Epilogue

Quarters ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 236-244
Author(s):  
John Gilbert McCurdy

This chapter concludes the book by asking what effects quartering in Revolutionary America has had on US history. Opposition to quartering appeared in the Declaration of Independence and informed the Third Amendment to the US Constitution, but the Americans also ignored restraints on quartering during the Revolutionary War and have never tested the Third Amendment before the US Supreme Court. However, the ideas of place that appeared between 1754 and 1775 because of quartering have continued to inform American ideas about military geography as well as places like the home, city, and nation.

2021 ◽  
pp. 31-68
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Sutton

The conventional account of judicial review starts with a US Supreme Court case, Marbury v. Madison. But judicial review in truth starts with the state courts and the state constitutions, not the US Supreme Court and the US Constitution. Before the US Constitution existed, the state courts established American judicial review and were the first courts to wrestle with the complexities of exercising it. Judicial review also is foremost a structural story, not an individual-rights story. The delegation of power to the judiciary to decide the meaning of our constitutions laid the groundwork for the growth in power of American courts—especially the federal courts, which have become the go-to answer for so many who-decides questions in American government over the last seventy-five years. This chapter begins a search for insights in resolving the dilemma of judicial review by looking at how the state courts innovated the concept and the ways they initially practiced it. It shows that the early state courts were deferential to the democratic branches of government. They rarely invalidated state laws and did so only when these laws violated a clear constitutional rule. That approach offers lessons for federal and state courts alike.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-105
Author(s):  
Anthony Cabot ◽  
Keith Miller

The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), was a 1992 law that, as has been well-documented, effectively restricted sports betting to Nevada. PASPA accomplished this by dictating that states could not "sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact," sports wagering. A separate provision forbade private parties from operating state-authorized sportsbooks. In 2018, the Supreme Court invalidated PASPA as a violation of the 10th Amendment to the US Constitution. The Court held that Congress did not have the constitutional authority to tell a state how to legislate and PASPA's provision that states could not authorize sports betting dictated to state legislatures what they were permitted to do and not do. The Court's ruling unleashed an explosion of pent-up energy for sports betting that had been building since PASPA became effective in 1993. Since that decision, several states have authorized sports betting in one of the most rapid expansions of a form of gambling in US history. Even more states are considering legislation that would permit sports betting, and the number of states legalizing and regulating sports betting will inevitably increase in 2020 and beyond. The controversy over sports betting has pivoted from whether states could legally offer sports betting, to whether they should legalize sports wagering, and if so, how they should go about regulating it.


Liars ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 39-51
Author(s):  
Cass R. Sunstein

In 2012, the US Supreme Court ruled, for the first time in its history, that lies and falsehoods are protected by the US Constitution. In the relevant case, a politician said that he had won the Congressional Medal of Honor, which was a palpable lie. Referring to the risks that would come from an Orwellian Ministry of Truth, the Court ruled that the government could not punish that lie. The Court was quite right to say that some false statements are protected by the Constitution, but its decision was wrong, even preposterous. A lie is worse than an innocent mistake, or even a negligent one, and if a politician says that he obtained a great honor, he imposes real harm on the public. The Court’s decision seems especially ill-considered in light of the nature and power of modern social media. It should not be read to say that falsehoods and lies are generally protected by the Constitution.


2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 300-315
Author(s):  
Frank Cranmer

High-profile cases in the Supreme Court of the United States (‘SCOTUS’) on religion tend to attract a certain amount of academic comment in the United Kingdom but US judgments are cited only infrequently by the superior courts in the UK. In return, SCOTUS rarely cites foreign judgments at all. The reason, it is suggested, is that the effect given by the First Amendment to the US Constitution is to render US case law of less relevance to the UK than, for example, judgments from jurisdictions such as Canada and Australia.


Significance The case, which concerns the power of a state to prohibit the carrying of concealed handguns, involves the Second Amendment to the US Constitution, which protects “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”. The outcome may see the Court restrict state regulatory power in unprecedented ways. Impacts This case could continue a trend begun in 2008 that has broadened the scope and applicability of the Second Amendment protections. The Court could adopt an ends-and-means evaluation that would permit greater variability for state restrictions on guns. Other interest groups will pursue well-chosen cases before the newly conservative court.


Author(s):  
Christoph Bezemek

This chapter assesses public insult, looking at the closely related question of ‘fighting words’ and the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire. While Chaplinsky’s ‘fighting words’ exception has withered in the United States, it had found a home in Europe where insult laws are widely accepted both by the European Court of Human Rights and in domestic jurisdictions. However, the approach of the European Court is structurally different, turning not on a narrowly defined categorical exception but upon case-by-case proportionality analysis of a kind that the US Supreme Court would eschew. Considering the question of insult to public officials, the chapter focuses again on structural differences in doctrine. Expanding the focus to include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR), it shows that each proceeds on a rather different conception of ‘public figure’.


2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
András Koltay

The issue of the use of religious symbols by the State, the Government, the Municipalities and Courts has emerged as a practical constitutional problem during the last quarter of a century. Contradictory examples of us Supreme Court jurisprudence prove that this issue is among the constitutional ‘hard cases’. The relatively recent appearance of the problem clearly indicates the ways in which American social conditions have changed and the transformation of us society’s attitude to religion.


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