scholarly journals Comparing mind perception in strategic exchanges: human-agent negotiation, dictator and ultimatum games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Minha Lee ◽  
Gale Lucas ◽  
Jonathan Gratch
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Social Actors ◽  
Ultimatum Games ◽  
Mind Perception ◽  
Cognitive Aptitude ◽  
Negotiation Agents ◽  
Emotional Capacity

AbstractRecent research shows that how we respond to other social actors depends on what sort of mind we ascribe to them. In a comparative manner, we observed how perceived minds of agents shape people’s behavior in the dictator game, ultimatum game, and negotiation against artificial agents. To do so, we varied agents’ minds on two dimensions of the mind perception theory: agency (cognitive aptitude) and patiency (affective aptitude) via descriptions and dialogs. In our first study, agents with emotional capacity garnered more allocations in the dictator game, but in the ultimatum game, agents’ described agency and affective capacity, both led to greater offers. In the second study on negotiation, agents ascribed with low-agency traits earned more points than those with high-agency traits, though the negotiation tactic was the same for all agents. Although patiency did not impact game points, participants sent more happy and surprise emojis and emotionally valenced messages to agents that demonstrated emotional capacity during negotiations. Further, our exploratory analyses indicate that people related only to agents with perceived affective aptitude across all games. Both perceived agency and affective capacity contributed to moral standing after dictator and ultimatum games. But after negotiations, only agents with perceived affective capacity were granted moral standing. Manipulating mind dimensions of machines has differing effects on how people react to them in dictator and ultimatum games, compared to a more complex economic exchange like negotiation. We discuss these results, which show that agents are perceived not only as social actors, but as intentional actors through negotiations, in contrast with simple economic games.

scholarly journals The Respective Effects of Being Observed and Sanctioned in Modified Dictator and Ultimatum Games

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Agnès Festré ◽  
Pierre Garrouste
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Ultimatum Games ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibria ◽  
Perfect Equilibria

We experiment within a laboratory the respective effects of being observed and sanctioned in both a dictator and an ultimatum game. We obtain the classical results that individuals do not play the subgame perfect equilibria. We also show that being observed increases the offers made by the proposer in the dictator game but this effect is difficult to identify in the ultimatum game. We also find that in the dictator game, the more the individuals are sensitive to observation the less they are to sanction.

scholarly journals How to Split Gains and Losses? Experimental Evidence of Dictator and Ultimatum Games

Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Neumann ◽  
Sabrina Kierspel ◽  
Ivo Windrich ◽  
Roger Berger ◽  
Bodo Vogt
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Monetary Loss ◽  
Ultimatum Games ◽  
Prior Experiences ◽  
Gains And Losses ◽  
Monetary Gain ◽  
Distribution Problems

Previous research has typically focused on distribution problems that emerge in the domain of gains. Only a few studies have distinguished between games played in the domain of gains from games in the domain of losses, even though, for example, prospect theory predicts differences between behavior in both domains. In this study, we experimentally analyze players’ behavior in dictator and ultimatum games when they need to divide a monetary loss and then compare this to behavior when players have to divide a monetary gain. We find that players treat gains and losses differently in that they are less generous in games over losses and react differently to prior experiences. Players in the dictator game become more selfish after they have had the experience of playing an ultimatum game first.

Vibration, Difference, and Solidarity in the Anthropocene

Resonance ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 218-241
Author(s):  
Andrew J. Chung
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Racial Inequality ◽  
Sound Studies ◽  
Ecological Crisis ◽  
New Materialism ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Departure Point ◽  
Social Actors ◽  
The Earth ◽  
Black Skin

Taking the new materialist and climate change themes of Ashley Fure’s The Force of Things: an Opera for Objects as a departure point, this article examines sound studies’ recent invocations of new materialist philosophy alongside this philosophy's foundational concern toward the Anthropocene ecological crisis. I argue that new materialist sonic thought retraces new materialism’s dubious ethical program by deriving equivalencies of moral standing from logically prior ontological equivalencies of material entities and social actors rooted in their shared capacities to vibrate. Some sonic thought thus amplifies what scholars in Black and Indigenous decolonial critique have exposed as the homogenizing, assimilative character of new materialism’s superficially inclusional and optimistic ontological imaginary, which includes tendencies to obscure the ongoingness of racial inequality and settler-colonial exploitation in favor of theorizing difference as a superfice or illusion. As I argue in a sonic reading of Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks, some of new materialism’s favored analytical and ecological terms such as objecthood, vibrationality, and connection to the Earth are also terms through which anti-Blackness, colonial desire, and the universalization of Whiteness have historically been routed. This historical amnesia in new materialism enables its powerfully obfuscating premises. As a result, I argue that new materialist sound studies and philosophy risk amplifying the Anthropocene’s similarly homogenizing rhetorics, which often propound a mythic planetary oneness while concealing racial and colonial climate inequities. If sound studies and the sonic arts are to have illuminating perspectives on the Anthropocene, they must oppose rather than affirm its homogenizing logics.

scholarly journals Social preferences across different populations: Meta-analyses on the ultimatum game and dictator game

2021 ◽  
Vol 90 ◽  
pp. 101613
Author(s):  
François Cochard ◽  
Julie Le Gallo ◽  
Nikolaos Georgantzis ◽  
Jean-Christian Tisserand
Keyword(s):  
Social Preferences ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Different Populations ◽  
Meta Analyses

scholarly journals The Intuition of Punishment: A Study of Fairness Preferences and Cognitive Ability

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Seier
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Test Results ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Other Regarding

Can differences in cognitive reflection explain other-regarding behavior? To test this, I use the three-item Cognitive Reflection Task to classify individuals as intuitive or reflective and correlate this measure with choices in three games that each subject participates in. The main sample consists of 236 individuals who completed the dictator game, ultimatum game and a third-party punishment task. Subjects afterwards completed the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test. Results showed that intuitive individuals acted more prosocially in all social dilemma tasks. These individuals were more likely to serve as a norm enforcer and third-party punish a selfish act in the dictator game. Reflective individuals were found more likely to act consistently in a self-interested manner across the three games.

scholarly journals On Feelings as a Heuristic for Making Offers in Ultimatum Negotiations

2008 ◽  
Vol 19 (10) ◽  
pp. 1051-1058 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew T. Stephen ◽  
Michel Tuan Pham
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Game Show ◽  
As If

This research examined how reliance on emotional feelings as a heuristic influences how offers are made. Results from three experiments using the ultimatum game show that, compared with proposers who do not rely on their feelings, proposers who rely on their feelings make less generous offers in the standard ultimatum game, more generous offers in a variant of the game allowing responders to make counteroffers, and less generous offers in a dictator game in which no responses are allowed. Reliance on feelings triggers a more literal form of play, whereby proposers focus more on how they feel toward the content of the offers than on how they feel toward the possible outcomes of those offers, as if the offers were the final outcomes. Proposers who rely on their feelings also tend to focus on gist-based construals of the negotiation that capture only the essential aspects of the situation.

Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game

1988 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 195-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard H Thaler
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Ultimatum Games

This paper discusses simple ultimatum games, two-stage bargaining ultimatum games, and multistage ultimatum games. Finally, I discuss ultimatums in the market. Any time a monopolist (or monopsonist) sets a price (or wage), it has the quality of an ultimatum.

Generosity, fairness, trust and time: the performance of therapeutic community residents in economics experiments

2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anup Gampa ◽  
Jessica V. Linley ◽  
Brian Roe ◽  
Keith L. Warren
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Behavior ◽  
Time Preference ◽  
Comparison Group ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Preference Elicitation ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Economic Games

Purpose Therapeutic communities (TCs) assume that residents are capable of working together to overcome substance abuse and criminal behavior. Economic games allow us to study the potential of cooperative behavior in TC residents. The paper aims to discuss this issue. Design/methodology/approach The authors analyze results from a sample of 85 corrections-based TC residents and a comparison group of 45 individuals drawn from the general population who participated in five well-known economic experiments – the dictator game, the ultimatum game, the trust game, risk attitude elicitation and time preference elicitation. Findings TC residents keep less money in the dictator game and return more in the trust game, and prefer short-term rewards in the time preference elicitation. In the ultimatum game, nearly half of all residents refuse offers that are either too low or too high. Research limitations/implications While the study involves a sample from one TC and a comparison group, the results suggest that residents are at least comparable to the general public in generosity and appear willing on average to repay trust. A substantial minority may have difficulty accepting help. Practical implications Rapid peer feedback is of value. Residents will be willing to offer help to peers. The TC environment may explain residents’ tendency to return money in the trust game. Residents who refuse to accept offers that are either too low or too high in the ultimatum game may also have difficulty in accepting help from peers. Social implications Economic games may help to clarify guidelines for TC clinical practice. Originality/value This is the first use of economic games with TC residents.

scholarly journals Suspicious Minds: The Link Between Stress and Perceptions of Agency

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Jeremy Meier
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Psychological Phenomena ◽  
Mind Perception ◽  
Methodological Approaches ◽  
Effects Of Stress ◽  
Human Faces

<p>How do we perceive other minds? Research shows that people intuitively think about other minds in terms of two dimensions: agency (the capacity to think and act) and experience (the capacity to sense and feel). Perceiving a mind in another entity can alter how people interact it because mind perception implies moral status. There is evidence that stress alters the treatment of others, including contributing to dehumanization (the failure to perceive a humanlike mind in another person), but the effect of stress on mind perception is unknown. Based on previous research about the effects of stress on psychological phenomena related to the dimensions of agency and experience, I hypothesized that stress increases perceptions of agency and reduces perceptions of experience. To test these hypotheses, I conducted four studies combining two different measures of mind perception and two different methodological approaches. The results were inconsistent from one study to the next, but a tentative pattern emerged when taking all studies together. Participants who reported high levels of pre-existing stress tended to perceive more agency across a range of different entities, while inducing stress in the laboratory caused participants to attribute agency more readily to inanimate human faces. These results were weak and inconsistent, but they suggest that stress might increase perceptions of agency. The results for experience were inconclusive. I discuss some possible implications of my findings for mind perception and morality.</p>

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