scholarly journals 從儒家倫理學到“儒家生命倫理學”的距離

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-42
Author(s):  
Shuai WANG
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Confucian Ethics ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Standards ◽  
Digital Commons ◽  
Moral Choices ◽  
Confucian Moral

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.生命倫理學由於強調平等和尊重的價值而使個體在道德困境中的抉擇顯得尤為重要，同時道德困境本身也要求個體具有一定的道德抉擇能力。就此而言，構建“儒家生命倫理”可能面臨兩個挑戰：從生命倫理學科性質而言，儒家面臨的是關於西方式“個體”概念缺失的問題；另外從個體抉擇方面而言，儒家似乎又面臨著缺乏道德抉擇能力的困境。前者是生命倫理學科的本質要求，後者則似乎是儒學內部的理論困境。二者似乎表明，儒家與生命倫理學科不能相容。面對當下中國令人憂慮的道德現狀，澄清上述問題就顯得必要。本文將通過分析儒家倫理思想來澄清上述兩個挑戰。由於儒家理解世界的方式不同於西方，我們就不能以西方流行的生命倫理學科標準來衡量儒家倫理學說。文章指出，儒家將一般人與儒者區別開來，也並不以要求君子的道德標準來要求一般人。儒家將承擔道義的責任更多的賦予了代表“天命”的儒者，以道在倫常日用之中的實用理性精神為本質特徵，開創了儒家理解道德和解決道德困境的獨特維度。然而，鑒於當代儒家的遭遇，構建“儒家生命倫理”依舊任重道遠。Contemporary bioethics and moral principles often emphasize values such as human dignity, equality, and individual autonomy, particularly in the case of moral dilemmas. Given that traditional Confucian ethics does not speak of these values, the effort to construct “Confucian bioethics” today may face challenges from two aspects: (1) the notion of individualism, and (2) individual autonomy that makes moral choices possible. The paper contends that there is an ethical incommensurability between traditional Confucian moral philosophy and contemporary bioethics. This leads to the argument that one cannot simply apply the moral principles of bioethics to assess and judge Confucian ethics. It also contends that the Confucian ethical viewpoint represents a kind of elitism that sets up moral standards for a minority, rather than for everyone in society. Therefore, Confucianism by default will not be able to answer many of the questions raised by bioethics, which has been highly influenced by a modern democratic system.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 673 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

scholarly journals 儒家倫理對構建醫師專業精神的若干啟示

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-146
Author(s):  
Enchang LI ◽  
Yumei XU ◽  
Yue TENG
Keyword(s):  
Healthcare Professionals ◽  
Confucian Ethics ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
Medical Professionalism ◽  
Cultural Tradition ◽  
Primary Concern ◽  
View Point ◽  
The West ◽  
Medical Issues ◽  
Digital Commons

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.《新世紀的醫師專業精神—醫師宣言》所規定的醫師專業精神的三條原則中，將患者利益放在首位原則和患者自主原則，由於諸多原因而存在著悖論。中國儒家的仁術、德教為先、修身為本、慎獨、推己及人、高度人倫的思想對解決以上悖論有啟發意義：遵循道德形成和醫學技術提高的規律，通過各種學習、強化方法，使醫者真正確立患者利益第一的專業精神和具有精湛的專業技能。從而使醫者成為患者利益的真正代表，能在各種情況下有效保護患者的利益。As a dominant cultural tradition in China, Confucianism has greatly inf luenced the Chinese medical ethics. From the view point of Confucian ethics, medicine is the“ art of benevolence” (renshu ). For a Confucian, Confucianism and medicine share the same principle. The concept of patients-first is deeply rooted in the Confucian ethical system in which the“ virtue of a doctor” (yide ) is a primary concern in medical professionalism. This paper f irst discusses the major three principles of professionalism presented by“ The Declaration of Medical Professionalism in the New Century,” and attempts to deal with the limitations of the Declaration by introducing Confucianism with respect to healthcare professionals and a doctor-patient relationship.The paper explains that the Confucian principle of care for others determines that Confucians take human relationship very seriously in their dealing with the health issue, since they understand that a person’s health is deeply affected by, and in turnaffects, other people. Therefore, the rule of individual autonomy as well as individual right emphasized in the West should not be taken as the only legitimate one in dealing with medical issues. More importantly, that the Confucian physician considers medical practice as benevolent action and thus it is more than medical professionalism.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 89 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

MORAL CONSTRUCTION AS A TASK: SOURCES AND LIMITS

2007 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 214-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Hill
Keyword(s):  
Human Dignity ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Objectivity ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Standards ◽  
Moral Perspective ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Moral Construction ◽  
Basic Standards ◽  
Law Making

This essay first distinguishes different questions regarding moral objectivity and relativism and then sketches a broadly Kantian position on two of these questions. First, how, if at all, can we derive, justify, or support specific moral principles and judgments from more basic moral standards and values? Second, how, if at all, can the basic standards such as my broadly Kantian perspective, be defended? Regarding the first question, the broadly Kantian position is that from ideas in Kant's later formulations of the Categorical Imperative, especially human dignity and rational autonomous law-making, we can develop an appropriate moral perspective for identifying and supporting more specific principles. Both the deliberative perspective and the derivative principles can be viewed as “constructed,” but in different senses. In response to the second question, the essay examines two of Kant's strategies for defending his basic perspective and the important background of his arguments against previous moral theories.

Repression and Moral Reasoning: An Outline of a New Approach in Ethical Understanding

SATS ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannes Nykänen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Problem ◽  
Related Phenomenon ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Moral Understanding ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Essential Aspect

AbstractThe aim of the paper is to show that moral reasoning is not really reasoning in the sense usually assumed in moral philosophy. Instead, moral reasoning is one aspect of repressing conscience. The formal dimensions of moral reasoning function as a repressive depersonalisation of our sense of being an I who stands in a relationship to a you. For instance, “moral principle” invokes a formal and hence impersonal understanding of a moral problem. The thinking person loses her sense of being a particular person related to another particular person and focuses instead on the moral principles with their inherent, systematic implications. However, and as I will show in connection to so-called moral dilemmas, the thinking person does not actually act in the rational manner that is presupposed by reasoning. Instead, moral reasoning will reveal itself as a discourse for repressing conscience. Part of the aim of the paper is to show that, contrary to what is generally assumed, repression is a morally related phenomenon that arises as a result of a person’s difficulties with acknowledging the character of a moral difficulty; an acknowledgement that is an essential aspect of moral understanding.

Dai Zhen’s Choice Between Philosophy and Philology

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying-shih Yü
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Correct Understanding ◽  
Constituent Elements ◽  
Basic Constituent ◽  
Confucian Moral

This study examines philosophy (moral principles) and philology (evidential investigation) as the two basic constituent elements in Dai’s system of Confucian learning. It shows that for Dai his philology and his philosophy were inseparable. His philosophy is seen as an inevitable outgrowth of his philology and his philology was close to the Confucian Dao and thus necessary to a correct understanding of Confucian moral philosophy.

scholarly journals 知情同意的權利主體: 儒家倫理視角下的考察

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-28
Author(s):  
Tongwei YANG ◽  
Zhangqi FENG
Keyword(s):  
Informed Consent ◽  
Family Relationship ◽  
Family Values ◽  
Reciprocal Relationship ◽  
Confucian Ethics ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
Digital Commons ◽  
The Family ◽  
Physician Relationship ◽  
The Right

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.“ 知情同意”這個在西方文化背景中產生的倫理和法律術語在中國仍然是一個比較新的概念。尤其是對於知情同意的權利主體這一基本問題，在立法實踐和臨床實務中仍存在認識模糊和不一致之處。本文基於儒家家庭倫理的基本精神——尊重個人意願與家庭關懷的統一，提出了關於知情同意權利主體的立法建議。在儒家倫理中，主張“和而不同”、“互以對方為重”，體現了尊重個人意願的思想。在儒家倫理中還主張“父慈子孝”、“兄友弟恭”、“夫婦和順”，體現了家庭關懷。可見，在儒家倫理視野下，知情同意權利並非由家屬包辦，也非僅僅屬於患者而和家庭無關，而是在患者做主前提下的家庭參與，是患者做主與家庭關懷的統一。所以，對於有同意能力的患者而言，其本人所作的同意表示才具有法律效力；只有在某些特殊的情形下患者家屬才可以代為簽署知情同意書或者代行知情同意權利。Informed consent has been a core principle endorsed by modern Western medical ethics. It involves patient-physician relationship as well as family relationship. It has been a focus of debates since it was introduced to the Chinese world whether informed consent is agreeable to the cultural ethos of China, and if not, whether it can be applied transculturally. This paper first discusses three principles in the policy of informed consent: 1. the principle of individual autonomy; 2. the principle of non-maleficence; and 3. the principle of effectiveness. Then the paper explores the issue informed consent within the framework of the Confucian concept of family and family values, indicating that in Confucian ethics, the idea of“ harmony in diversity” acknowledges the importance of individuality whereas the notion of reciprocal relationship emphasizes the interconnectedness of everyone in family and society at large. We should always look for a balanced point between the right of the patient and the duty of the physician, and between the interest of an individual person and the interest of the family as a unit.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 183 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

scholarly journals 儒道與生命倫理

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-98
Author(s):  
Sen PEI
Keyword(s):  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
The West ◽  
Full Account ◽  
Chinese Tradition ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Universal Principles ◽  
Modern Age ◽  
Digital Commons ◽  
Moral Strangers

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.誕生於北美的生命倫理學有著獨特的社會歷史文化背景，它是在科學技術發展的推動下，在西方資本主義發展以來個人主義的倫理傳統的基礎上，伴隨著後現代思潮發展起來的。然而由於文化傳統的不同，在中國生硬地套用西方理論，在實踐中反而會使人更加迷惘。在中國如何解決道德異鄉人共處的問題，如何建構中國本土化的生命倫理學，從與北美生命倫理學的產生背景比較的角度分析，我們得出了回溯傳統文化的結論。儒家思想作為中國傳統文化中最有影響力的一派，其價值取向和思維方式已經滲透到中國人生活的各個方面，因此在與西方生命倫理思想對話，以及建構當代的生命倫理學中儒家思想可以從以下三個方面作出貢獻：第一、倫理原則的普世性論證層面；第二、原則矛盾的解決層面；第三、具體問題層面。In this essay, I begin by addressing H. Tristram Engelhardt’s argument of the breakdown of the traditional consensus on moral and religious good. Engelhardt maintains that in the post-modern age, the possibility of constructing a full account of human good is almost impossible. People from different groups and communities engage with one another as moral strangers who need to negotiate moral arrangements. These negotiations are governed by the principle of autonomy, or the “principle of permission.” I contend that Engelhardt’s argument is also relevant in China, although from a different perspective. The traditional distinctions used to distinguish moral categories in the West very often do not fit into the context of Chinese tradition. I propose that we need to go back to our own cultural heritage, such as Confucianism, to deal with the problem of diversity and moral relativism in China, rather than being confined to a rationalized form of universal principles. Although Confucian moral judgment sometimes tends to be intuitive, it makes more sense when we are confronting specific moral dilemmas. Any moral principle, when compared with other moral principles, needs to be weighed and balanced in determining the optimal course of action.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 125 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

scholarly journals 儒家視角下的死亡的尊嚴

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-53
Author(s):  
Jianhui LI ◽  
Yaming LI
Keyword(s):  
Human Dignity ◽  
Assisted Suicide ◽  
New Technology ◽  
Death And Dying ◽  
Confucian Ethics ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Freedom Of Choice ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Right

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.在當代的醫療實踐中，各種新的醫療技術在臨終階段的應用引發了關於如何維護死亡的尊嚴的激烈爭論。爭論的焦點集中在對什麼是人的尊嚴和什麼是死亡的尊嚴的概念的不同理解上。人的尊嚴概念在當代西方的倫理學中尚沒有得到清晰的闡釋，死亡的尊嚴概念更是存在混亂。儒家倫理學則可以在這種討論中為問題的解決提供新的思路。本文試圖重建儒家的人的尊嚴和死亡的尊嚴的基本含義，並對死亡的尊嚴與人的生物學生命的關係，死亡的尊嚴與人的痛苦的關係，死亡的尊嚴同人的自主性的關係，以及死亡的尊嚴同社會公平正義之間的關係做出分析說明。儒家關於人的尊嚴的觀點有助於化解西方死亡倫理研究中出現的概念混亂和理論矛盾。What does a death have dignity? In modern healthcare, the wide use of new technology has generated confusion around how to define and protect human dignity, especially in the case of death and dying. Those who advocate the legalization of assisted suicide often appeal to the right to “die with dignity” and the right to individual autonomy. The problem is that it is very difficult to justify one particular understanding of human dignity in the contemporary pluralistic world through a rational formulation without defining dignity.In this paper, the authors attempt to respond to the current debate on euthanasia and assisted suicide from a Confucian perspective. The paper first defines the Confucian concept of human dignity and shows how the concept could be used in the case of dignity in death and dying. The authors argue that in Confucianism, there are two kinds of dignity: One is intrinsic dignity, which is endowed by Heaven on everyone, and the other is extrinsic dignity, which arises from the cultivation of virtues. This extrinsic dignity is also called “personal dignity.” Unlike the individual-oriented human dignity model, Confucian ethics argue for a family-oriented model of human dignity. That is to say, the Confucian ideal of human dignity is not satisfied by a concept of human dignity that is centered on individual rights and freedom of choice; instead, it focuses on relations in a concrete community in which a person’s human dignity is actualized through morals and virtues. In the case of euthanasia and assisted suicide, therefore, the decision should not be solely based on freedom of choice, but on what kinds of values and obligations the person has. In addition, the paper shows that the Confucian view of human dignity does not support the idea of prolonging life through technological means without restraints.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 1292 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

Framing Morality: How Antecedent-Focused Strategies Can Shape Moral Judgments

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Kappes ◽  
Jay Joseph Van Bavel
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Emotional Reactions ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Process Dissociation ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
First Response ◽  
High Conflict

From moral philosophy to programming driverless cars, scholars have long been interested in how to shape moral decision-making. We examine how framing can impact moral judgments either by shaping which emotional reactions are evoked in a situation (antecedent-focused) or by changing how people respond to their emotional reactions (response-focused). In three experiments, we manipulated the framing of a moral decision-making task before participants judged a series of moral dilemmas. Participants encouraged to go “with their first” response beforehand favored emotion-driven judgments on high-conflict moral dilemmas. In contrast, participants who were instructed to give a “thoughtful” response beforehand or who did not receive instructions on how to approach the dilemmas favored reason-driven judgments. There was no difference in response-focused control during moral judgements. Process-dissociation confirmed that people instructed to go with their first response had stronger emotion-driven intuitions than other conditions. Our results suggest that task framing can alter moral intuitions.

Folklorisation and the Emergent Moral Degeneration: A Functionalist Approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Siziwe Mandubu
Keyword(s):  
Young People ◽  
South African ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Behavioral Norms ◽  
South African Society ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Societal Norms ◽  
Moral Standards ◽  
The Social ◽  
Functionalist Approach

Living in an egalitarian society has resulted in the corrosion of the moral base among certain sectors in the community. Some people misconstrue egalitarianism as an authorisation to act as they see fit. Young people, in particular, are gradually losing touch with reality in relation to acceptable behavioral norms in the South African society. Based on the functionalist theory of balancing the social equilibrium among people, the article delineates moral standards as the most fundamental and general principles of behaviour and reflects on how the society expects one to act in certain situations. The article, therefore, explores the primary concepts within functionalism and attempts to outline that the society is a system of interconnected parts that work together in harmony to maintain a state of stability and social cohesion. The article will use the folktale “uDyakalashe noMvolofu” (“The Jackal and the Wolf”) to reflect on the expected societal norms. It demonstrates that folktales, which used to transfer values, morals and shape the conduct of people in the olden days are still appropriate in reshaping the outlook and perceptions of today’s generation. As such, the shrewd nature of folklore in the moral regeneration of the current generation of young people is exposed. While there are many folktales in this category, “uDyakalashe noMvolofu” (“The Jackal and the Wolf”) provides the theme relevant for the analysis of the topic to highlight that moral standards generate moral principles and moral judgments.

基於儒家家庭本位思想的知情同意原則的思考

2013 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-44
Author(s):  
Xiangjin KONG ◽  
Mingjie ZHAO
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Filial Piety ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Family Members ◽  
Confucian Ethics ◽  
Medical Decision ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
The Family ◽  
Family Decision ◽  
Opinion Polls

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.在具有家庭主義特徵的中國社會文化語境下，儒家家庭本位思想對病人知情同意權的影響是客觀實在。以自由主義和個人主義為理論基礎的個人自主知情同意原則要想在中國本土的醫療實踐中發揮應有作用，突顯家庭在知情同意過程中的主導地位是重要前提。在中國的醫療實踐中，知情同意的模式必須融入中國儒家家庭本位思想，才能更好地發揮其作用。Opinion polls released recently show that the majority of people in China today think that informed consent in medical practice is necessary, with more than half favoring family decision making over individual, autonomous patient decision making. Based on these opinion polls, this essay argues that the liberalism and liberal individualism that emphasize individual autonomy do not square with the Confucian tradition.The essay submits that the “family decision” model is designed to embody Confucian family ethics and maximize the benefit of family involvement in medical decision making. The family model includes both the patient and his or her close family members in the decision making process. The Confucian ethics of humanness (ren) – the highest moral virtue – and filial piety (xiao) – the foundation of all moral virtue – support family as the most appropriate authority for medical decisions. Further, the essay explores how the family as a unit is better positioned to work with the physician at critical moments to protect the interests of the patient. This means that the family, not the patient, is in authority, and that in some cases, it is acceptable for family members to hide “medical information” from the patient with the cooperation of the physician. The essay concludes that the family is, and should be treated as, a significant moral participant in medical decision making.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 99 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

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