The Abolition of Antidumping Measures in the EU: An Example and Inspiration for the TTIP

Author(s):  
Jonas Kasteng

The European Union (EU) is one of the main users of the antidumping instrument. The EU is also a unique example of a regional trade agreement that has abolished the use of antidumping measures in force between the integrating parties. The chapter analyzes the effects on trade of imposing and abolishing antidumping measures in the EU based on empirical evidence. The imposition of antidumping measures is analyzed from the points of effectiveness, that is, if the protection is effective as regards EU producers, the exporters of allegedly dumped products and third country exporters; and efficiency, that is, the cost of protection for EU user industry and consumers. The abolition of antidumping measures is analyzed from the point of injury to EU producers when it comes to price undercutting and loss of market shares; and possible changes in the use of the antidumping instrument against third countries. The chapter also analyses the antidumping measures between the EU and the United States, as well as the experiences with abolishing antidumping measures in the EU and the European Economic Area (EEA) as an inspiration for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations.

Author(s):  
Amanda M Countryman ◽  
Andrew Muhammad

AbstractImport policies in the European Union have greatly restricted beef imports from all sources. The presence of a binding tariff-rate quota (TRQ) on beef imports in tandem with sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions on biotechnological food products specifically inhibit beef imports from the United States and limit market access in the EU. Potential passage of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership may lead to a loosening of non-tariff measures (NTM) that serve as technical barriers to trade and give rise to the coexistence of hormone and non-hormone beef products in the EU marketplace. This research assesses the potential changes in import demand for beef under a trade agreement that allows for imports of conventional beef as well as an expansion of the existing TRQ in the EU beef import market. Results confirm that EU imports of beef will increase from all sources with an expansion of the TRQ and that elimination of the NTM related to beef production practices leads to an increase in competiveness of U.S. and Australian beef in the EU import market.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilaria Espa ◽  
Kateryna Holzer

Abstract In the context of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the European Union (EU) has taken the lead in promoting the inclusion of a specific chapter on energy trade and investment in order to enhance energy security and promote renewable energy. Irrespective of the success of the TTIP negotiations, the EU proposal can contribute to developing multilateral rules on energy trade and investment. This is especially important given the increased number of energy disputes filed by the EU and the United States against other leading energy market players, including the BRICS. This article provides a normative analysis of the new rules proposed by the EU and reflects on potential responses of BRICS energy regulators. It argues that, while these rules are unlikely to immediately affect BRICS energy practices, they may eventually be ‘imported’ in BRICS domestic jurisdictions in order to promote renewable energy and attract investment in energy infrastructure.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 67-68
Author(s):  
Federico Ortino

Even when it comes to investment, despite appearances to the contrary, it does not seem to me that there is a shift to the non-discrimination principle. First, there is no doubt that absolute standards such as fair and equitable treatment or the provision on expropriation have by far overshadowed the relative standards, in particular national treatment. Second, while the MFN standard has, on the other hand, been a key provision in investment treaty arbitration, particularly as an instrument to expand the scope of the ISDS system (based on more favorable provisions found in third-party treaties), there are clear signs in recent investment treaties of the willingness to curtail the use of the MFN provision as a way to extend the procedural and substantive protections of investors. This seems to be the current position, for example, of both the United States and the European Union (EU). Third, when it comes to the apparent disappearance of the absolute standards of treatment in some of the treaties being negotiated by the European Union (such as with Japan), this is more simply due to a question of the nature of the EU external competence in commercial matters. In its recent opinion on the EU-Singapore FTA, the Court of Justice of the EU has determined that the EU does not have exclusive competence to conclude agreements covering non-FDI and ISDS. The EU has thus responded to such opinion by splitting investment protection (with ISDS) from the rest of the trade agreement, thus keeping investment liberalization (including market access and national treatment) in the latter. In this way, while the trade agreement will fall under the exclusive competence of the EU, the former will still require ratification by each member state. While it is not clear whether the backlash vis-à-vis investment protection and ISDS in some quarters within some of the member states will eventually lead to the end of EU investment treaties, a decision in this sense has not yet been taken by EU institutions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 680-704 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federico Ortino ◽  
Emily Lydgate

Abstract The number of international agreements purporting to liberalise trade, mainly focused on reducing protectionist measures through the imposition of general principles, has increased greatly over the last 25 years. More recently, the United States and the European Union (EU) concluded comprehensive agreements covering trade in goods, trade in services, and foreign investment. This article inquires whether, and the extent to which, such agreements represent a departure from previous practice. It focuses on (a) the instruments employed to address domestic regulation affecting trade in services and (b) three specific agreements concluded between 2016 and 2018: the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. While these recent Preferential Trade Agreements put forward novel approaches to regulatory diversity affecting trade in services, it is too early to ascertain whether these will have any ground-breaking impact in terms of services trade liberalisation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baldur Thorhallsson

The aim of this paper is to determine Iceland’s foreign policy options in relation to shelter theory. Iceland has been seeking political and economic shelter ever since the United States deserted it in 2006, by closing its military base, and in 2008, by refusing to provide it with assistance following its economic collapse. Iceland has made several new security and defence arrangements with its neighbouring states, applied for membership of the European Union and was the first European country to make a free-trade agreement with China. Moreover, the president of Iceland pressed for closer political and economic ties with Russia. Prominent Icelandic politicians frequently claim that Brexit will create a number of opportunities for Iceland and lead to closer cooperation with Britain. However, Iceland has not yet secured shelter of an extent comparable to what it had enjoyed from the United States. In this paper, we will answer questions such as: What does shelter theory tell us about Iceland’s overseas relations with the US, NATO, the EU, Britain, Russia, China, and the Nordic states? Will Iceland receive more reliable shelter provided by multilateral organizations than by a single shelter provider?


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 312-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophie Meunier ◽  
Christilla Roederer-Rynning

Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) and for the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada have provoked massive mobilization throughout Europe, both on the streets and online. Yet France, long at the epicenter of anti-globalization and anti-Americanism, has played a surprisingly modest role in the mobilization campaign against these agreements. This article asks why France did not contribute to anti-TTIP mobilization and, more broadly, how patterns of French mobilization over trade have changed over the past two decades. Using comparative-historical analysis, we explore to what extent this puzzling French reaction can be traced to changing attitudes towards the US, agenda-shaping by the French government, and transformations in the venues and techniques of social mobilization. We thus contribute to the growing literature on the politicization of trade agreements and offer insights into the links between domestic and international politics.


2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-29
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Bledowski

Abstract Expectations run high about the cornucopia of riches which are supposed to fow from the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). TTIP is a proposed free trade agreement between the United States and the European Union. It aims to build upon the already sweeping scope of the North American Free Trade Agreement concluded two decades earlier and the 2013 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which removes 99 % of tariffs between the EU and Canada.1 Te TTIP negotiations were launched in July 2013 with an initial time frame of completion within two years. It is too early to pass judgment about the benefits of the deal simply because its scope is still being framed as of this writing. However, it's possible to shed light on the most likely sticking points during the negotiations, particularly those seen from the U.S. negotiating side. Likewise, it's not too early to draw up interests and concerns of U.S. business. Both are discussed in this paper. The first section takes stock of the likely scope of negotiations. The second section summarizes the view of business gleaned from a survey of corporate executives. The survey was conducted among members of the Manufacturers Alliance for Productivity and Innovation, an education forum for senior managers of large industrial companies.


2017 ◽  
Vol 107 ◽  
pp. 181-193
Author(s):  
Sylwia Majkowska-Szulc

EU–U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD AFTER A COLLISION IN THE “SAFE HARBOUR”. THE SCOPE OF PRIVACY PROTECTION AFTER THE JUDGEMENT IN THE C-362/14 SCHREMS CASETransfer of personal data is an essential element of the transatlantic trade relationship, because the EU and the United States are for each other the most important trading partners. Data transfers increasingly form an integral part of their commercial exchanges. The Court of Justice of the European Union ruling of 6 October 2015 in case C-362/14 Schrems reaffirmed the importance of the fundamental right to the protection of personal data, as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, including the situation when such data are transferred outside the EU. In the wake of the hereinabove judgement the transatlantic data transfer has been regulated anew. European Commission has launched EU-U.S. Privacy Shield in order to ensure stronger protection for transatlantic data flows. This article aims to analyse the importance and results of the above-mentioned judgement.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-87
Author(s):  
Oleh Ożarowski

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is a major trade pact created to further integration of the EU and US economies. In today’s low-tariff reality, the agreement concentrates on eliminating nontariff trade barriers between the states, such as the differing standards in the European union and in the United States for given consumer goods and services. Unfortunately, a number of barriers threaten ratification. The agreement remains far from implementation and it is hard to measure how the two sides would benefit from it equally.


2016 ◽  
Vol 238 ◽  
pp. R31-R42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monique Ebell

One of the key issues facing the UK in the wake of the advisory referendum result to leave the European Union is the precise nature of its relationship with the European Union. At one extreme would be continued membership in the European Economic Area, including membership in the single market. Other options would be either no free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU at all or a less comprehensive FTA which stops short of single market membership. This paper compares the ability of EEA membership and less comprehensive FTAs to generate trade in goods and services. We investigate this question using empirical gravity model methodology and the most recent available data from 42 countries. We use recently developed econometric methods to deal with observations of zero trade flows and issues connected with endogeneity. The main finding is that while EEA membership is associated with substantial and statistically significant increases in bilateral services trade flows, membership in less comprehensive FTAs is not associated with any significant increase in bilateral services trade. For goods, EEA membership is associated with larger bilateral trade flows than are less comprehensive FTAs. These results suggest that it might be difficult to replace, on an exit from a European Union, lost trade flows with the EU by means of shallower FTAs with the EU or with third countries.


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