How Principles Ground

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Enoch
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Important Work ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Metaphysical Grounding ◽  
Moral Facts

Specific moral facts (like the fact that you ought to send the paper by that deadline) seem to be grounded in relevant natural facts (that you promised), together with relevant moral principles (that you ought to keep your promises). This picture—according to which moral principles play a role in grounding specific moral facts—is a very natural one, and it may be especially attractive to non-naturalist, robust realists. A recent challenge from Selim Berker threatens this picture, though. Moral principles themselves seem to incorporate grounding claims, and it’s not clear that this can be reconciled with according the principles a grounding role. This chapter responds to Berker’s Challenge, utilizing a (moderate) grounding pluralism. In particular, it argues that distinguishing between normative and metaphysical grounding is the key to saving the natural picture. It also shows how such a distinction is one that you have a reason to endorse independently of this challenge, as it does important work elsewhere in moral philosophy.

The Modal Status of Moral Principles

2021 ◽  
pp. 257-280
Author(s):  
Gideon Rosen
Keyword(s):  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Metaphysical Necessity ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Facts

Conventional wisdom holds that pure moral principles hold of metaphysical necessity, from which it follows that it is metaphysically impossible for the moral facts to vary independently of the descriptive facts. Moral contingentists deny this, holding that the moral laws are in some cases like the laws of nature: metaphysically contingent, but necessary in a weaker sense. The present chapter makes a preliminary case for moral contingentism and defends the view against recent objections due to Lange (2018) and Dreier (2019).

scholarly journals Epistemic and ethical responsibility during the pandemic

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 117-125
Author(s):  
Andrea Klimková
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Ethical Responsibility ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Policy Responses ◽  
Actual Content ◽  
Political Decisions

Abstract Intellectual (specialised) knowledge is omnipresent in human lives and decisions. We are constantly trying to make good and correct decisions. However, responsible decision-making is characterised by rather difficult epistemic conditions. It applies all the more during the pandemic when decisions require not only specialised knowledge in a number of disciplines, scientific consensus, and participants from different fields, but also responsibility and respect for moral principles in order to ensure that the human rights of all groups are observed. Pandemic measures are created by politicians, healthcare policy-makers, and epidemiologists. However, what is the role of ethics as a moral philosophy and experts in ethics? Experts in ethics and philosophy are carefully scrutinising political decisions. Levy and Savulescu (2020) have claimed that Ethicists and philosophers are not epistemically arrogant if they question policy responses. They played an important role in the creation of a reliable consensus. This study analyses epistemic and moral responsibility, their similarities, analogies, and differences. Are they interconnected? What is their relationship and how can they be filled with actual content during the pandemic?

Moral particularism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger Crisp
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Education ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Sensitivity ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Moral Particularism ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Theories

Moral particularism is a broad set of views which play down the role of general moral principles in moral philosophy and practice. Particularists stress the role of examples in moral education and of moral sensitivity or judgment in moral decision-making, as well as criticizing moral theories which advocate or rest upon general principles. It has not yet been demonstrated that particularism constitutes an importantly controversial position in moral philosophy.

Buddhist Moral Thought and Western Moral Philosophy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher W. Gowans
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Pluralism ◽  
Moral Particularism ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Phenomenology

This essay discusses interpretations of Indian Buddhist moral thought in terms of common categories of Western moral philosophy. Problems are raised for interpretations of Buddhism as being committed to a theory of what makes an action morally right (specifically deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics). Following the lead of the poison arrow simile, a nontheoretical understanding of Buddhist moral thought is proposed: it was implicitly supposed that we do not need to act on the basis of universal moral principles but simply need to overcome the roots of unwholesome actions (greed, hatred, and delusion) and act skillfully. This interpretation is compared with other nontheoretical interpretations of Buddhist moral thought by reference to moral particularism, moral phenomenology, moral pluralism, and a nontheoretical conception of virtue ethics. It is also suggested that we should not be perplexed by the absence of explicit moral theory in Buddhism. Featured figures include Aristotle and Śāntideva.

Abortion, Feminism, and ‘Traditional’ Moral Philosophy

2019 ◽  
pp. 107-120
Author(s):  
Kate Greasley
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Feminist Ethics ◽  
Ethical Problems ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Ethical Approaches

Feminist ethics approaches to abortion have a tendency to be critical of the methodology employed by mainstream philosophical treatments of the abortion problem. In particular, they impugn the latter’s reliance on abstract theorizing and general principles, advising that only a focus on the particular and concrete details of real-life ethical problems such as abortion can direct us towards the truth of the matter. This chapter attempts to defend so-called ‘traditional’ abortion ethics from such criticisms. More fully, it sets out to explain and vindicate the aim of mainstream abortion ethics to discern and apply more general moral principles to the particular case of abortion, as well as the centrality of foetal moral status to many of those accounts. It also works towards showing that mainstream and feminist ethical approaches are more aligned in both their methods and their claims than might first appear.

The Ontic Cosmic Coincidence Problem for Non-Naturalism about Morality

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Nadeem J. Z. Hussain
Keyword(s):  
Natural World ◽  
Coincidence Problem ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Cosmic Coincidence Problem ◽  
Moral Facts

The combination of non-naturalism and standard morality generates an ontic cosmic coincidence problem different from the epistemic and semantic coincidence problems already facing non-naturalism. In the normative realm, morality has a very special status. In turn morality gives a central role to persons both as agents and patients. Only some humans are persons; even very intelligent creatures such as chimpanzees and dolphins are not regarded as persons. The existence of humans, however, is highly contingent. The coincidence is that precisely the kind of very distinctive creatures needed for moral principles to apply just happen to exist. It is a coincidence because for non-naturalists moral principles do not explain events in the natural world and natural facts do not explain moral principles: the non-natural moral facts cannot explain why there are humans, and the existence of humans, or facts about their nature, cannot explain why the moral principles focus on persons.

A Single True Morality? The Challenge of Relativism

1996 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 73-85
Author(s):  
Harry Bunting
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Widespread Agreement

Ethical objectivists hold that there is one and only one correct system of moral beliefs. From such a standpoint it follows that conflicting basic moral principles cannot both be true and that the only moral principles which are binding on rational human agents are those described by the single true morality. However sincerely they may be held, all other moral principles are incorrect. Objectivism is an influential tradition, covering most of the rationalist and naturalist standpoints which have dominated nineteenth and twentieth century moral philosophy: there is widespread agreement amongst relativists themselves that objectivism is firmly rooted in common sense.

Repression and Moral Reasoning: An Outline of a New Approach in Ethical Understanding

SATS ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannes Nykänen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Problem ◽  
Related Phenomenon ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Moral Understanding ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Essential Aspect

AbstractThe aim of the paper is to show that moral reasoning is not really reasoning in the sense usually assumed in moral philosophy. Instead, moral reasoning is one aspect of repressing conscience. The formal dimensions of moral reasoning function as a repressive depersonalisation of our sense of being an I who stands in a relationship to a you. For instance, “moral principle” invokes a formal and hence impersonal understanding of a moral problem. The thinking person loses her sense of being a particular person related to another particular person and focuses instead on the moral principles with their inherent, systematic implications. However, and as I will show in connection to so-called moral dilemmas, the thinking person does not actually act in the rational manner that is presupposed by reasoning. Instead, moral reasoning will reveal itself as a discourse for repressing conscience. Part of the aim of the paper is to show that, contrary to what is generally assumed, repression is a morally related phenomenon that arises as a result of a person’s difficulties with acknowledging the character of a moral difficulty; an acknowledgement that is an essential aspect of moral understanding.

scholarly journals The Discussion on the Principle of Universalizability in Moral Philosophy in the 1970s and 1980s: An Analysis

2018 ◽  
pp. 65-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. V. Loginov
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Causal Criterion ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Better Than

In this paper, I analyzed the discussion on the principle of universalizability which took place in moral philosophy in 1970–1980s. In short, I see two main problems that attracted more attention than others. The first problem is an opposition of universalizability and generalization. M.G. Singer argued for generalization argument, and R.M. Hare defended universalizability thesis. Hare tried to refute Singer’s position, using methods of ordinary language philosophy, and claimed that in ethics generalization is useless and misleading. I have examined Singer’s defense and concluded that he was right and Hare was mistaken. Consequently, generalization argument is better in clarification of the relationship between universality and morality than Hare’s doctrine of universalizability, and hence the universality of moral principles is not incompatible with the existence of exclusions. The second problem is the substantiation of the application of categorical imperative in the theory of relevant act descriptions and accurate understanding of the difference between maxims and non-maxims. In Generalization in Ethics, Singer drew attention to this theme and philosophers have proposed some suggestions to solve this problem. I describe ideas of H.J. Paton, H. Potter, O. O’Neill and M. Timmons. Paton coined the teleological-law theory. According to Potter, the best criterion for the relevant act descriptions is causal one. O’N eill suggested the inconsistency-of-intention theory. Timmons defended the causal-law theory. My claim is that the teleological-law theory and the causal-law theory fail to solve the relevant act descriptions problem and the causal criterion and the inconsistency-of-intention theory have their limits. From this, I conclude that these approaches cannot be the basis for clarifying the connection between universality and morality, in contrast to Singer’s approach, which, therefore, is better than others to clarify the nature of universality in morality.

scholarly journals IN WHAT SENSE MUST POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY BE POLITICAL?

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 155-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Miller
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Liberal State ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Narrow View ◽  
The Status ◽  
Political Evaluation ◽  
The Right

Abstract:Political philosophy appears to have recovered from its alleged death in the middle of the last century, but now faces the realist charge that in the work of John Rawls and those influenced by him it fails to be political in the right way; it is merely “applied moral philosophy.” I dismiss the hyper-realist position of authors such as Raymond Geuss for taking an implausibly narrow view of politics. There is more merit in Bernard Williams’s claim that legitimacy, not justice, is the central problem of political philosophy. Yet we cannot understand the significance of legitimation without referring to the moral values that are realized when it succeeds. Thus, Williams fails to show that political normativity can be detached entirely from ethics. Moreover the legitimacy requirements of a liberal state, according to Williams, are substantively close to the requirements of justice according to Rawls. In light of the latter’s turn to “political liberalism,” they appear also to hold convergent views about the status of the theories they are advancing. I conclude by suggesting that the “applied moral philosophy” charge would apply only to philosophers who believe that general moral principles, like utility or rights, can do all the work of political evaluation. Politics does indeed have special features that impose distinctive justificatory requirements on its procedures and the outcomes they produce.

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