of the concept meaning. The purpose of this article was to analyse the existing scientificpositions in various branches of knowledge on the constituent elements of social rehabilitation concept of convicted persons,based on the principles of truth and correctness.The problem of state policy realization for the rehabilitation of convicted persons is one of the key issues from the point of viewof preventing the crime recurrence and has, therefore, been studied by various scholars. At the same time, as further explained in thestudy, a detailed analysis of the basic understanding of the legal category “rehabilitation of convicted persons” was not carried out, whatled to a certain degree of scientific interest. That is what this article does.The analysis of the sectoral and penal enforcement legislation does not give an idea of the substantive grounds that the conceptof social rehabilitation must correspond to. Rehabilitation services for convicts are considered in the context of the abstract category ofsocial care. Through the review of the Law of Ukraine “On Social Services” a gradual departure of the legislator from the assignmentof this category is seen. The medical aspect of understanding the category “rehabilitation” brings the author closer to a significantexpansion of understanding of this category.It seems that the broad approach to the understanding of the category should be the basis for further study of the category “rehabilitationof convicts”, except for specifying that it is not unlawful or unjustified action by state institutions, but the restoration of rights,which have been interfered with or restricted in connection with the conviction and serving of the sentence as well as overcoming othernegative consequences of isolation or other measures of penal correction.

EL CONSENTIMIENTO DE LA VÍCTIMA EN EL ACOSO SEXUAL LABORAL

2021 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
Author(s):  
RODRIGO VERA-GARCÍA
Keyword(s):  
Sexual Harassment ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Cultural Elements ◽  
Interpretation Criteria ◽  
Correct Understanding ◽  
Constituent Elements

The coming into force of sexual harassment regulation in our legal system, produced the need to include an analysis of its constituent elements. In this way, until now it was understood -by definition- that sexual harassment is an unwanted conduct by the victim, which violates their fundamental rights. Through this work, however, we try to tackle the task of determining the boundaries of such consent, evidencing the existence -in its origin- of cultural elements that reproduce stereotypes that ultimately darken the correct understanding of this phenomenon. In this way, we seek to establish interpretation criteria which is respectful of gender rights, in order to facilitate its application, in the sense of understanding that regulation enforceability related to the lack of consent, does not constitute a cause for exclusion of sexual harassment, but the object itself which the legal precept protects.

scholarly journals Epistemic and ethical responsibility during the pandemic

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 117-125
Author(s):  
Andrea Klimková
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Ethical Responsibility ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Policy Responses ◽  
Actual Content ◽  
Political Decisions

Abstract Intellectual (specialised) knowledge is omnipresent in human lives and decisions. We are constantly trying to make good and correct decisions. However, responsible decision-making is characterised by rather difficult epistemic conditions. It applies all the more during the pandemic when decisions require not only specialised knowledge in a number of disciplines, scientific consensus, and participants from different fields, but also responsibility and respect for moral principles in order to ensure that the human rights of all groups are observed. Pandemic measures are created by politicians, healthcare policy-makers, and epidemiologists. However, what is the role of ethics as a moral philosophy and experts in ethics? Experts in ethics and philosophy are carefully scrutinising political decisions. Levy and Savulescu (2020) have claimed that Ethicists and philosophers are not epistemically arrogant if they question policy responses. They played an important role in the creation of a reliable consensus. This study analyses epistemic and moral responsibility, their similarities, analogies, and differences. Are they interconnected? What is their relationship and how can they be filled with actual content during the pandemic?

Moral particularism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger Crisp
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Education ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Sensitivity ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Moral Particularism ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Theories

Moral particularism is a broad set of views which play down the role of general moral principles in moral philosophy and practice. Particularists stress the role of examples in moral education and of moral sensitivity or judgment in moral decision-making, as well as criticizing moral theories which advocate or rest upon general principles. It has not yet been demonstrated that particularism constitutes an importantly controversial position in moral philosophy.

Buddhist Moral Thought and Western Moral Philosophy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher W. Gowans
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Pluralism ◽  
Moral Particularism ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Phenomenology

This essay discusses interpretations of Indian Buddhist moral thought in terms of common categories of Western moral philosophy. Problems are raised for interpretations of Buddhism as being committed to a theory of what makes an action morally right (specifically deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics). Following the lead of the poison arrow simile, a nontheoretical understanding of Buddhist moral thought is proposed: it was implicitly supposed that we do not need to act on the basis of universal moral principles but simply need to overcome the roots of unwholesome actions (greed, hatred, and delusion) and act skillfully. This interpretation is compared with other nontheoretical interpretations of Buddhist moral thought by reference to moral particularism, moral phenomenology, moral pluralism, and a nontheoretical conception of virtue ethics. It is also suggested that we should not be perplexed by the absence of explicit moral theory in Buddhism. Featured figures include Aristotle and Śāntideva.

How Principles Ground

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Enoch
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Important Work ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Metaphysical Grounding ◽  
Moral Facts

Specific moral facts (like the fact that you ought to send the paper by that deadline) seem to be grounded in relevant natural facts (that you promised), together with relevant moral principles (that you ought to keep your promises). This picture—according to which moral principles play a role in grounding specific moral facts—is a very natural one, and it may be especially attractive to non-naturalist, robust realists. A recent challenge from Selim Berker threatens this picture, though. Moral principles themselves seem to incorporate grounding claims, and it’s not clear that this can be reconciled with according the principles a grounding role. This chapter responds to Berker’s Challenge, utilizing a (moderate) grounding pluralism. In particular, it argues that distinguishing between normative and metaphysical grounding is the key to saving the natural picture. It also shows how such a distinction is one that you have a reason to endorse independently of this challenge, as it does important work elsewhere in moral philosophy.

Abortion, Feminism, and ‘Traditional’ Moral Philosophy

2019 ◽  
pp. 107-120
Author(s):  
Kate Greasley
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Feminist Ethics ◽  
Ethical Problems ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Ethical Approaches

Feminist ethics approaches to abortion have a tendency to be critical of the methodology employed by mainstream philosophical treatments of the abortion problem. In particular, they impugn the latter’s reliance on abstract theorizing and general principles, advising that only a focus on the particular and concrete details of real-life ethical problems such as abortion can direct us towards the truth of the matter. This chapter attempts to defend so-called ‘traditional’ abortion ethics from such criticisms. More fully, it sets out to explain and vindicate the aim of mainstream abortion ethics to discern and apply more general moral principles to the particular case of abortion, as well as the centrality of foetal moral status to many of those accounts. It also works towards showing that mainstream and feminist ethical approaches are more aligned in both their methods and their claims than might first appear.

A Single True Morality? The Challenge of Relativism

1996 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 73-85
Author(s):  
Harry Bunting
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Widespread Agreement

Ethical objectivists hold that there is one and only one correct system of moral beliefs. From such a standpoint it follows that conflicting basic moral principles cannot both be true and that the only moral principles which are binding on rational human agents are those described by the single true morality. However sincerely they may be held, all other moral principles are incorrect. Objectivism is an influential tradition, covering most of the rationalist and naturalist standpoints which have dominated nineteenth and twentieth century moral philosophy: there is widespread agreement amongst relativists themselves that objectivism is firmly rooted in common sense.

Repression and Moral Reasoning: An Outline of a New Approach in Ethical Understanding

SATS ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannes Nykänen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Problem ◽  
Related Phenomenon ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Moral Understanding ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Essential Aspect

AbstractThe aim of the paper is to show that moral reasoning is not really reasoning in the sense usually assumed in moral philosophy. Instead, moral reasoning is one aspect of repressing conscience. The formal dimensions of moral reasoning function as a repressive depersonalisation of our sense of being an I who stands in a relationship to a you. For instance, “moral principle” invokes a formal and hence impersonal understanding of a moral problem. The thinking person loses her sense of being a particular person related to another particular person and focuses instead on the moral principles with their inherent, systematic implications. However, and as I will show in connection to so-called moral dilemmas, the thinking person does not actually act in the rational manner that is presupposed by reasoning. Instead, moral reasoning will reveal itself as a discourse for repressing conscience. Part of the aim of the paper is to show that, contrary to what is generally assumed, repression is a morally related phenomenon that arises as a result of a person’s difficulties with acknowledging the character of a moral difficulty; an acknowledgement that is an essential aspect of moral understanding.

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