Author(s):  
Minha Lee ◽  
Gale Lucas ◽  
Jonathan Gratch

AbstractRecent research shows that how we respond to other social actors depends on what sort of mind we ascribe to them. In a comparative manner, we observed how perceived minds of agents shape people’s behavior in the dictator game, ultimatum game, and negotiation against artificial agents. To do so, we varied agents’ minds on two dimensions of the mind perception theory: agency (cognitive aptitude) and patiency (affective aptitude) via descriptions and dialogs. In our first study, agents with emotional capacity garnered more allocations in the dictator game, but in the ultimatum game, agents’ described agency and affective capacity, both led to greater offers. In the second study on negotiation, agents ascribed with low-agency traits earned more points than those with high-agency traits, though the negotiation tactic was the same for all agents. Although patiency did not impact game points, participants sent more happy and surprise emojis and emotionally valenced messages to agents that demonstrated emotional capacity during negotiations. Further, our exploratory analyses indicate that people related only to agents with perceived affective aptitude across all games. Both perceived agency and affective capacity contributed to moral standing after dictator and ultimatum games. But after negotiations, only agents with perceived affective capacity were granted moral standing. Manipulating mind dimensions of machines has differing effects on how people react to them in dictator and ultimatum games, compared to a more complex economic exchange like negotiation. We discuss these results, which show that agents are perceived not only as social actors, but as intentional actors through negotiations, in contrast with simple economic games.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
S.C. Ng ◽  
M.N. Sulaiman ◽  
M.H. Selamat

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 16-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Réal A. Carbonneau ◽  
Rustam Vahidov ◽  
Gregory E. Kersten

Quantitative analysis of negotiation concession behavior is performed based on empirical data with the purpose of providing simple and intuitive decision support in electronic negotiations. Previous work on non-linear concave preferences and subsequent concession crossover provides a theoretical basis for the model. The authors propose a model which quantifies the remaining concession potential for each issue and a generalization of the model which permits the memory/decay of past concessions. These models permit the analysis of negotiators' concession behavior. Using the proposed models, it was possible to quantitatively determine that negotiators in the authors' negotiation case exhibit concession crossover issues and thus have a tendency to give concessions on issues with the most remaining concession potential. This finding provides empirical evidence of concession crossover in actual concessions and the corresponding model permits the design of a simple and intuitive prediction methodology, which could be used in real world negotiations by decision support systems or automated negotiation agents.


Author(s):  
Leila Alem ◽  
Ryszard Kowalczyk ◽  
Maria R. Lee

Intelligent negotiation agents are software agents, which can negotiate the terms of transactions on behalf of purchasers and vendors on the Internet. Current solutions are mostly limited to single attribute negotiations, and are typically used to determine price. Moreover they typically assume information to be precisely defined and shared between the parties. Bargaining situations are, in most cases, characterized by conflicting interests among the agents that don’t cater for common interests and possibility for collaboration to improve the outcomes of the parties. Another limitation of existing on-line negotiation agents is that their negotiation is usually taking place in a centralized marketplace where the agents meet and negotiate following a set of protocols that don’t cater for more open and direct party-to-party negotiations. This chapter reports on solutions for addressing the issues of negotiations with incomplete and imprecise information, dynamic coalition formation and negotiation ontologies. The negotiation with incomplete and imprecise information uses fuzzy constraint-based reasoning and the principle of utility theory. The formation of coalition is based on negotiation over the distribution of the coalition value and the agent level of resources. The negotiation ontologies make use of shared ontologies as well as individual ontologies to avoid misunderstanding and make data exchange meaningful.


2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo An ◽  
Kwang Mong Sim ◽  
Chun Yan Miao ◽  
Zhi Qi Shen

Author(s):  
Takayuki Ito ◽  
◽  
Toramatsu Shintani

We propose a utility revision mechanism for persuasion among agents in the Group Choice Design Support System (GCDSS). GCDSS is a group decision support system based on multiagent negotiation. In GCDSS, each user manages a system for an Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and an agent. Each user subjectively constructs a decision hierarchy and determines weights of alternatives using AHP Based on the hierarchy and weights, agents negotiate with each other on behalf of users. In negotiation, agents attempt to persuade each other. If an agent is persuaded, the agent attempts to revise its utility for a state of its decision hierarchy by adjusting pairwise comparisons in AHP We propose a utility revision mechanism for persuasion among agents using the user’s subjective decision hierarchy of AHP to make persuasion more flexible. Agents try to make their decision hierarchy reliable to revise its utility.


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