The Effects of T-TIP Market Access Reform on EU Beef Import Demand

Author(s):  
Amanda M Countryman ◽  
Andrew Muhammad

AbstractImport policies in the European Union have greatly restricted beef imports from all sources. The presence of a binding tariff-rate quota (TRQ) on beef imports in tandem with sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions on biotechnological food products specifically inhibit beef imports from the United States and limit market access in the EU. Potential passage of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership may lead to a loosening of non-tariff measures (NTM) that serve as technical barriers to trade and give rise to the coexistence of hormone and non-hormone beef products in the EU marketplace. This research assesses the potential changes in import demand for beef under a trade agreement that allows for imports of conventional beef as well as an expansion of the existing TRQ in the EU beef import market. Results confirm that EU imports of beef will increase from all sources with an expansion of the TRQ and that elimination of the NTM related to beef production practices leads to an increase in competiveness of U.S. and Australian beef in the EU import market.

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilaria Espa ◽  
Kateryna Holzer

Abstract In the context of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the European Union (EU) has taken the lead in promoting the inclusion of a specific chapter on energy trade and investment in order to enhance energy security and promote renewable energy. Irrespective of the success of the TTIP negotiations, the EU proposal can contribute to developing multilateral rules on energy trade and investment. This is especially important given the increased number of energy disputes filed by the EU and the United States against other leading energy market players, including the BRICS. This article provides a normative analysis of the new rules proposed by the EU and reflects on potential responses of BRICS energy regulators. It argues that, while these rules are unlikely to immediately affect BRICS energy practices, they may eventually be ‘imported’ in BRICS domestic jurisdictions in order to promote renewable energy and attract investment in energy infrastructure.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 67-68
Author(s):  
Federico Ortino

Even when it comes to investment, despite appearances to the contrary, it does not seem to me that there is a shift to the non-discrimination principle. First, there is no doubt that absolute standards such as fair and equitable treatment or the provision on expropriation have by far overshadowed the relative standards, in particular national treatment. Second, while the MFN standard has, on the other hand, been a key provision in investment treaty arbitration, particularly as an instrument to expand the scope of the ISDS system (based on more favorable provisions found in third-party treaties), there are clear signs in recent investment treaties of the willingness to curtail the use of the MFN provision as a way to extend the procedural and substantive protections of investors. This seems to be the current position, for example, of both the United States and the European Union (EU). Third, when it comes to the apparent disappearance of the absolute standards of treatment in some of the treaties being negotiated by the European Union (such as with Japan), this is more simply due to a question of the nature of the EU external competence in commercial matters. In its recent opinion on the EU-Singapore FTA, the Court of Justice of the EU has determined that the EU does not have exclusive competence to conclude agreements covering non-FDI and ISDS. The EU has thus responded to such opinion by splitting investment protection (with ISDS) from the rest of the trade agreement, thus keeping investment liberalization (including market access and national treatment) in the latter. In this way, while the trade agreement will fall under the exclusive competence of the EU, the former will still require ratification by each member state. While it is not clear whether the backlash vis-à-vis investment protection and ISDS in some quarters within some of the member states will eventually lead to the end of EU investment treaties, a decision in this sense has not yet been taken by EU institutions.


Author(s):  
Jean-Christophe Bureau ◽  
Luca Salvatici

Abstract This paper provides a summary measure of the possible new commitments in the area of agricultural market access undertaken by the European Union and the United States, using the Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) as the tariff aggregator. We take the 2001 bound tariffs as the starting point and attempt to assess how much liberalization in agriculture could be achieved in the European Union and the United States as a result of the present negotiations. We compute the index for 20 agricultural commodity aggregates under the actual commitments assuming a specific functional form for import demand. We compare the present levels of the TRI with three hypothetical cases: a repetition of the same set of tariff cuts commitments of the Uruguay Round according to a EU proposal prior to the 2003 WTO ministerial meeting, a uniform 36% reduction of each tariff, an harmonization ( "Swiss" ) formula based on the initial US proposal.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 312-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophie Meunier ◽  
Christilla Roederer-Rynning

Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) and for the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada have provoked massive mobilization throughout Europe, both on the streets and online. Yet France, long at the epicenter of anti-globalization and anti-Americanism, has played a surprisingly modest role in the mobilization campaign against these agreements. This article asks why France did not contribute to anti-TTIP mobilization and, more broadly, how patterns of French mobilization over trade have changed over the past two decades. Using comparative-historical analysis, we explore to what extent this puzzling French reaction can be traced to changing attitudes towards the US, agenda-shaping by the French government, and transformations in the venues and techniques of social mobilization. We thus contribute to the growing literature on the politicization of trade agreements and offer insights into the links between domestic and international politics.


Author(s):  
Jonas Kasteng

The European Union (EU) is one of the main users of the antidumping instrument. The EU is also a unique example of a regional trade agreement that has abolished the use of antidumping measures in force between the integrating parties. The chapter analyzes the effects on trade of imposing and abolishing antidumping measures in the EU based on empirical evidence. The imposition of antidumping measures is analyzed from the points of effectiveness, that is, if the protection is effective as regards EU producers, the exporters of allegedly dumped products and third country exporters; and efficiency, that is, the cost of protection for EU user industry and consumers. The abolition of antidumping measures is analyzed from the point of injury to EU producers when it comes to price undercutting and loss of market shares; and possible changes in the use of the antidumping instrument against third countries. The chapter also analyses the antidumping measures between the EU and the United States, as well as the experiences with abolishing antidumping measures in the EU and the European Economic Area (EEA) as an inspiration for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations.


2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-29
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Bledowski

Abstract Expectations run high about the cornucopia of riches which are supposed to fow from the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). TTIP is a proposed free trade agreement between the United States and the European Union. It aims to build upon the already sweeping scope of the North American Free Trade Agreement concluded two decades earlier and the 2013 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which removes 99 % of tariffs between the EU and Canada.1 Te TTIP negotiations were launched in July 2013 with an initial time frame of completion within two years. It is too early to pass judgment about the benefits of the deal simply because its scope is still being framed as of this writing. However, it's possible to shed light on the most likely sticking points during the negotiations, particularly those seen from the U.S. negotiating side. Likewise, it's not too early to draw up interests and concerns of U.S. business. Both are discussed in this paper. The first section takes stock of the likely scope of negotiations. The second section summarizes the view of business gleaned from a survey of corporate executives. The survey was conducted among members of the Manufacturers Alliance for Productivity and Innovation, an education forum for senior managers of large industrial companies.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-87
Author(s):  
Oleh Ożarowski

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is a major trade pact created to further integration of the EU and US economies. In today’s low-tariff reality, the agreement concentrates on eliminating nontariff trade barriers between the states, such as the differing standards in the European union and in the United States for given consumer goods and services. Unfortunately, a number of barriers threaten ratification. The agreement remains far from implementation and it is hard to measure how the two sides would benefit from it equally.


2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 881-900 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hyeonho Hahm ◽  
Thomas König ◽  
Moritz Osnabrügge ◽  
Elena Frech

AbstractWhat type of trade agreement is the public willing to accept? Instead of focusing on individual concerns about market access and trade barriers, we argue that specific treaty design and, in particular, the characteristics of the dispute settlement mechanism, play a critical role in shaping public support for trade agreements. To examine this theoretical expectation, we conduct a conjoint experiment that varies diverse treaty-design elements and estimate preferences over multiple dimensions of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) based on a nationally representative sample in Germany. We find that compared to other alternatives, private arbitration, known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), generates strong opposition to the trade agreement. As the single most important factor, this effect of dispute settlement characteristic is strikingly large and consistent across individuals’ key attributes, including skill levels, information, and national sentiment, among others.


Equilibrium ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elżbieta Czarny ◽  
Paweł Folfas

We analyse potential consequences of the forthcoming Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union and the United States (TTIP) for trade orientation of both partners. We do it so with along with the short analysis of the characteristics of the third wave of regionalism and the TTIP position in this process as well as the dominant role of the EU and the U.S. in the world economy – especially – in the world trade. Next, we study trade orientation of the hypothetical region created in result of TTIP. We use regional trade introversion index (RTII) to analyze trade between the EU and the U.S. that has taken place until now to get familiar with the potential changes caused by liberalization of trade between both partners. We analyze RTII for mutual trade of the EU and the U.S. Then, we apply disaggregated data to analyze and compare selected partial RTII (e.g. for trade in final and intermediate goods as well as goods produced in the main sectors of economy like agriculture or manufacturing). The analysis of the TTIP region’s orientation of trade based on the historical data from the period 1999-2012 revealed several conclusions. Nowadays, the trade between the EU and the U.S. is constrained by the protection applied by both partners. Trade liberalization constituting one necessary part of TTIP will surely help to intensify this trade. The factor of special concern is trade of agricultural products which is most constrained and will hardly be fully liberalized even within a framework of TTIP. Simultaneously, both parties are even now trading relatively intensively with intermediaries, which are often less protected than the average of the economy for the sake of development of final goods’ production. The manufactured goods are traded relatively often as well, mainly in consequence of their poor protection after many successful liberalization steps in the framework of GATT/WTO. Consequently, we point out that in many respects the TTIP will be important not only for its participants, but for the whole world economy as well. TTIP appears to be an economic and political project with serious consequences for the world economy and politics.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 309-315
Author(s):  
Robert Howse

Late last year, the European Commission unveiled an ambitious and complex proposal to replace investor-state arbitration with a transnational court, including an appellate instance, which has now been incorporated into its new bilateral agreements with Vietnam and Canada (CETA). The Commission was responding to strong public resistance to including investor protections in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the trade and investment agreement being negotiated between the European Union and the United States. This resistance reflects a remarkable shift in emphasis from the World Trade Organization (WTO) to the investment regime in what could be called loosely the antineoliberal globalization movement. The overarching concern is that international decision-makers with a neoliberal or procorporate bias will limit the policy space of sovereign states, especially in sensitive areas such as public services, the environment, health, and safety. While it is arguable that few of the actual outcomes in investor-state disputes can properly be understood in this way, the pursuit by Philip Morris of its attack on tobacco regulation through the investment regime has certainly provided a very obvious example for the activists. (The defeat of that challenge on jurisdictional grounds doesn’t really provide assurance about the substantive norms at issue and their consistency with policy space.)


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