Stolen Valor

Liars ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 39-51
Author(s):  
Cass R. Sunstein

In 2012, the US Supreme Court ruled, for the first time in its history, that lies and falsehoods are protected by the US Constitution. In the relevant case, a politician said that he had won the Congressional Medal of Honor, which was a palpable lie. Referring to the risks that would come from an Orwellian Ministry of Truth, the Court ruled that the government could not punish that lie. The Court was quite right to say that some false statements are protected by the Constitution, but its decision was wrong, even preposterous. A lie is worse than an innocent mistake, or even a negligent one, and if a politician says that he obtained a great honor, he imposes real harm on the public. The Court’s decision seems especially ill-considered in light of the nature and power of modern social media. It should not be read to say that falsehoods and lies are generally protected by the Constitution.

2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
András Koltay

The issue of the use of religious symbols by the State, the Government, the Municipalities and Courts has emerged as a practical constitutional problem during the last quarter of a century. Contradictory examples of us Supreme Court jurisprudence prove that this issue is among the constitutional ‘hard cases’. The relatively recent appearance of the problem clearly indicates the ways in which American social conditions have changed and the transformation of us society’s attitude to religion.


2021 ◽  
pp. 31-68
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Sutton

The conventional account of judicial review starts with a US Supreme Court case, Marbury v. Madison. But judicial review in truth starts with the state courts and the state constitutions, not the US Supreme Court and the US Constitution. Before the US Constitution existed, the state courts established American judicial review and were the first courts to wrestle with the complexities of exercising it. Judicial review also is foremost a structural story, not an individual-rights story. The delegation of power to the judiciary to decide the meaning of our constitutions laid the groundwork for the growth in power of American courts—especially the federal courts, which have become the go-to answer for so many who-decides questions in American government over the last seventy-five years. This chapter begins a search for insights in resolving the dilemma of judicial review by looking at how the state courts innovated the concept and the ways they initially practiced it. It shows that the early state courts were deferential to the democratic branches of government. They rarely invalidated state laws and did so only when these laws violated a clear constitutional rule. That approach offers lessons for federal and state courts alike.


1968 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 499-518
Author(s):  
Vivian Vale

‘HISTORIC’, ‘MOMENTOUS’ AND ‘REVOLUTIONARY’ ARE ONLY A FEW OF the epithets freely bestowed upon the case of Baker v. Carr. By that justly celebrated judgment of 26 March 1962 the US Supreme Court implied for the first time that the weight of an American's vote might no longer depend on whereabouts in the country he lived. It did so by ruling that a scheme of apportionment which permitted inequalities of population between electoral districts represented in a state's legislature could be challenged in federal (not merely state) courts, which had competence to protect the right in question. The tide of ensuing litigation attained a new level on I7 February 1964, when the Court in Wesberry v. Sanders held that a like symmetry must prevail among US Congressional districts also. High-water mark was reached on 15 June of that year with Reynolds v. Sims, where the constitution was held to requirethat the seats of both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis. Simply stated, an individual's right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Logan Strother ◽  
Colin Glennon

Public support for the US Supreme Court has been trending downward for more than a decade. High-profile decisions and hotly contested nominations have drawn the Court into our polarized politics. Recently, some justices have spent considerable time and energy giving interviews, speeches, and the like, assuring the public that the Court is an apolitical, neutral arbiter of disputes, distinct from the “political” branches. In this context, we turn to an understudied potential source of judicial legitimacy: the off-bench public rhetoric of Supreme Court justices. In this article, we present evidence from three original survey experiments to argue that Supreme Court justices’ off-bench rhetoric can powerfully influence public perceptions of the Court’s institutional legitimacy. Furthermore, these studies show that performance approval is key to changes in legitimacy: respondents who disapprove of a Court decision were immune to the effects of justices’ rhetoric.


Quarters ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 236-244
Author(s):  
John Gilbert McCurdy

This chapter concludes the book by asking what effects quartering in Revolutionary America has had on US history. Opposition to quartering appeared in the Declaration of Independence and informed the Third Amendment to the US Constitution, but the Americans also ignored restraints on quartering during the Revolutionary War and have never tested the Third Amendment before the US Supreme Court. However, the ideas of place that appeared between 1754 and 1775 because of quartering have continued to inform American ideas about military geography as well as places like the home, city, and nation.


2020 ◽  
Vol V (II) ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Salman Farooq ◽  
Musab Yousufi

The legal maxim “King can do no wrong” was in full force in the English constitutional law ever since the emergence of British Empire. The doctrine provided absolute immunity to the Crown. The king started losing his absolute prerogatives, in centuries long battle for power among the Crown and lord businessmen, which eventually resulted in the concept of liable government in the UK in the shape of the crown proceedings act 1947. On the contrary the US constitutional law is silent about the presidential immunity, following the maxim “no one, even the government is above the law”. However, the US Supreme Court is expanding the application of this doctrine by granting the immunity to the president in cases where his act falls within the constitutionally assigned duties along with negating it in cases where the act of president falls outside the outer perimeters of his constitutionally assigned duties.


Author(s):  
Steven K. Green

The public funding of private religious education has been one of the more contentious issues in the history of American education and in US constitutional law. Unlike the situation in many Western democracies, the United States does not have a tradition of equal funding of public and private schools. This is based in large part on interpretations of the US Constitution and the historical development of public education in the United States. This article discusses the evolution of the “no-funding rule” from the early nineteenth century through the latest interpretations of that rule by the US Supreme Court. It demonstrates that neither the rule nor its application has remained static over time.


2021 ◽  
pp. 15-42
Author(s):  
R. Barry Ruback

Chapter 2 discusses the primary types of economic sanctions by focusing on the three purposes of economic sanctions: (1) punishing the offender (fines), (2) funding the government (fees and forfeitures), and (3) compensating the victim (restitution). Although these three purposes are ostensibly independent, in practice compensating the government or the victim can also mean punishing the offender. Because state and local governments have in recent years focused on using economic sanctions to fund the criminal justice system, there is some detailed discussion about fees and forfeitures. The chapter also examines the constitutional status of economic sanctions as outlined in court decisions, particularly the US Supreme Court. There is a brief overview of the laws in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government regarding the three major types of economic sanctions: fines, fees, and restitution. In general, poorer states (particularly in the South) have more fees for compensating the government.


ICL Journal ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Azriel ◽  
Charles Mayo

Abstract2014 marks the 50th anniversary of the US Supreme Court decisions in Times v Sullivan and 40th anniversary of Gertz v Welch. These two decisions by the US Supreme Court had an important legal impact in the United States on federal law pertaining to libel, specifically proving actual malice and who is defined as a public figure or public official. This article analyzes both Supreme Court decisions within the context of present day online social media libel controversies. It also analyzes three recent federal court rulings where judges had to issue decisions based on Sullivan and Gertz’s actual malice and public figure legal principles. The article concludes that both Sullivan and Gertz are still relevant to how other federal, American courts decide issues related to defamation published in social media.


2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 300-315
Author(s):  
Frank Cranmer

High-profile cases in the Supreme Court of the United States (‘SCOTUS’) on religion tend to attract a certain amount of academic comment in the United Kingdom but US judgments are cited only infrequently by the superior courts in the UK. In return, SCOTUS rarely cites foreign judgments at all. The reason, it is suggested, is that the effect given by the First Amendment to the US Constitution is to render US case law of less relevance to the UK than, for example, judgments from jurisdictions such as Canada and Australia.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document